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Risk	Governance,	Financial	Performance	and	Financial	Stability:	
Comparative	Studies	between	Conventional	and	Islamic	Banks	in	the	
GCC	Countries	By	Hajar	Raouf	
	
Abstract	
 
The banking institutions confront a wide range of complex risks while carrying out their 
traditional and innovative business activities. As financial risk management dwells at the heart 
of their business model, its governance is of crucial importance to achieve their performance 
targets while maintaining the required level of safety and stability within the national and global 
financial systems. The governance structures and mechanisms pertaining to the management of 
all types of risks are therefore of high-level concern for banks and for the regulators, particularly 
after the global financial crisis (GFC). Since the weaknesses in the risk management practices 
were identified as key contributor to the GFC, a substantial number of reports, peer-reviews 
and recommended guidelines published by international bodies such as the OECD, the BCBS 
and the FSB emphasize the important role of risk governance in ensuring financial health and 
stability of the financial sector in the post-crisis era. The academic evaluation of the role of risk 
governance in banks before and after the GFC remains limited despite the established 
theoretical nexus between bank governance and performance on the one hand and between bank 
governance and financial stability on the other hand. Given the above, the main aim of this 
thesis is to contribute to this nascent body of knowledge by examining the soundness of the risk 
governance frameworks and empirically evaluating their associations with various key 
indicators of banks’ performance and financial stability. To widen the scope of the analysis, the 
study is carried out on a sample of conventional and Islamic banks with the objective of 
comparing the results from the two distinct banks’ types. The interest to examine the particular 
case of Islamic banks stems from the results of some research that show their better performance 
and resilience during the GFC.  
The thesis is structured as three essays to evaluate the soundness of the risk governance 
frameworks, a novel ‘Risk Governance Index’ (RGI) has been developed that accounts for the 
most important determinants identified in academic and regulatory literature. The RGI is used 
in dynamic panel regressions to study the causality effects of risk governance with three key 
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proxies of financial performance (namely ROAA, ROAE and Cost-to-Income) and bank’s 
stability indicators (namely the z-score, the capital adequacy ratio, the ratio of loan loss reserves 
to gross loans and the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding). Dynamic models 
using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments are estimated to assess the impact of RGI 
and various bank-specific and macroeconomic variables on the dependent variables. The main 
findings from the three empirical essays show that the different nature of the two banks’ type 
induces different impacts of RGI on performance and stability. Specifically, conventional banks 
show better risk governance structures relative to Islamic banks which also enable them to 
achieve higher operational performance and to improve their stability. Islamic banks, however, 
need to improve their risk management governance practices as in addition to having weaker 
structures that impact financial stability adversely, there are limitations to appropriately benefit 
from the good risks to increase their profitability. 																	
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1.1 Introduction and Overview and Research Background 
The centrality of risk management in financial institutions broadly and banks particularly has 
been recognized in research by academics, policy and regulatory bodies as well as industry 
experts. There has been renewed interest on risk management framework in financial 
institutions after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008. Although banking corporations 
are in the business of complex financial risk management, it has been recognised that one of 
the utmost shocks from the last decade’s financial markets fiasco dwelled in risk management 
failures which reflected significantly in the corporate governance practices (FSB, 2013a; 
OECD, 2009). Examples of such failures include implementation of risk management by 
products or divisions rather than on a firm-wide basis, the location of risk managers in the 
organizational skeleton of the bank did not permit the immediate transmission of red flags 
indicating that they were regarded more as deterrent agents rather than efficient security 
watchdogs. The need for larger proportions of independent directors within the board and its 
main committees was worsened by the lack of knowledge of financial risks among the board 
members, an excessive focus on meeting capital regulatory thresholds and attempting to 
outperform the expected rates of return on equity to maximize shareholders’ value (FSB, 2013a; 
OECD, 2009).  
Risk management is undoubtedly a pillar of the short and long term financial performance for 
companies operating in all industries as it enables gains from the good risks and reduce losses 
from the bad risks. Nonetheless, financial intermediaries play an important role in the economic 
and financial system as they collect deposits and provide credit to the real economy by 
funnelling savers’ funds to companies and households that need to borrow (Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993). In other words, they perform maturity and liquidity transformation whereby 
they use short-term liquid funds to issue long-term illiquid loans. While they seek profitability 
and maximization of value through this business model, their individual financial stability is 
crucial to the soundness of the entire financial and economic system. A key feature of the 
banking system is its inter-linkages with the other financial sectors and the economy that can 
create systemic risks. As experienced in the recent global financial crisis, the insolvency of 
Bear Stearns in March 2008 followed by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 was detrimental to the world-wide financial stability which ensued large social costs at 
global scale. Becht et al. (2011) report that in the case of Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
United-Kingdom, the total effective state aid that was granted to banks by July 2009 exceeded 
20% of GDP. The result was a decrease of GDP per capita by 3 percent on average in the Euro 
zone countries with Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy and Spain being the hardest hit countries 
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(Otker-Robe and Podpiera, 2013). The authors also report that the income per capita reduced 
in 95 countries around the world in 2009 at the peak of the financial crisis. An alarming figure 
in their paper shows that globally 47 to 84 million people are estimated to have fallen in extreme 
poverty in 2009 because of the global financial crisis (Otker-Robe and Podpiera, 2013, p. 15). 
Therefore, the crisis transmission channels from the financial system to the social sphere are 
not only real and large but astoundingly swift.  
These socio-economic costs of the GFC motivated the policy-makers and regulators to improve 
and strengthen the operational norms and review the prudential regulations to prevent similar 
consequences in the future. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued new 
Basel III standards to improve the resilience of banks. While Pillar 1 of Basel III increases the 
capital buffers and holdings of banks, Pillar 2 enhances the supervisory overview role to ensure 
that banks hold adequate capital to mitigate different types of risks and Pillar 3 promotes market 
discipline through regulatory disclosure requirements. Other than raising the exigencies in 
terms of the quality and quantity of capital that improve risk coverage of the capital framework 
(to better capture on- and off-balance sheet risks and derivatives related exposures) new 
liquidity standards were also issued (BCBS, 2010a, 2013). The BCBS introduced a leverage 
ratio1 that serves as a backstop to the risk-based capital framework (BCBS, 2014), additional 
capital conservation and countercyclical buffers as well as a global standard to manage liquidity 
risk (BCBS, 2013). Acknowledging the findings of the OECD (2009), the Basel Committee 
also recognised the crucial importance of corporate governance in managing banking 
corporations and safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders beyond the shareholders 
particularly in retail banks (BCBS, 2015a). Accordingly, it issued a first set of guidelines of 
Corporate Governance for banks in 2010 drawing mainly from the published principles of the 
OECD (BCBS, 2010b). Recognizing the weaknesses in the risk management function in 
financial institutions during the GFC, the (FSB, 2013a) conducted a thematic peer-review on 
risk governance to assess the progress achieved in implementing the recommendations on 
enhanced supervision as set out in FSB (2012). The main findings of the peer-review show that 
national authorities took several initiatives to improve the regulatory and supervisory oversight 
of risk governance in financial institutions such as raising the supervisory expectations from 
the risk management function especially with respect to the chief risk officer (CRO) stature and 
qualifications, requiring the establishment of a risk committee, engaging more frequently with 
                                                             
1 This leverage ratio divides Tier 1 -as the capital measure- by the sum of the following exposure measures: on-
balance sheet exposures, derivatives exposure, securities financing transaction exposure and off-balance sheet 
items. For detailed regulatory information, please refer to (BCBS, 2014).   
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the board and management as well as evaluating the accuracy and usefulness of the information 
provided to the board to enable the effective discharge of their responsibilities (FSB, 2013a, p. 
14). Nonetheless, the peer-review also spots areas where more supervision is required to 
improve risk governance practices. These pertain to the clear definition of the independence 
status of the directors, the establishment of a stand-alone risk committee that is composed of 
independent directors, the kind of risk information that the firm should provide in addition to 
the frequency of risk reporting (FSB, 2013a, p. 15). The (FSB, 2013a) notes the responsibility 
of the firm above all to identify and manage the risks it faces then of the supervisors to assess 
whether its risk governance frameworks and processes are adequate, appropriate and effective. 
BCBS issued an updated version of the Corporate Governance guidelines in 2015 which also 
takes into account results from the peer-review survey on risk governance carried out by the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2013a).  
These efforts from the OECD, the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board portray 
the importance that regulators allot to the best practices in risk management governance that 
are expected to rectify mistakes from the pre-crisis period and enhance the soundness of the 
risk management processes, systems and strategic decisions.  
Considering the positive correlation between risk and expected returns, a question that arises is 
whether improvement of risk governance regime promotes safer risk management decisions in 
banks or is likely to compromise the institution’s financial performance? In addition, is the 
inclusion of governance mechanisms that are less likely to put maximization of shareholders’ 
interests above other considerations going to achieve better or worse operational performance 
such as returns on assets and returns on equity? Besides profitability measures, one additional 
question that needs attention is whether these recommended risk governance practices are 
effectively associated with enhanced financial stability at the individual bank level contributing 
thereafter to lower systemic risk likelihood?  
As Islamic banks proved better resilience to shocks during the GFC due to their lower leverage 
and higher solvency (Hasan and Dridi, 2010), this research explores answers to the questions 
raised above and carries out a comparative study of conventional and Islamic banks to assess if 
the distinct business model of Islamic banks, which relies on compliance to ethics and Shari’ah 
such as interest-free transactions, sale and equity modes of financing, speculation-free 
investments and imposes tighter risk governance practices, can explain to a certain extent their 
resilience to the external negative shocks as experienced in 2008.  
It can be inferred from the above discussion that banking institutions have private incentive 
structures that are more performance or efficiency oriented while the regulatory authorities are 
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more concerned about their externalities that can affect the public at large. From the regulators’ 
perspective, the effects of these externalities cannot be ignored hence sound risk governance 
behaviour must be imposed on banks. Financial authorities have therefore incentive structures 
that are more socially oriented with a stressed focus on the costs arising from instability.  
Despite the crucial importance of risk management in achieving profitability and maintaining 
solvency in banking institutions, academic research on risk governance remains remarkably 
scant whether in conventional or in Islamic finance literature. As will be discussed in chapters 
two, three and four in ampler details, very few academic papers critically evaluate the progress 
achieved so far by commercial banks or financial intermediaries at large in upgrading their risk 
management practices to safeguard the depositors’ funds and improve market discipline to 
which many financial institutions sadly did not fairly submit in the past. While the specificities 
and implications of corporate governance mechanisms in banks have been explored from 
various angles such as in the works of (Adams and Mehran, 2008; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Andrieş and Nistor, 2016; Anginer et al., 2016; Caprio et al., 2007; Ellis et al., 2014; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Pathan and Faff, 2013) among many others or in the works of 
(Abdallah et al., 2015; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Elasrag, 2014; Mollah 
and Zaman, 2015; Safieddine, 2008) in the case of Islamic banks, the focus of research dwells 
mainly on (i) the attributes of the board of directors such as their size, the proportion of 
independent or non-executive directors or the meetings’ frequency or (ii) the centrality that is 
the remuneration and/or the power of the CEO when chairing the board as well. The inclusion 
of determinants pertaining to the risk management function such as the role of the chief risk 
officer and the internal audit or the attributes of the risk and audit committees started to appear 
in the literature a few years after the global crisis as in the works of Aebi et al. (2012); Battaglia 
and Gallo (2015); Ellul and Yerramilli (2013); Hines and Peter (2015).  
Given the limited literature for a function that can be detrimental to the soundness of the 
business activities of banks, this research aims to fill this gap and to build-up on the previous 
corpus by discussing in-depth the pivotal importance of risk governance and explore its linear 
associations with profitability and stability. Specifically, the thesis empirically investigates the 
contribution of sound risk governance frameworks to the banks’ operational performance and 
financial stability. To consider the changes in regulatory requirements in terms of the 
governance of risks after the GFC, the study also accounts for the impact of risk governance 
regimes in the pre- and post-crisis periods.  
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1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
As introduced in the previous section, the broad aim of this thesis is to evaluate the strength of 
the risk governance frameworks in conventional and Islamic banks and examine their 
associations with financial performance and financial stability. Specifically, it entails three 
research objectives which constitute the rationale for each of its three empirical essays. In the 
first essay, the research objective is to explore the concept of risk governance in the academic 
and regulatory literature and assess its strength in a sample of conventional and Islamic banks 
in the GCC region. To assess the status of risk governance, a novel metric is developed and 
used for comparisons between the two bank types and before and after the global financial 
crisis.  
The second essay aims to examine the impact of strong risk governance and financial 
performance. The metric introduced in the first essay is used in a dynamic econometric model 
to explore the associations and causality effects with three commonly-used financial 
performance indicators, namely the return on average assets (ROAA), the return on average 
equity (ROAE) and the cost-to income ratio (C2I).  
The third empirical essay explores the relationship between risk governance and financial 
stability. The inclusion of four indicators of the bank’s health enables a comprehensive analysis 
on the various possible associations between sound risk governance frameworks and bank’s 
likelihood of insolvency (z-score), its capital adequacy (capital adequacy ratio), its assets 
quality (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans) and its liquidity profile (ratio of liquid assets 
to deposits and short-term funding).  
It should be noted that in the second and third essays the econometric analysis starts by 
presenting the results for the overall sample regardless of the banks’ type or time-period. 
Thereafter, the second section of the econometric analysis focuses on the case of Islamic banks 
relative to their conventional counterparts in the pre-crisis period. In the third section of the 
analysis, the emphasis is on the contribution of risk governance to financial performance and 
to financial stability in the whole sample in the post-crisis period. Lastly, the interest in the 
fourth section of the econometric analysis is centred on the impact of the risk governance 
regimes in the specific case of Islamic banks in the post-crisis period.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The three empirical essays that constitute this thesis attempt to answer various research 
questions to achieve the research objectives set out in the previous section. The objective in the 
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first essay is to evaluate the strength of the risk governance frameworks then proceed to several 
comparisons including between the two bank groups and between the two periods of time of 
before and after the GFC. Therefore, the first empirical paper explores the following three 
research questions:  
Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference in the risk governance disclosure 
between conventional and Islamic banks?  
Research Question 2: Is there a significant difference in the risk governance disclosure for 
both types of banks before and after the global financial crisis?  
Research Question 3: Is there a significant difference in the risk governance disclosure 
between conventional and Islamic banks within each GCC country?  
Once this first set of research questions is answered, the second empirical paper proceeds to the 
exploration of the causality effects between risk governance and performance using more 
sophisticated quantitative research methods. Hence, in chapter three the following research 
questions will be explored:  
Research Question 4: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of banks?  
Research Question 5: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of Islamic banks?  
Research Question 6: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of both types of banks in the post global financial 
crisis period? 
Research Question 7: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of Islamic banks in the post global financial crisis 
period?  
Following the second set of research questions, the third empirical essay proceeds to the 
investigation of the potential effects of robust risk governance frameworks on indicators of 
financial stability. Therefore, chapter four provides answers to the following four research 
questions:  
Research Question 8: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of banks?  
Research Question 9: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of Islamic banks?  
Research Question 10: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of both types of banks in the post global financial crisis?  
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Research Question 11: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of Islamic banks in the post global financial crisis?  
The eleven research questions introduced above will set out the statement of the research 
hypotheses to be tested later in each related empirical chapter.  
1.4 Organisation of the empirical chapters by objectives and research 
questions 
This thesis does not follow a monograph structure with separate literature review and 
methodology chapters. In contrast, it adopts an essay-based structure where each empirical 
chapter entails its related literature, methodology and findings discussion. As stated above, the 
broad aim of this thesis is to evaluate the strength of the risk governance frameworks in 
conventional and Islamic banks and examine their associations with financial performance and 
financial stability. To reach this broad aim, the empirical chapters are organised as follows.  
1.4.1 Essay One 
In the first empirical chapter, the objective is to investigate the concept of risk governance in 
the academic and regulatory literature then proceed to the evaluation of its frameworks in each 
bank included in the sample. To achieve this objective, the following research questions are 
answers: 
Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference in the risk governance disclosure 
between conventional and Islamic banks?  
Research Question 2: Is there a significant difference in the risk governance disclosure for 
both types of banks before and after the global financial crisis?  
Research Question 3: Is there a significant difference in the risk governance disclosure 
between conventional and Islamic banks within each GCC country?  
1.4.2 Essay Two 
In the second empirical chapter, the objective is to examine the effect of risk governance 
disclosure on three proxies of the banks’ financial performance. The analysis starts by an 
exploration on the overall sample regardless of the banks’ types and periods of time then 
proceeds to the specific case of Islamic banks overall and after the GFC. In that sense, the 
following research questions are answered:  
Research Question 4: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of banks?  
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Research Question 5: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of Islamic banks?  
Research Question 6: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of both types of banks in the post global financial 
crisis period? 
Research Question 7: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and the financial performance of Islamic banks in the post global financial crisis 
period?  
1.4.3 Essay Three 
In the third empirical chapter, the objective is to examine the effect of risk governance 
disclosure on the banks’ financial stability. Similar to the previous chapter, the analysis starts 
by an exploration on the overall sample regardless of the banks’ types and periods of time then 
proceeds to the specific case of Islamic banks overall and after the GFC. To reach this essay’s 
main objective, the following research questions are answered:  
Research Question 8: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of banks?  
Research Question 9: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of Islamic banks?  
Research Question 10: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of both types of banks in the post global financial crisis?  
Research Question 11: Is there a significant relationship between the extent of risk governance 
disclosure and financial stability of Islamic banks in the post global financial crisis?  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This research is essay-based, hence each empirical paper (chapters two, three and four) entails 
its related methodology section that describes the processes of data collection, statistical tests 
and econometric estimations and data analysis. Nonetheless, the objective in this section is to 
provide a brief overview on the methodology followed to construct the ‘Risk Governance 
Index’ (RGI) and discuss the theoretical motivations for the choice of the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) that was used to estimate the panel data in chapters three and four.  
24 
 
1.4.1 Risk Governance Index: Rationale and Structure 
The very few empirical studies that look at corporate governance (including risk governance) 
estimate each attribute by a separate variable that is later used in a static or dynamic regression2. 
For instance, the number of directors (sometimes transformed to natural logarithm) is used as a 
separate variable to capture the board size (Aebi et al., 2012; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Andrieş and Nistor, 2016; Anginer et al., 2016; Pathan, 2009; Pathan and Faff, 2013). The 
percentage of independent, outside or non-executive directors out of the total number of 
directors will also be included as a distinct independent variable to convey the level of the board 
independence (Aebi et al., 2012; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Andrieş and Nistor, 2016; 
Anginer et al., 2016). To measure the existence or absence of a committee at board level or the 
fulfilment of a threshold of required number of meetings for instance, a natural option is to use 
binary variables with values of 1 or 0. While these methods of quantifying corporate governance 
features have been extensively used in empirical literature, there are two issues that cast doubt 
about the general inferences that might be drawn post-estimation. One is theoretical and the 
second is technical. On the theoretical side, the link has long been established between bank 
governance and risk-taking behaviour3 by using concepts from agency problems, property 
rights and separation of ownership and control that naturally affect bank profitability and its 
business soundness in fine (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Nonetheless, 
when it comes to exploring the implications of theory in practice, researchers are compelled to 
a series of constraining interrogations when quantifying bank governance characteristics which 
are then used in cause-effect or predictive models. If we consider the case of financial 
performance as one example, conceptually the measures of profitability are mainly affected by 
a combination of bank level variables such as the size, operating costs, income diversification, 
quality of assets, and the market share among other drivers. The governance structure and 
composition also contribute to achieving profitability as the risk appetite is defined at the 
strategic firm level. Nonetheless, if the regression equation that examines profitability (as the 
dependent variable) includes more corporate governance variables than the main drivers of 
return, this is likely to affect the regression weights of the predictor variables hence signify that 
the governance variables are the main predictors of bank’s performance. A relevant question 
                                                             
2 Econometric methods used in previous literature vary between (i) the fixed and random effects followed by 
additional two or three stage least squares to correct for endogeneity (such as in (Adams and Mehran, 2012; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015) or (ii) the generalized method of moments (such as in Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Pathan and Faff, 2013) 
3 More discussion on the established theoretical nexus will follow in the introduction and literature review 
sections of chapters three and four.  
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arises therefore for how many of these bank governance characteristics are directly associated 
with the selected performance indicators and cannot be ignored when constructing the 
econometric model? In fact, what is the theoretical relevance in attributing a linear association 
and causal effect of say, the meeting frequency of the board or of the audit committee with 
returns on assets or the Tobin’s Q? Or how sound is it to infer the impact of the number of board 
members on higher or lower ratios of capital adequacy or the loan loss reserves to gross loans 
for instance? And what about the effect of the direct or indirect reporting line of the CRO to the 
banks’ CEO on for example the returns on equity? These conceptual questions ensue the second 
technical concern mentioned earlier as a researcher would then wonder about which and how 
many of these governance traits should be inputted in an econometric model? While the 
research interest might dwell in capturing the maximum possible effect of governance features 
on a specific performance proxy, one technical issue could be to fall in the over-specification 
trap if too many variables are included in the model or on the contrary to face the omitted 
variable bias if too few variables are accounted for. As is commonly known, these two issues 
in financial econometrics theory4 engender inflated standard errors in the former case and biased 
and inconsistent estimators in the latter and cannot be used to ascribe the influence of a predictor 
on a response variable (Antonakis et al., 2010; Wooldridge, 2009). The root cause of inflated 
standard errors can sometimes reside in a problem as common as multicollinearity which is 
very probable when including measures of certain governance attributes that are likely to be 
highly correlated with each other. An example is using the number of independent directors in 
the board together with the level of independence of the audit or risk committee. Furthermore, 
including too many variables on the right-hand side of the regression equations is likely to 
influence the explanatory power of the constructed model (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
The academic papers to which this thesis adds up do not converge together in terms of the 
number of governance measures that were implemented as predictors as there is no theory on 
the subject that can guide the empirical researchers on the variable selection process when 
constructing the adequate econometric models to explore their associations with performance 
or stability indicators. For instance, Andres and Vallelado (2008) use only three determinants 
(namely the board size, the proportion of outsiders among the board members and the number 
of meetings held per year) to study the role of the board of directors in the banks’ corporate 
                                                             
4 For a theoretical in-depth discussion on the danger of making causal claims in the presence of econometric 
issues such as: the omitted variable, omitted selection, simultaneity, measurement error and common method 
variance, please refer to the comprehensive and instructive work of (Antonakis et al., 2010) 
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governance structure. In Aebi et al. (2012) fourteen governance variables relating to corporate 
and risk management governance are examined. In Adams and Mehran (2012) twenty-four 
characteristics relating to the board (and its changes) composition, size and other governance 
features are explored. In their seminal paper, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) use seven risk 
management governance characteristics and eight proxies for board, ownership and CEO 
power’s attributes. Battaglia and Gallo (2015) account for only three corporate and two risk 
governance features in the model. 
In contrast with these studies, this thesis opts for a different method to look at the role of risk 
governance as part of the overall corporate governance structure in banks. To overcome the 
misspecification constraints discussed above and in order to draw sound inferences whilst 
observing the theoretical and conceptual groundwork for the most important drivers of banks’ 
financial performance and financial stability, a composite risk governance indicator has been 
constructed to operate as one explanatory variable along with other bank level control variables 
and macroeconomic factors that are likely to influence the selected set of performance and 
financial stability indicators. The composite indicator named as ‘Risk Governance Index’ (RGI) 
entails a total of nineteen items. These relate to three important characteristics of the board that 
are derived from the corporate governance literature and sixteen key attributes of strategic risk 
management mechanisms. The characteristics in the RGI include the roles of the risk and audit 
committees, the role of the CRO and of the internal audit function. This approach reduces the 
risk of under -or over-specifying the dynamic linear model and at the same time reflects 
comprehensively the soundness level of the risk governance structures through the scores that 
are achieved by each bank in the sample during the chosen time interval. Also, one additional 
advantage of constructing the RGI dwells in the possibility to use it by national and international 
regulators to assess the level of conformity and progress accomplished by banks on the crucial 
regulatory requirement of maintaining healthy governance practices.  
To construct the index, the method of Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) is followed only in the way 
they construct their Ethical Identity Index from broad dimensions to specific items but no in the 
way they calculate its scores. In short, firstly a checklist of items is developed based on an in-
depth coverage of the academic and financial regulatory literature. This extensive reading phase 
enabled the identification of the most important roles and functions that lead, oversee, 
implement and control the risk management mechanisms in banks. After identifying the key 
features in the first step, it became necessary to distinguish between two categories of 
characteristics in structuring the RGI. This was done mainly to differentiate between the two 
strategic levels that are responsible for oversight of risk management functions, namely the 
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board of directors and the senior management. Thereafter, each category has been broken down 
into dimensions under which the most relevant attributes of the board members, the audit and 
risk committees, the CRO and the internal audit were inputted. Similar to Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2007), the items were allocated a score of one every time the condition for sound practice is 
fulfilled and zero otherwise. The final score of the RGI for each bank-year observation was 
derived as the sum of the total scores recorded for each of the nineteen items.  
1.4.2 Data Collection, Data Structure and Estimation Method 
As the composite measure is self-developed, the primary data of the elements of RGI had to be 
collected manually from the annual reports, the financial statements and the corporate 
governance reports whenever available. For the three empirical essays, I used a sample of 26 
commercial Islamic banks and 27 commercial conventional banks from five GCC countries5 
for the years 2006 to 2012 giving a total of 371 firm-year observations. Note that the time period 
includes both before and after the GFC. To collect the maximum number of data, the annual 
reports and every available financial document including the notes sections in both English and 
Arabic were thoroughly read to fairly allocate the scores and to reduce chances of omitting a 
key statement or disclosure. As some banks were established after 2006 and as not all annual 
reports were available in the banks’ websites6, the panel data structure is unbalanced.   
The dependent and bank level explanatory variables were extracted from the BankScope Bureau 
Van Dijk database and the macroeconomic indicators were downloaded from the World Bank 
database. The dependent variables that are used to measure financial performance in chapter 
three are: return on average assets (ROAA), return on average equity (ROAE) and the cost-to-
income (C2I) ratio. By using these three distinct financial ratios, the exploration approaches the 
impact of risk governance analysis on three different aspects of a bank’s performance that 
matter to the external investors (ROAA), the bank’s managers (ROAA and C2I) and the 
shareholders (ROAE). Furthermore, by carrying out the impact analysis on three outcome 
variables, the results ensure multiple robustness that provide reliable and thorough inferences. 
The dependent variables that are used to measure the financial stability in the third essay are 
the z-score, the capital adequacy ratio, the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans and the ratio 
of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding. By using these four variables, various 
                                                             
5 Further details on the motivations behind the choice of the GCC region will follow in section 6 that tackles the 
“Scope of the Study”.  
6 I attempted several times to directly contact banks via email to enquire their missing annual reports. I received 
an automatic acknowledgment of receipt from Commercial Bank of Qatar (CBQ) and a personalized response 
from the Acting Head of Investor Relations at Qatar National Bank (QNB) however without the enquired 
reports. The other banks never replied.  
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aspects of financial stability at individual bank level are explored. Specifically, the z-score 
proxies the risk of banks insolvency by looking at the volatility of returns on assets with respect 
to the ratio of equity-to-assets. The capital adequacy ratio is the well-known and the most 
important regulatory requirement when measuring the banks’ capital quality and soundness. 
The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans reflects the preponderance of the bad loans and 
the probabilities of customers default in the banks’ assets portfolio. Lastly, the ratio of liquid 
assets to deposits and short-term funding, which is also called the deposit run-off ratio, is a 
salient measure of how much cash-convertible assets are available to the bank in case depositors 
unexpectedly need to withdraw their funds.  
The determinants for each of these dependent variables used in the regressions are a 
combination of several bank-level, including the newly developed risk governance index as a 
focus explanatory variable, and other key macroeconomic factors that will be introduced and 
explained in the methodology section of each related essay.    
As the data structure is both time series and cross-sectional, the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables must be estimated through a panel data model. The pooled 
OLS estimator however cannot be used as it does not consider the unobservable and constant 
heterogeneity of the banks in the cross-country sample. Also, the pooled OLS estimator does 
not account for the endogeneity of some of the independent variables. The panel data analysis 
through static or dynamic panel models is therefore the most efficient tool to conduct the 
econometric investigation. In this research, the generalized method of moments (GMM) is 
chosen for several theoretical reasons that makes it the most efficient estimator.  
First of all, following Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002), GMM is appropriate for 
panels with a large number of cross-section units and smaller time periods. Effectively, the 
sample size of this empirical research consists of data from fifty-three firms that are observed 
for seven years. Second, considering the nature of the relationships that this research aims to 
explore, the achievements in terms of performance and stability are very likely to follow the 
same trend from their previous year’s performances. While the direction of influence cannot be 
assumed a priori, especially that the period of study covers about two years before the GFC and 
five years after it, there are autoregressive dynamics from the values of year t-1 of the dependent 
variables that cannot be ignored although their coefficients are not of direct interest in the 
interpretation of the results and for the implications of the study.  
The choice of GMM is further confirmed by the existence of explanatory variables that are not 
strictly exogenous (Bond, 2002). For the case of this research and by using the GMM method, 
it is possible to build instruments for the variables that are potentially endogenous. A dynamic 
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panel model at first-order is therefore the most appropriate to construct despite its substantial 
complications7 in contrast with the fixed and random effects models (Greene, 2011, p. 307). It 
is also worth-noting that the reliability of the GMM estimates in essays two and three are 
verified using the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation in the error components 
as well as the Hansen test for the validity of instruments.  
1.6 Significance of the Research 
As discussed in the introduction section above, this thesis seeks to fill a gap in the academic 
literature that explores risk governance practices in banks and their associations with levels of 
profitability and financial stability. As far as this research is concerned, there are not yet any 
empirical papers that comprehensively include more than ten determinants related to the risk 
management function and investigate their linkage with various indicators of financial 
performance and / or financial stability. Specifically, the first empirical papers that tackled the 
concept of risk management governance in financial institutions and to which this thesis 
extensively refers are Aebi et al. (2012) Battaglia and Gallo (2015), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) 
and Hines and Peter (2015). In these papers, the number of attributes of risk governance vary 
between two in Battaglia and Gallo (2015) and six in (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). In Aebi et 
al. (2012), the authors use five risk governance variables while in Hines and Peter (2015), the 
only risk governance variable is the outcome binary variable that refers to the voluntary risk 
committee formation. Details of the variables used in each paper will be discussed in the 
subsequent empirical chapters accordingly.  
In fact, three out of the four papers that tackled the concept of risk governance (Aebi et al., 
2012; Battaglia and Gallo, 2015; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) explore its nexus with several 
measures of operational and market-based indicators of bank performance and none has 
considered the potential ties with bank stability. The fourth paper by Hines and Peter (2015) is 
somewhat different as it looks at the determinants and consequences of voluntary risk 
management committee formation. Therefore, the outcome variable that the authors estimate in 
a probit regression model stands for the presence/absence of a risk management committee 
which is function of several firm characteristics and risk measures. Furthermore, these four 
pieces of research are on commercial banks and saving institutions in North America (Aebi et 
al., 2012), bank holding companies in the U.S (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013), listed commercial 
banks, cooperative banks, bank holdings and holding companies in China and India (Battaglia 
                                                             
7 A detailed and powerful theoretical mathematical proof is provided in Chapter 13 on GMM Estimation of 
Dynamic Panel Data Models in (Greene, 2011, pp. 307–334).  
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and Gallo, 2015) and on financial institutions in the U.S (Hines and Peter, 2015). Hence, this 
thesis extends the line of research on the importance of risk governance mechanisms in 
promoting banks’ profitability and adds to it by exploring its role in safeguarding banks stability 
yet in a different geographical region that is the Gulf Cooperation Countries. It should be noted 
that none of the cited papers include Islamic banks in their selected samples. Hence research 
carried out in this thesis8 is non-existent in the Islamic finance literature. Furthermore, while 
Islamic banks are present in more than sixty countries, they have become systemically 
important in fourteen jurisdictions (IMF, 2017) among which the GCC region accounts for the 
fastest growing Islamic financial sector (The Banker, 2016). Therefore, an exploration of the 
concept and implications in their case as well is fundamental.  
Additionally, there are two more contributions of this thesis. First, it comes up with a new 
indicator to evaluate the strength of the risk management governance architectures by capturing 
together nineteen determinants of healthy risk governance practices as informed by academic 
and regulatory literature. This method differs from the one used in the above-mentioned papers 
where separate governance variables are used as explanatory variables in the econometric 
equations. Second, while corporate governance data are sufficiently available in corporations 
headquartered in the U.S and Europe9, it is widely acknowledged that this is not the case in the 
GCC, MENA or Southeast-Asia regions. Therefore, several studies on corporate governance in 
countries of these regions are compelled to manually collect data from annual reports and 
financial statements or corporate governance reports if available (such as Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014). More details about this limitation of data 
unavailability will be discussed in the conclusion chapter (Chapter five). Hence, an important 
contribution of this thesis dwells also in the manual construction of a tailored database of 
nineteen governance determinants among which sixteen are specific to risk governance and 
three relate to attributes of the board of directors. As indicated, the constructed database covers 
data from 27 conventional commercial banks and 26 commercial Islamic banks from the GCC 
countries and required more than eight months to painstakingly read and thoroughly validate 
information available in more than three hundred annual reports, financial statements (as well 
as their “Notes” sections) and corporate governance separate reports whenever available.  
                                                             
8 Meaning risk management governance specifically and not corporate governance at large which counts several 
published papers such as (Abdallah et al., 2015; Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Elasrag, 2014; Mollah et al., 2016; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015) among many others.  
9 Corporate governance data for these countries are available in the following databases: CompuStat and Risk 
Metrics are widely used for U.S companies in addition to BoardEx, Thomson Reuters Datastream, Bloomberg 
for America, Europe and a few countries in other regions, yet availability and length of the historical is a 
significant issue for the GCC companies and banks as is commonly known in the academia.  
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Finally, the essays’ findings from the applied quantitative research methods are of key 
importance to international financial regulators, national authorities such as central banks and 
capital markets authorities and financial institutions likewise. In fact, the results from the three 
essays show that (1) the risk governance structures significantly improved after the global 
financial crisis, but Islamic banks are required to increase efforts in adopting better risk 
management practices as results from their conventional counterparts are significantly better. 
In terms of financial performance, it is found that (2) the more robust the risk governance 
composition, the higher the profitability in conventional banks but the lower in Islamic banks. 
In fact, the differences in the two banks’ type induce different impacts of sound risk governance 
on the three key performance indicators. In terms of financial stability, it is found that (3) strong 
and healthy risk governance frameworks plays a significant role in improving various indicators 
of bank-level stability including insolvency likelihood and capital adequacy among others and 
this is specifically true in the case of conventional banks but not in Islamic banks where key 
stability measures are not directly associated with stringent risk management mechanisms.  
1.7 Scope of the Study 
Considering the greater share and expansion of Islamic banks in the global financial industry, 
especially in some specific geographic regions such as the GCC and Southeast Asia, as well as 
their distinctive operating model where Shari’ah principles underpin their risk-taking 
behaviour, one of the objectives of this research as well as its main contributions to the body of 
knowledge dwells in including them in its sample and accounting for their distinctiveness in 
the econometric estimations. The empirical research is carried out for the GCC region where a 
sufficient number of Islamic banks compete with a higher number of conventional banks.  
While it would have been enriching to include Islamic banks from different jurisdictions where 
the Shari’ah governance models differ between a decentralised model in the GCC and a 
centralised model in countries like Malaysia (Hamza, 2013), the hand collection of data under 
strict deadlines is one first and important limitation to this possibility and therefore 
homogeneity of the Shari’ah governance model in this cross-country study is preferred.  
Out of the six Gulf Council Cooperation countries, only Oman is excluded from the sample 
because it launched its first Islamic banks in 2013. The remaining five countries included are: 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. It should be noted that all 
and only full-fledged Islamic banks in these countries, that is 26 Islamic banks, have been 
included in the sample. Considering the fastidious hand-collection process of corporate and risk 
management governance data, 27 conventional banks have been added to their Islamic 
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counterparts making together a sample of 53 banks. The data and information for these banks 
were collected for the period 2006 to 2012 to enable the comparison of results between the 
overall, pre- and post-crisis periods as will follow in larger details. The rationale behind the 
choice of the period of study is mainly motivated by the constraint dwelling from the year of 
establishment of the Islamic banks in the GCC region. The unavailability of annual reports 
dated before 2006 for many banks, especially the Islamic ones, raised the necessity to 
investigate their year of establishment.  
As can be found in Table 1.1, there are 11 Islamic banks out of the 26 full-fledged10 ones 
operating in the selected countries that were established after 2006 while 8 were incorporated 
before the year 2000 and only 7 were established between years of 2000 and 2005. Therefore, 
an ensuing effect is to set the threshold for the starting date of the study based on the most 
common year of establishment of the banks in the sample. Furthermore, when considering the 
most common year of establishment of banks, the severity of missing data is reduced as a larger 
number of annual reports and financial statements -which are the primary source of data for the 
present study- becomes available. In the conventional banking side, there is only one 
conventional bank in the United Arab Emirates that was incorporated in November 2007. The 
remaining 26 conventional banks counted 19 that were market players since the 1970s or earlier, 
four were established in the 1980s, two were established in the year 2004 and only one in the 
year 2000. Consequently, the starting date of the study is set for 2006 and considering the 
objectives of the study which target effects of risk governance post-GFC, the time interval is 
extended to year 2012 in a way that accounts for a sufficient number of years after the onset of 
the crisis.  
In addition to the arguments above, the choice of the time interval is further supported by the 
main empirical literature on which the present study builds. Without similar constraints, Aebi 
et al. (2012) who also look at the risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms 
in North American banks, restrict the pre-crisis period to the year 2006. Their study aims at 
examining these mechanisms during the financial crisis, a period they delimit as of July 2007 
to December 2008. Also, in the seminal study of Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) which was the first 
to develop an index for the organizational structures of the risk management functions, the 
authors use data between years 1994 and 2010 and specify the years 2009 and 2010 as the 
period following the crisis. In Battaglia and Gallo (2015), the time interval is set between 2007 
                                                             
10 It is worth reiterating that all and only full-fledged Islamic banks are included in this study. In fact, the sample 
selection started by first identifying all of these first before adding to them with their local conventional 
counterparts.    
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and 2011 to look at risk governance in Chinese and Indian banks over the financial crisis. While 
their interest does not dwell in the pre-crisis period, the authors imply that the selected years 
demarcates the financial crisis period.  
Hence, as the interest of this thesis resides in an exploration of risk governance over the entire 
time interval then in the changes occurring to their statuses after the onset of the crisis in 
addition to the sampling constraints discussed earlier, this study delimits the starting period to 
year 2006 and extends it to 2012 building up on the literature introduced above. It is important 
to note also that the substantial effort involved in the manual data collection through the 
meticulous reading of the annual reports and financial statements presents a consequential 
constraint, hence a fair and manageable number of years had to be designated in a way which 
permits the fulfilment of the thesis’ objectives and therefore the selection of a time interval that 
encompasses data from the pre-crisis period and data following the onset of the financial 
turmoil. This constraint and therefore limitation is acknowledged in section 5.4 of Chapter Five.  
 
Table 1.1: Years of Establishment of Conventional and Islamic Banks in the Sample 
GCC Country Bank’s Name 
Bank’s 
Code 
Bank’s type 
Date of 
Establishment 
Saudi Arabia 
(8 Banks) 
National 
Commercial Bank 
NCB Conventional 1953 
Bank Saudi Fransi BSF Conventional 1977 
Saudi British Bank SABB Conventional 1978 
Arab National Bank ANB Conventional 1979 
Al Rajhi RJH Islamic 1957 
Al INMA INM Islamic 2008 
Bank Al Jazira BAJ Islamic 2007 
Bank Al Bilad BAB Islamic 2004 
Kuwait 
(10 Banks) 
National Bank of 
Kuwait 
NBK Conventional 1952 
Burgan Bank BURG Conventional 1977 
Gulf Bank GlfB Conventional 1960 
Commercial Bank 
of Kuwait 
CBK Conventional 1960 
Al Ahli Bank of 
Kuwait 
ABK Conventional 1967 
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Kuwait Finance 
House 
KFH Islamic 1977 
WARBA Bank WARBA Islamic 2010 
Kuwait 
International Bank 
KIB Islamic 1973-Islamic since 
2007 
Boubyan Bank BOUB Islamic 2004 
Al Ahli United 
Bank 
AUBK Islamic 1941-Islamic since 
2010 
Bahrain 
(12 Banks) 
Al Ahli Bank 
Bahrain 
AUB Conventional 2000 
Arab Banking 
Corporation 
ABC Conventional 1979 
Bank of Bahrain 
and Kuwait 
BBK Conventional 1971 
Bank Muscat 
International 
BMI Conventional 2004 
Future Bank FBB Conventional 2004 
Gulf International 
Bank 
GIB Conventional 1977 
Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank – Bahrain 
BRK Islamic 1984 
Al Salam Bank 
Bahrain 
SLM Islamic 2006 
Bahrain Islamic 
Bank 
BISB Islamic 1979 
ITHMAAR Bank ITH Islamic 2003 
Khaleeji 
Commercial Bank 
KHL Islamic 2003 
Kuwait Finance 
House - Bahrain 
KWFH Islamic 2002 
Qatar 
(8 Banks) 
Al Ahli Bank – 
Qatar 
AhliQ Conventional 1984 
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Qatar National 
Bank 
QNB Conventional 1964 
Commercial Bank 
of Qatar 
CBQ Conventional 1975 
Doha Bank Doha Conventional 1979 
Barwa Bank Barwa Islamic 2009 
Masraf Al Rayan Rayan Islamic 2006 
Qatar International 
Islamic Bank 
QIIB Islamic 1991 
Qatar Islamic Bank QIB Islamic 1993 
UAE 
(15 Banks) 
Emirates NBD EM-NBD Conventional November 2007 
National Bank of 
Abu Dhabi 
NBAD Conventional 1968 
Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank 
ADCB Conventional 1985 
First Gulf Bank FGlf Conventional 1984 
Mashreq Bank Mash Conventional 1967 
National Bank of 
Dubai 
NBD Conventional 1969 
National Bank of 
Ras Al Khaimah 
NBRK Conventional 1976 
Union National 
Bank 
UNB Conventional 1982 
Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank 
ADIB Islamic 1997 
Ajman Bank AJMAN  Islamic 2007 
Al Hilal Bank AlHilal Islamic June 2008 
Dubai Islamic Bank DIB Islamic 1975 
Emirates Islamic 
Bank (formerly 
Middle East Bank) 
EIB Islamic 2004 (that it 
became full-
fledged IB, 
established in 1975 
as CB) 
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Noor Islamic Bank NIB Islamic March 2007 
Sharjah Islamic 
Bank 
SIB Islamic June 2002 (that it 
became full-
fledged IB, 
established in 1975 
as CB) 
 
For a thorough comparison between the two types of banking groups, the checklist constructed 
to evaluate the robustness of the risk governance compositions is applied to each group equally. 
An important assumption suggests that because Islamic banking activities orientate from the 
Islamic moral economy principles (Asutay, 2010, 2012) and because of their obligation to 
comply with Shari’ah “in all aspects of their products, instruments, operations, practices and 
management which will be achieved by the establishment of a proper Shari’ah governance 
framework” (Elasrag, 2014, p. 68), they are more likely to preserve the interests of the 
stakeholders rather than focus on enhancing the shareholders’ benefits through profit 
maximization regardless of engaging in excessive risks. In fact, Chapra and Ahmed (2002) note 
that corporate governance is of even greater importance in the Islamic financial institutions 
because of the additional risks that depositors, hence the investment account holders (IAH), are 
exposed to as a result of risk-sharing. Consequently, these ethics11 are expected to be reflected 
in many aspects of their strategic risk management mechanisms particularly in the quality of 
their risk oversight.  
Following the assessment of the status of risk governance strength through the risk governance 
index ‘RGI’, the investigation of the associations and causality effects between risk governance 
and indicators of operational performance and financial stability is performed in four different 
analysis stages as briefly set out earlier. The starting point of interest is to look at the linkage in 
the overall sample regardless of the banks’ type to explore the effectiveness of risk governance 
on a maximum number of data points. The specific case of risk governance in Islamic banks in 
the pre-crisis period then follows. The third stage of the analysis focuses on risk governance 
results during the post-crisis period yet again on the overall sample first then in the specific 
case of Islamic banks. This methodological strategy enables to capture whether the banks’ 
                                                             
11 Chapra and Ahmed (2002, pp. 35–42) provide an in-depth exploration of corporate governance distinctive 
features in Islamic finance and discuss its peculiarities in avoiding conflicts of interests and in the principal / 
agent problem. The authors also discuss the issue in an illustrative example of the Mudaraba contract and 
explain how market discipline is imposed thereafter.    
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business model and / or the effect of the crisis effectively drive the causality results of RGI on 
the seven dependent variables (three performance variables in chapter three and four stability 
variables in chapter four). The four-stage analysis also operates as a strong robustness test to 
validate the statistical inferences.  
Although this study is the first of its kind to consider the impact of risk governance on 
operations of Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC, there are still many ways it can be 
improved surely. While the possible development of this research will be discussed in the last 
chapter (chapter five), it can be noted here that one important way in which the study could 
have improved is by increasing the sample size. As explained earlier, the main hindrance to 
choosing a larger sample is the need to collect data manually. Nonetheless, under less 
constraints of time and budget, a collaborative work between more researchers can permit the 
collection of more data from more banks in the GCC countries and in other regions where 
Islamic banks operate and possess substantial market shares such as in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan and further countries in the Asian and MENA regions. With a larger 
and longer dataset, the statistical estimations are likely to bring about more appealing research 
findings and enlarge the scope for policy implications.  
 
1.8 Outline and Structure of Research  
This thesis is essay-based hence it follows a structure where the core of the research is structured 
in three journal-style essays. The thesis consists of five chapters in total with this introductory 
chapter followed by three distinct empirical papers. In the next chapter, the regulatory and 
academic literature on the subject of risk governance is studied then adequately utilized to 
develop the novel metric ‘RGI’ which is used to assess the risk management structures in banks. 
As part of a comprehensive analysis, results from this index are split into two time periods, one 
before and the other after the GFC to statistically test for the existence of any differences in 
means in the two sub-samples. Results from the same metric are also analysed for the two 
banking groups to distinguish between the scores performed by Islamic and non-Islamic banks. 
Therefore, the empirical work in chapter two mainly comprehends descriptive and inferential 
statistics on RGI. In contrast, chapter three uses more complex quantitative techniques to 
explore the associations and causality effects between the risk governance indicator and a set 
of financial performance measures. Details on the econometric method were provided in section 
1.4.2 of this chapter. Following the same structure of chapter three, in chapter four the objective 
will be to study the nexus between risk governance and financial stability. In contrast with 
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several previous empirical studies on financial stability, the chapter examines various aspects 
of banks’ financial stability and goes beyond the commonly-used variable of z-score which 
proxies the distance from insolvency. In particular, it adds capital adequacy, the quality of the 
loan portfolio and the level of liquid assets to withstand a bank run shock. By accounting for 
these four measures together, the aim is to provide an analysis on the stability of a financial 
system that is as comprehensive as possible. Chapter five concludes the thesis by bringing 
together the results discussions from the three empirical essays. It synthesizes their main 
inferences and draws policy implications from their empirical findings. The last chapter also 
discusses the limitations to the thesis and identifies future areas for research development. 												
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2.1 Introduction 
A review of the evolution of the financial theory shows that the researchers debate on the 
“Irrelevance Theorem of Modigliani and Miller’s Capital Structure Theorem (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958) reveals many issues arising from the financial markets characteristics that do 
matter in funding decisions such as taxation, transaction costs and costs of default. Also, as 
markets became more complex, so has become the interplay between shareholders, creditors 
and firms’ managers that is commonly examined in the academia under the “Agency Theory”. 
The impetus that deregulation and liberalisation has brought afterwards to the world of finance 
along with the multiplicity of financial products have centred the focus of market players onto 
efficiently managing risks and striving to halt the increasing uncertainty. Nonetheless, it seems 
that all attempts to achieve this last target went bust as the markets collapsed in 2008 after a 
series of financial scandals until the most recent global financial crisis (GFC).  
Yet, when considering these milestones in the evolution of the financial theory and of the 
tendencies in the financial markets from the late 1950s to the early twenty-first century as 
applied specifically to banking corporations, the importance of corporate governance overall -
and of risk governance more recently- can be traced at each phase along the changes that shook 
then shaped financial markets as we know them today (Saito et al, 2013). Effectively, between 
the 1960s and the 1970s, remedies to the Capital Structure Theorem outlined the importance of 
funding decisions, an onus on managers as finding the optimal combination of equity and debt 
does affect the firm’s value hence the interests of shareholders. Creditors are also concerned by 
such decisions when managers for instance choose to raise more debt than equity increasing 
likewise the riskiness of the corporation. Such unaligned targets between principals and agents 
are thoroughly discussed under the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a). In addition to being 
opposite and in conflict, these relationships also prove the divergent risk tolerance levels 
between the two parties. While the principal invests their capital into the corporation’s equity, 
their interest dwells in the short-term profitability. Furthermore, in worse case scenarios, 
principals are aware that they should bear the financial losses as opposed to managers.  
To narrow down the gap between the parties’ risk appetite and smoothen the divergences, 
corporate governance emerged as a set of rules that defines well the roles and practices of 
managers at all levels of the organization, considers the rights of shareholders and investors and 
promotes better disclosures and transparency to lower asymmetries of information.  
Although from a theoretical perspective, corporate governance seems to have brought about a 
turning point in business practices and ethics, one would agree that it took long to see it fully 
embedded into the business sphere. Also, one would even agree more that its comprehensive 
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and diligent embeddedness was and remains even more acutely required in the banking sector 
above all others in a post crisis period. This is mainly and naturally explained by the financial 
intermediation role that banks play in economies. From collecting deposits and issuing loans to 
finance different segments of the economy, banks have in less than half a century shifted into 
overleveraged financial corporations putting their liabilities from economic agents at stake as 
was apparent in the last global financial crisis.  
Four main flaws believed to having significantly contributed to ensuing the debacle in the 
financial sector are identified by the former Chairman of the BCBS Nout Wellink as follows : 
(1) too much leverage, (2) inadequate liquidity buffers, (3) poor governance and risk 
management and (4) inadequate incentive structures especially related to compensation 
(Wellink, 2010). These statements have been widely supported by academics and international 
institutions alike (Adams and Mehran, 2012; FSB, 2013a; OECD, 2009). These distinct factors 
at a micro level in a few banks (notably Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns) ended up impacting 
the macro / global scale through a swift domino effect.  
When investigating the roots of the four causes identified above, one would argue that a 
common source dwells in what is stated as a distinct flaw: poor governance and risk 
management. Determining the leverage in the capital structure, setting sufficient liquidity 
cushions and deciding on the compensation incentives are all matters of strategic corporate 
governance decisions. Guidance on capital adequacy and liquidity management should 
unarguably emanate from regulatory bodies yet when the corporation is considered to bear a 
systematically important risk hence the responsibilities lay more sharply at the institutional 
level. The role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board 
and the regional financial authorities is indispensable at the international level more than ever 
before and their guidelines provide a framework for national regulatory bodies to institute 
specific rules that can be enforced at micro bank level.  
Acknowledging the pivotal role of corporate governance along with risk management, the 
objective of this essay is to examine risk governance more closely and come up with a 
methodology to evaluate the strength of their structures as proposed by the FSB, the BCBS and 
the academic research in the post crisis period. To widen the span of the study, both 
conventional and Islamic banks in one geographical region are included for comparative and 
comprehensive analyses. The inclusion of Islamic banks is of substantial importance as they 
were found to have better resilience during agitated times and relative resistance to liquidity 
penuries (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Therefore, an appealing research question would be to probe 
whether risk governance practices in these banks differ considerably or are similar to their 
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mainstream counterparts. Based on an understanding of their business model, one could expect 
stronger and more robust risk governance structures in Islamic banks as they follow stricter 
ethical rules hence put depositors and stakeholders interest above all others.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed review of 
the literature on the concept of risk governance. Section 3 introduces the research questions and 
hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the methodology followed to construct a novel metric for Risk 
Governance. The same section explains how data was collected and provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the results obtained in Islamic and conventional banks overall then at each country 
level. Finally, Section 5 discusses the implications of the study and concludes.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Risk Governance: Emergence of the Concept 
Risk governance as a concept was first initiated through the establishment of the International 
Risk Governance Council (IRGC) in June 2003 in Geneva. IRGC12 is a private independent 
foundation that aims at playing the role of a “catalyst” to design and implement improved and 
effective risk governance strategies. IRGC states that: “risk governance includes the totality of 
actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk 
information is collected, analysed and communicated and management decisions are taken 
encompassing the combined risk-relevant decisions and actions of both governmental and 
private actors” (IRGC, 2005, p. 2). Renn et al. (2011) explain that risk governance translates 
the core principles of governance to the context of risk-related policy making. They assert that 
it “denotes both the institutional structure and the policy progress that guide and restrain 
collective activities of a group, society or international community to regulate, reduce or control 
risk problems” (Renn et al., 2011, p. 231). Hence, the concept is treated by the organization at 
a macro / global level to assist key policy makers in addressing systemic risks which might 
affect negatively the health and safety of the human beings, their living environment, economies 
and societies. This has been operationalized by the suggestion of two risk governance 
frameworks one in 2005 and an ameliorated version in 2008 which both inspired researchers to 
discuss the concept at large, build on their format and propose further adjustments (Asselt and 
Renn, 2011; Boholm et al., 2012; Klinke and Renn, 2012; Renn et al., 2011).  
                                                             
12 The IRGC is “an independent non-profit organization which aims to help improve the understanding and 
management of risks and opportunities by providing insight into systemic risks that have impacts on human 
health and safety, on the environment, on the economy and on society at large” (IRGC, 2005, p. 5) 
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Yet, since risk governance is perceived as a broad concept encompassing multi-actors and 
multi-processes bringing together various instances for better risk-related decision-making, 
these frameworks as well as their supporting academic publications cannot be adapted to or 
incorporated at a micro / firm level irrespective of the nature of its business, size or sector. 
2.2.2 Risk Governance in Banking and Finance: International Initiatives 
In finance, risk governance was first mentioned in Kielholz and Nebel (2005) while studying 
the regulatory impact on the management function of financial firms. The paper is dated 
January 2005 that is about two years and half before the inception of the subprime credit crisis. 
Kielholz and Nebel (2005) showed the rationale behind the changes in the regulatory 
environments and their economic impact and influence on the management function. They 
explained how regulation is moving toward a “more risk sensitive capital adequacy system and 
stronger risk governance” (Kielholz and Nebel, 2005, p. 34). They further maintain that the 
implementation of the Basel II capital adequacy and risk governance rules will lead financial 
firms to improve their processes for assessing risk and pricing capital. Unsurprisingly, the 
concept gained more attention from regulators after GFC in 2008-09. 
Considering the crucial role that banks play in the economy of safekeeping and intermediating 
funds from depositors and investors to entrepreneurs and fund seekers, their safety and 
soundness is vital to the financial stability. The notion of corporate governance fully embodies 
this responsibility as it “determines the allocation of authority and responsibilities by which the 
business and affairs of a bank are carried out by its board and senior management” (BCBS, 
2015b, p. 1). This includes the setting of the bank’s strategy and objectives, operating the bank’s 
business on a day-to-day basis, striving to align the corporate activities with the protection of 
the depositors’ interest, meeting shareholders’ obligations, considering the interests of other 
stakeholders and establishing control functions all with integrity and in compliance with the 
laws and regulations (BCBS, 2015b). In terms of developing international regulatory standards, 
the OECD launched its first set of “Principles of Corporate Governance” as early as May 1999 
and a revised version in 2004. In the latest version, the OECD summarize the basics for a well-
functioning corporate governance system as one that corroborates high transparency level, 
accountability, board oversight, respects shareholders’ rights and acknowledges the role of key 
stakeholders (OECD, 2015). The principles of (OECD, 2004) served the Basel Committee to 
issue its guidelines for banking corporate governance rules in September 1999 then provide a 
revised version in February 2006 (BCBS, 2006, 1999).  
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Following the GFC, these multinational authorities reviewed their consultative documents on 
corporate governance matters several times advocating more focus towards the risk governance 
part of the overall structure. Referring to the OECD (2004) and the BCBS (2010b), the 
Financial Stability Board – which was created in 2009- also issued their first policy measures 
addressing risks to the global financial system specifically for Systematically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFI). The policy measures features a call for “more intensive and 
effective supervision through stronger supervisory mandates, and higher supervisory 
expectations for risk management functions, risk data aggregation capabilities, risk governance 
and internal controls” (FSB, 2011a, p. 1). Furthermore, in October 2011, the FSB conducted a 
peer review entirely dedicated to the assessment of general frameworks and practices of risk 
governance in financial institutions (including Systematically Important Banks or SIB). The 
survey tackled seven areas where supervisors needed to evaluate: the firms’ approach toward 
risk governance, the defined responsibilities for the board, the defined responsibilities for the 
risk committee, the governance of the board and risk committee, the information provided to 
the board and risk committee, the risk management function and the independent assessment of 
the risk management function.  
For the purpose of this peer review survey, the FSB suggested a template for a risk governance 
framework which comprises key risk governance functions at three hierarchy levels.  
These are: the board and its audit and risk committees, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
Internal Audit and the firm-wide CFO, and CRO and business units. 
 
The structure for risk governance that the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2015a) suggests does not 
differ much from the one put forth by the FSB. The BCBS asserts that an effective risk 
governance framework (RGF) includes a strong oversight of the board in addition to clearly 
defined risk management organizational responsibilities. These concern: the business line, the 
risk management function and an independent compliance function as well as an internal audit 
function that is also independent from the previous hierarchy levels (BCBS 2015). 
Determinants for each of the cited above functions will be expounded more thoroughly in the 
methodology section when discussing the construction of the metric. 
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Figure 2.1: Risk Governance Framework 
 
Source: (FSB, 2013a, p. 6)  
 
 
2.2.3 Corporate governance in Banking: Conceptual framework and Empirical 
Literature 
Building up on one of the main concerns for corporate governance at large, Macey and O’hara 
(2003) refer to the limits of the fiduciary duties of a company’s directors as perceived 
differently in the Anglo-American and the Franco-German corporate governance models and 
centre their analysis on the application of these in the case of banks. In the Anglo-American 
model, corporate governance is the set of mechanisms that would essentially enable the 
maximization of shareholders’ value. This understanding contrasts with the Franco-German 
model which exhorts directors and officers to consider the long-term interests of all the 
stakeholders as much as ones of the shareholders (Macey and O’hara, 2003, p. 91). Considering 
the particular case of banks in the U.S, Macey and O’hara (2003) assert that the public role 
banks play, the latter model should be better applied to them for a number of reasons. First, the 
capital structure of banks is constituted of very little equity and about 90 percent of deposits 
and debts (Macey and O’hara, 2003, p. 97) making them highly leveraged firms. Second, banks 
collect deposits that must remain available to depositors on the one hand, and issue loans of 
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longer maturities to their customers on the other hand. Failure to efficiently manage the 
liquidity mismatch, pay back debts and handle unexpected bank runs can lead banks to 
insolvency and disrupt the stability of the financial system. Hence, the authors argue that the 
board’s decisions and actions on the bank’s leverage, risk and balance sheet solvency found 
the rationale to impose broader duties on bank directors which should encompass equity as 
well as fixed claimants (shareholders and stakeholders respectively). 
 
Additionally, Levine (2004) explains that sound corporate governance is operationalized in 
banking institutions mainly through the efficient allocation of capital, the exertion of effective 
corporate governance over firms they fund and by taking into same account the interests of 
shareholders as well as debt holders. He further argues that the opaqueness of banks stemming 
from information asymmetries between controlling owners and debt holders with opposite 
interests in addition to the governments’ interventions on the controlling ownership of the 
banks’ capital are two mean features that render corporate governance more complex as 
compared to the case in non-financial firms. To promote more effective governance in banking, 
Levine argues that governmental regulations (on acquiring substantial share of a bank’s stocks) 
should be reduced in favour of more incentives to private investors to assume the monitoring 
of banks and permit better and more effective competition (Levine, 2004, p. 11).  
 
2.2.4 Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks: The Islamic Finance Perspective 
The business model of Islamic banks is different than one of the conventional banks (CB) 
particularly as they must comply with an additional legal and ethical framework that is based 
on Islamic Law or Shari’ah. Hence, they collect deposits, offer interest-free funding alternatives 
and intermediate resources to foster economic growth. The balance sheet of an Islamic bank 
aggregates several financial contracts that shape their assets and liabilities structure. Table 2.1 
displays the main Islamic financial contracts offered by Islamic banks based on functionality 
(Greuning and Iqbal, 2008; IFSB, 2011; Visser, 2009). Table A2.1 in the Appendix summarizes 
definitions of the main Islamic Financial Contracts. 
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Table 2.1: Basic Structure of an Islamic Bank’s Balance Sheet 
 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash and Short-Term funds (Cash Balances) Deposits 
Demand Deposits (Qard Al Hassan) 
Investments Accounts Mudaraba (Restricted 
and Unrestricted) 
Financing Assets: 
• Murabaha (sale based on cost-plus 
margin) 
• Ijara Leasing 
• Salam 
• Istisnâa 
Special Investment Accounts: 
• Mudaraba 
• Musharaka 
Investment Assets: 
• Mudaraba 
• Musharaka 
• Sukuk (Islamic bonds) 
Other Liabilities 
Fee-based Transactions:  
• Ju’alah 
• Kafala (guarantee) 
• Sarf (foreign currency exchange) 
Shareholders’ Equity 
Other Assets / Non-banking Assets Reserves 
 
Source: (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008, p. 69) 
The dissimilarities between corporate governance principles and practices in conventional and 
Islamic banking are essentially the resultant of Shari’ah supervision that imposes a number of 
boundaries on the Islamic banking activities (Al-Suhaibani and Naifar, 2014). Shari’ah 
governance ensures the compliance of the Islamic bank’s operations, products and management 
conducts with the Islamic law principles (Elasrag, 2014). The international regulatory and 
standard-setting bodies for institutions offering Islamic financial services such as the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) encourage Islamic banks to comply with the rulings 
and supervision of the Shari’ah boards to preserve the credibility of the industry. The IFSB 
(2009) defines the Shari’ah Governance System as the ‘set of institutional and organisational 
arrangements through which an Institution offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS) ensures 
that there is effective independent oversight of Shari’ah compliance over each of the following 
structures and processes: (a) the issuance of relevant Shari’ah pronouncements/ resolutions, (b) 
the dissemination of information on such Shari’ah pronouncements/resolutions to the operative 
personnel of the IIFS who monitor the day-to-day compliance with the Shari’ah 
pronouncements/resolutions vis-à-vis every level of operations and each transaction, (c) an 
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internal Shari’ah compliance review/audit for verifying that Shari’ah compliance has been 
satisfied, (d) an annual Shari’ah compliance review/audit for verifying that the internal 
Shari’ah compliance review/audit has been appropriately carried out and its findings have been 
duly noted by the Shari’ah board. The governance, control and compliance structures within 
Islamic banks will therefore be complemented by the Shari’ah Governance System defined 
above such as at the governance level the Shari’ah board supplements the board of directors, 
the control function including the internal and external auditors is complemented by both the 
Internal Shari’ah Review Unit (ISRU) and an external Shari’ah review then the regulatory and 
compliance units are supported by an Internal Shari’ah Compliance Unit (ISCU) (IFSB, 2009).  
Hence, the main role of the Shari’ah board dwells in setting the Shari’ah related rules and 
principles and overseeing the compliance with its verdict (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). More 
specifically, the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) has in principle five dues including: the 
certification of permissible financial instruments through fatwas, the verification of the 
transactions’ compliance with the issued fatwas, the calculation and payment of Zakat, the 
disposal of non-Shari’ah compliant earnings and advice on the distribution of income or 
expenses among the bank’s shareholders and investment account holders (Grais and Pellegrini, 
2006). At an operational yet independent level, Islamic banks establish a Shari’ah audit unit 
that ensures the adherence to the Islamic law principles in the bank’s operations including the 
safeguarding of the depositors’ rights as per the acquisition and the use of funds by the Islamic 
bank (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002).  
While the above discussion presents the main distinctive feature between conventional and 
Islamic corporate governance structures that is the roles and duties of the SSB, a more 
informative examination of the distinctiveness of Islamic corporate governance principles has 
been provided by Shibani and De Fuentes (2017) who analyse them based on four paradigms 
of social theory. Shibani and De Fuentes (2017) argue that under the functionalist paradigm it 
is the religious governance element of the presence of the SSB that plays the most significant 
distinguishing role in its multi-level governance structure and whereby the reduction of agency 
problems and the protection of the interests of all the bank’s stakeholders are guaranteed. Under 
the interpretive paradigm which sees corporate governance as a social construct, Islamic 
corporate governance’s characteristic dwells in its social commitments to the ethical norms that 
are set out by the religion of Islam. Therefore, the values of justice, honesty and fairness are 
not to be compromised to parties in any economic or financial transactions and business must 
be conducted in accordance with the Shari’ah rules (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Under the radical 
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humanist paradigm which refers to the democratic and fair process that defines corporate 
governance models, the principle of ‘Shura’ or consultation with the Islamic bank’s 
stakeholders defines the Islamic corporate governance model. Finally, under the radical 
structuralist paradigm which demonstrates that the corporate governance model founds its 
basics in social classes, the Islamic corporate governance model is portrayed most importantly 
in their proposition of non-riba or non-interest bearing financial solutions to people in the 
society for whom the application of Islamic law is fundamental.  
Implications of the analysis of the Islamic corporate governance principles include the 
responsibility of Islamic banks to carry business operations that are Shari’ah compliant and 
that go beyond the protection of only the shareholders’ interests to the safeguarding of the rights 
of all the Islamic bank’s stakeholders including its debtholders, depositors, the managers and 
employees as well as the wider community (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). In that sense, the 
mechanisms of corporate governance in place can translate the approach to strategic decision-
making at the board of directors’ level where the Shari’ah Supervisory Board sits and 
contributes to the achievement of the financial institution’s objectives. Therefore, with the 
responsibility widened to the social community, the safeguarding of the financial stability of 
the Islamic bank along with the achievement of the profitability targets from halal non-riba 
sources mean that the SSB is actively involved in (1) the delimitation of the risk appetite, (2) 
the demarcation of the gharar boundaries in income-generating products as well as its presence 
as potential asymmetric information in the financial contracts with their customers and (3) in 
the definition of the high-level risk management strategies which collectively form the essence 
of strategic risk governance as discussed in the previous section 2.2.2.  
On the academic investigation side, research papers studying the concept of corporate 
governance in Islamic finance tackle issues such as the variations of the agency theory in the 
context of Islamic banks (Ahmed, 2013; Safieddine, 2008), the implications of risk-sharing 
principles for corporate governance (Al-Suhaibani and Naifar, 2014), the special attributes of 
corporate and Shari’ah governance (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Elasrag, 2014) as well as the 
links between corporate governance and some issues raising in the particular case of 
unrestricted investment account holders (Magalhães and Al-Saad, 2013). As explained by 
Ahmed (2011), Islamic banks face two types of risks. Specifically, they incur risks that are 
similar to ones faced by the conventional financial intermediaries as well as others that are 
specific to them arising due to compliance with Shari’ah rules. Moreover, not all classic risk 
mitigation techniques such as insurance and derivatives are allowed by Shari’ah (Ahmed, 
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2011). Therefore, it becomes manifest that risk management in Islamic banks introduces 
additional issues and legal constraints that add to the responsibilities and expectations from 
sound corporate governance frameworks put in place.    
In summary, assuming the necessity of complying with an additional ethical framework as 
outlined by Shari’ah, it can be hypothesized that Islamic banks would have stronger risk 
governance structures as there are religious boundaries that (1) prohibit the involvement in 
activities where gharar (excessive risk) is high, (2) introduce limits on industries for Shari’ah 
Compliant Investments and (3) make sure they tie banking to the real economy hence exclude 
intangible or virtual assets from their portfolios. Answers to the hypotheses are provided in the 
subsequent sections.  
2.3 Research Objective and Hypotheses 
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, and as a main contribution it aims at developing 
a measure to assess the quality of the risk governance structures in banks in line with 
recommendations from academic research and regulatory guidelines. This novel measure will 
enable evaluation of risk governance status in a financial institution at two periods of time. 
Second, this chapter aims to examine the evolution of the statuses of risk governance over time 
and compare between Islamic and conventional banks considering the differences of their 
business models. 
To meet these aims, the study postulates the following hypotheses: 
H01: There is no difference between risk governance structures in Islamic and Conventional 
banks  
H02: There is no difference between risk governance structures before and after the global 
financial crisis  
H03: There is no difference between risk governance structures in Islamic and Conventional 
banks within each GCC country.  
 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Evaluating Risk Governance: An Exploration of the Empirical Literature 
Considering the nascent interest on risk governance, exploration of academic literature on the 
theme led to the identification of only four relevant papers tackling the concept. Aebi et al. 
(2012) examine the associations between some risk management related corporate governance 
mechanisms and banks’ financial performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. The 
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authors proxy risk management related corporate governance by using the presence of the CRO 
in a bank’s executive board, the reporting line of the CRO (whether to the CEO or directly to 
the board of directors) and the presence of a dedicated risk committee that monitors and 
manages the risk management within the bank. In addition, they add other corporate governance 
variables such as the board size (natural logarithm of the number of directors in board), the 
board independence (percentage of independent outside directors) and the percentage of the 
directors with experience in banking or insurance industries as executive officers. Their major 
finding suggests that banks where the CRO reports directly to the board of directors and not the 
CEO or any other corporate department show higher stock returns and higher return on equity 
during the financial crisis. They do not find any impact of the standard corporate governance 
variables on returns.  
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) introduce a measure for risk management to explore whether it 
curtails tail risk exposures of U.S Bank Holding Companies. The Risk Management Index 
(RMI) that the authors develop encompasses determinants for two main functions of risk 
management, namely the role of the CRO and the Risk Committee. For the first function, the 
authors use binary variables for the presence of the CRO, whether s/he is an executive officer 
of the U.S bank holding companies, if their pay is amongst the top five highest paid executives 
and finally the authors measure the centrality of the CRO by comparing their total compensation 
over the CEO’s. The second category of “risk committee” is proxied by using a dummy variable 
that measures if at least one of the independent directors has experience in banking and finance. 
They use another dummy variable that measures whether the frequency of the risk committee 
meetings exceeds the average computed for the sample. Interestingly, Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) find that before the inception of the GFC, banks with higher RMI had lower tail risk, 
lower non-performing loans and better operating and market return performance. Similarly, 
after the crisis banks with higher RMI are found to have lower tail risk and higher returns on 
assets. This finding suggests that strong and independent risk management functions restrain 
exposures to tail risks.  
Hines and Peter (2015) examine the determinants and consequences for voluntary risk 
management committee (RMC) formation in financial institutions and study if the latter has 
any effects on short-term risk outcomes and profitability. Using a sample of 47 financial 
institutions that form a RMC at board level between 1994 and 2008, the authors use firm 
characteristics and risk measures as potential determinants for RMC formation. Specifically, 
they use a Probit model with non-performing assets, loan charge-offs and risk-adjusted capital 
ratio as risk measures. The firm level characteristics include: the presence of a CRO, the 
52 
 
existence of an Assets and Liabilities Committee (ALCO), whether the CEO chairs the board 
of directors or not, the CEO turnover that accounts for any structural changes that occurred in 
the board’s governance during the fiscal year, the board size as well as the percentage of 
independent directors in the board among other explanatory variables such as total notional 
amount of hedging derivatives, total notional amount of trading derivatives, leverage and 
whether the financial institution conducts international banking or not. Hines and Peter (2015) 
find that highly leveraged financial institutions that conduct international banking activities, 
and have larger and more independent boards (among other determinants) are more likely to 
form a risk management committee. However, with respect to the changes in risk outcomes and 
in profitability, the authors find that RMC formation constitutes only a symbolic governance 
practice through which the financial institutions transmit a signal of taking responsible risk 
management actions even if these are not necessarily embodied and put in real practice.  
Finally, Battaglia and Gallo (2015) study the associations between risk governance and 
financial performance using a match-paired sample of 36 Chinese and Indian banks during the 
global financial crisis year of 2007/2008. Specifically, they select three board governance 
characteristics namely the board size, the number of independent directors and the number of 
board meetings held during the year 2007. To proxy for risk governance, they use two variables 
only that is the size of the risk committee and the number of risk committee meetings during 
the year 2007. Results show a positive relationship between the size of the risk committee and 
the profitability measures ROA and ROE but opposite association with the market valuation 
(Tobin’s Q) and expected market growth (Price to Earnings Ratio). They also find that market 
valuation is positively associated with the frequency of the risk committee’s meetings. The 
authors find the standard corporate governance determinants to be irrelevant when risk 
committee characteristics are incorporated in the estimated model.  
The scarce theoretical and empirical literature on this new and important notion of risk 
governance constitutes an important incentive to develop a comprehensive and richer proxy to 
measure its status. Furthermore, the determinants of risk governance in financial institutions as 
used in the empirical papers discussed above appear to be small and limited when compared to 
the regulatory requirements of a robust risk governance structure in banks, particularly for 
banks that are systemically important financial institutions with potentials of affecting the 
stability of the financial system. Essentially, as supervisory and regulatory bodies have 
acknowledged the need for an efficient risk governance structure within the overall banking 
corporate governance frameworks ((BCBS, 2015a; FSB, 2013b), there are several key 
determinants that need to be accounted for in addition to the ones used in the above studies.   
53 
 
2.4.2 The Risk Governance Index “RGI” 
Building up on the previous studies, this empirical chapter focuses on the development of a 
novel and comprehensive measure that takes account of the major determinants for a robust risk 
governance structure as recommended by the BCBS (2015a) and the FSB (2013b) in addition 
to academic literature. The references for each determinant included to develop the index are 
detailed in Table 2.2. 
To build the “Risk Governance Index” (hereafter RGI), the methodology used by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2007) is followed only in the way they structure and construct their Ethical Identity 
Index (EII) however not in their calculation approach. Further references for constructing 
similar indicators based on disclosures include Akhigbe and Martin (2008, 2006) and Mollah 
and Liljeblom (2016). Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) developed the EII to measure the incongruity 
between the communicated (through the disclosures of information in the annual reports) and 
ideal (information on the Islamic ethical business framework) ethical identities of seven Islamic 
banks in four GCC countries between 2002 and 2004. Using content analysis, Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2007) design a checklist of items drawn from substantive Islamic literature, the Islamic 
perspective on the social responsibility framework as well as disclosures required by the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). The 
checklist is composed of five themes that portray the ideal ethical identity. Each theme consists 
of several items that the authors score using a binary scale of one or zero. Every item that is 
communicated in the annual report is allocated a score of one otherwise it is given zero. In 
Akhigbe and Martin (2006), the aim is to evaluate the valuation effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
based on the disclosures and governance features in the annual statements of the financial firms. 
The authors measure the level of involvement of the CEO by constructing an index named 
‘CEOINVOLV’. The index counts the number of high profile roles held by the CEO as a proxy 
for their level of involvement. The roles considered are chairman of the board and memberships 
on the compensation, nominating, and/or audit committee. In a subsequent study, Akhigbe and 
Martin (2008) aim to explore the impact of disclosure and governance on the variations in the 
capital markets measures of risk following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley on U.S financial 
institutions based. The authors construct four composite indicators to proxy for Disclosure, 
board monitoring, ownership and the level of CEO involvement. Each of these four variables 
are the sum of several governance characteristics. Disclosure is the sum of characteristics 
relating to the independence of the audit committee, the existence of an independent financial 
expert in the audit committee and the degree of disclosure through financial footnotes. Board 
monitoring is the sum of the following characteristics: the degree of independence of the board 
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nominating committee and compensation committee. Ownership counts two determinants that 
refer to the percentage of the shares owned by the officers and directors as well the percentage 
of shares owned by the institutional investors. Finally, CEO involvement is the sum of the high-
profile roles that the CEO holds.  
In a more recent paper, Mollah et al. (2016) constructed a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 
based on 12 board of directors’ characteristics. Specifically, the authors include the board size, 
the independence of the board, the existence of female directors, the frequency of the board 
meetings, the attendance of the board members to these meetings, the number of board 
committees, the chairman’s independence, the CEO’s split from role of chairman, if the CEO 
is internally recruited, the CEO’s qualifications, the CEO’s banking experience and the CEO’s 
tenure. Mollah et al. (2016) hand-collected the corporate governance data of 104 conventional 
banks and 52 Islamic banks from 14 countries for the period 2005 to 2013. The authors 
established a list of conditions for each of the 12 items whereby each item is assigned a value 
of 1 when the condition is fulfilled or 0 otherwise.  
 
As the purpose of this study is to gauge the risk governance practices in banks in a more 
comprehensive fashion, an appealing method is to come up with a composite measure that 
entails items from previous academic studies in addition to the financial regulatory literature, 
chiefly the recommended guidelines for robust risk and corporate governance frameworks in 
banks. Following the construction method of Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) and by referring to the 
risk governance framework suggested by FSB (2013), two broad categories related to 
governance hierarchy levels in charge of the banks’ risk management strategies and 
implementations are identified as the Board of Directors (BOD) and the Senior Management. 
The board of directors’ category in turn has three dimensions that stand for the characteristics 
of the board as well as its committees. Specifically, in the first dimension of BOD the three 
following board characteristics are included: the board size, the board chair and the board 
independence. The second and third dimension relate to risk and audit committees respectively 
and comprises the following five determinants each: the risk / audit committee existence, the 
risk / audit committee authority, the risk / audit committee activity, the risk / audit committee 
chair and the risk / audit committee composition. Both the risk and audit committees have the 
same determinants since they constitute two main board-level committees that steer risk 
management strategies and ensure the auditing and control over their relevance and soundness 
of their implementation.  
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The senior management’s category consists of two dimensions that stand for the attributes of 
the chief risk officer and the internal audit function. Therefore, in the fourth dimension of the 
index the following three determinants are included: the CRO presence, the CRO stature and 
the CRO independence. Finally, the fifth and last dimension comprises the internal audit’s 
presence, the internal audit’s stature and the internal audit chair. Figure 2.2 shows the items 
relating to each of the five dimensions of RGI.  
To summarize, the RGI includes two broad categories, five dimensions and nineteen specific 
items as can be seen in Figure 2.2. Using a binary scoring for each item, the composite measure 
the RGI would show the status of risk governance in a quantitative manner. The relevant 
references from literature supporting the inclusion of each item included in RGI are listed in 
Table 2.2.  
Also, the checklist that comprehensively explains the set of conditions to fulfil for each item is 
provided in Table 2.4 as will follow later in section 2.4.4 where the scoring method will be 
thoroughly presented.  
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Figure 2.2: The Risk Governance Index (Author’s Contribution) 
 
 
    
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk	Governance	Index 
Board	of	Directors	Level	 Senior	Management	Level	
Dimension	1:	BoD	Determinants		
§ Board	Size	
§ Board	Chair	
§ Board	Independence		
Dimension	3:	Audit	Committee	Determinants		
§ Audit	Com.	Existence,	
§ Audit	Com.	Authority,	
§ Audit	Com.	Activity,	
§ Audit	Com.	Chair,	
§ Audit	Com.	Composition	
Dimension	2:	Risk	Committee	Determinants		
§ Risk	Com.	Existence,	
§ Risk	Com.	Authority,	
§ Risk	Com.	Activity,	
§ Risk	Com.	Chair,	
§ Risk	Com.	Composition	
Dimension	4:	CRO	Determinants		
§ CRO	Presence	
§ CRO	Stature	
§ CRO	Independence				
Dimension	5:	Internal	Audit	Determinants		
§ Internal	Audit	Presence	
§ Internal	Audit	Stature	
§ Internal	Audit	Chair				
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Table 2.2: Summary of key references of items in the Risk Governance Index 
 
R
is
k 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
In
de
x 
Index Category Index 
Dimensions 
Index Items Key References in 
Literature 
Category 1: Board 
of Directors Level 
Board of 
Directors 
Determinants 
Board Size (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) 
Board Chair 
(BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 
2013a; Hines and 
Peter, 2015)  
Board Independence (BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 2013a) 
Risk 
Committee 
Determinants 
Risk Committee 
Existence 
(Aebi et al., 2012; 
BCBS, 2015b; Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2013; 
FSB, 2013a) 
Risk Committee 
Activity 
(Battaglia and Gallo, 
2015; Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013) 
Risk Committee 
Authority 
(Battaglia and Gallo, 
2015; BCBS, 2015b; 
FSB, 2013a) 
Risk Committee Chair  (BCBS, 2015b) 
Risk Committee 
Composition 
(BCBS, 2015b) 
Audit 
Committee 
Determinants 
Audit Committee 
Existence 
(BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 
2013a) 
Audit Committee 
Activity 
(Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013) 
Audit Committee 
Authority 
(BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 
2013a) 
Audit Committee Chair  (BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 2013a) 
Audit Committee 
Composition 
(BCBS, 2015b) 
Category 2: Senior 
Management Level 
Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) 
Determinants 
CRO Presence 
(Aebi et al., 2012; 
BCBS, 2015b; Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2013; 
FSB, 2013a; Hines and 
Peter, 2015) 
CRO Stature 
(Aebi et al., 2012; 
BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 
2013a) 
CRO Independence (BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 2013a) 
Internal Audit 
Determinants 
Internal Audit Presence  (BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 2013a) 
Internal Audit Stature (BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 2013a) 
Internal Audit 
Independence 
(BCBS, 2015b; FSB, 
2013a) 
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2.4.3 Sample and Data collection 
The sample of the empirical study comprises 53 banks from five GCC countries: Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Data and information for these banks 
were collected for the period 2006 to 2012. Table 2.3 provides the distribution of the number 
of banks from each country and Table A2.2 in the appendix lists the banks’ names. Oman is 
excluded from the sample as it launched its first Islamic banks only in 2013. The GCC was 
chosen for the study as most countries have adequate number of Islamic banks compared to 
their conventional counterparts. Furthermore, the GCC region counts the highest number of 
Islamic financial institutions that experienced the largest asset growth13 in the decade between 
2006 and 2016 as reported in The Banker Magazine’s top ten movers by asset growth (The 
Banker, 2016).   
Only full-fledged Islamic banks were included and Islamic windows of conventional banks 
were excluded due to conceptual and technical reasons. Conceptually, as the study attempts to 
assess risk governance frameworks at a strategic organizational level, Islamic windows of 
conventional banks being subsidiaries, are governed by the board of directors, audit and risk 
committees that are the same as ones of the parent company. Thus, the risk governance 
architecture in place in the Islamic windows would be the same as the conventional parent 
company and the information will not be able to capture the idiosyncrasies of Islamic banking 
business model that include unique financial products and the prohibitions of some activities 
and management tools such as derivatives. Furthermore, if the conventional parent company 
operates in one of the five countries from which the sample is drawn, then there is a high chance 
that it is already included in the conventional banking sub-sample. Hence, there would be a 
possibility of assessing same risk governance structure twice.  
To collect data for the 19 items in the RGI, information was manually collected from the annual 
reports, financial statements (including the notes sections) and corporate governance reports 
where available. Annual reports published in both English and Arabic were included in the data 
collection process and their entire contents were thoroughly read in order to lessen the 
probability of omitting the disclosure of an item hence reducing the actual score merited by a 
bank. The hand-collection of data is a fastidious exercise particularly when accuracy and strict 
attention to details is required to enhance precision. Therefore, where ambiguity was noticed 
with respect to one or more statement misleading information was reported in a separate 
document and the item given a null score.  
                                                             
13 In the Top Ten, the GCC region alone counts five institutions, two in Iran then the remaining three in Asia. 
(The Banker, 2016) 
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Table 2.3: Sample Distribution 
Country Islamic Banks Conventional Banks Full Sample 
 
Observations 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
Bahrain 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Total 
4 
5 
4 
6 
7 
 
26 
4 
5 
4 
6 
8 
 
27 
8 
10 
8 
12 
15 
 
53 
56 
70 
56 
84 
105 
 
371 
 
2.4.4 Scoring the Risk Governance Index 
As this paper is the first to measure most of the risk-related functions of risk governance in 
banking institutions all together, the approach to scoring is more in favour of an unweighted 
index as all items are considered equally important. This argument is inferred mainly from the 
detailed recommendations of the FSB (2013), BCBS (2015) and BCBS (2014). In these 
regulatory documents, it is clearly stated and widely reiterated that the Basel Committee stresses 
the importance of risk governance as part of the overall corporate governance framework 
“which promotes strong boards and strong board committees together with effective control 
functions” (BCBS, 2015a). In their analysis of the risk management issues in the Islamic finance 
industry, Khan and Ahmed (2001) also highlight that good governance that contributes to 
market discipline needs to be promoted through an appropriate structure and set of 
responsibilities for the board of directors as well as the senior management. Furthermore, as the 
focus of this research does not target one specific group of banks annual reports users, there is 
no need to allocate weights. As explained in (Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al., 1995), when different 
weights are assigned then one class of users will assign a specific but different weight than 
another class of corporate annual reports users. In academic literature, Cooke (1989), Hossain 
et al (1995), Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) opted for unweighted indices in their empirical studies 
as discussed earlier.  
The scoring method hence allocates a score of 1 when the condition for an item of sound risk 
governance practice is present (as reported in the checklist in Table 2.4), or a value of 0 is 
assigned when it is absent. To obtain the total RGI score the method is additive as expressed in 
Equation (2.1).  
RGI i,t = ∑ #$%&'$  i,t  (2.1) 
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Where: 
o RGI i,t : the risk governance index score for bank i in year t  
o n: the items in the index (from item 1 to 19) 
o X i,t: the disclosed item in bank i in year t. 
 
Table 2.4 provides the checklist of the criteria followed to score each item in the RGI.  
Besides the choice of an equally weighted index, the calculation method described above 
follows the methods of Akhigbe and Martin (2008, 2006) and of Mollah and Liljeblom (2016) 
As discussed earlier in section 2.4.2, Akhigbe and Martin (2006) construct an index to evaluate 
the level of involvement of the CEO by counting the number of high-profile roles they hold. 
The high-profiles roles considered are the chairman of the board and the memberships on the 
compensation, nominating, and/or audit committee. In a subsequent study, Akhigbe and Martin 
(2008) where they examine the associations of disclosure and governance with the variations 
in the capital markets measures of risk following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley on U.S 
financial institutions based, the authors construct four composite indicators to proxy for 
Disclosure, board monitoring, ownership and the level of CEO involvement. Each of these four 
variables are the sum of several governance characteristics as will follow. Disclosure is the sum 
of characteristics relating to the independence of the audit committee, the existence of an 
independent financial expert in the audit committee and the degree of disclosure through 
financial footnotes. Board monitoring is the sum of the following characteristics: the degree of 
independence of the board nominating committee and compensation committee. Ownership is 
the sum of two determinants that refer to the percentage of the shares owned by the officers and 
directors as well the percentage of shares owned by the institutional investors. Finally, CEO 
involvement is the sum of the high-profile roles that the CEO holds. To measure the CEO 
power, Mollah and Liljeblom (2016) construct an index formed of six characteristics which are 
scored as binary variables. When the condition is satisfied, the item is scored one or zero 
otherwise. The CEO power is therefore the sum of the following six dummy variables: the 
CEO-chair duality, if the CEO is internally recruited, if the CEO’s age is above the median age, 
if the CEO’s tenure is greater than the median tenure, if the CEO’s banking experience is greater 
than the median experience and if the CEO’s qualifications surpass the median qualifications.  
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Table 2.4: Checklist of criteria used for Risk Governance Index Items 
 
RISK GOVERNANCE INDICATOR 
Category 1: Board of Directors Level of Risk Governance 
Dimension 1: BOD determinants: 
• Board Size: number of directors on a bank’s board should be ≤ 814), scored 1 if so or 
0 otherwise 
• BOD_Chair: Chair of BOD is not chair of AC and/or RC and is not the CEO (non-
executive), scored 1 if so or 0 otherwise  
• BOD_Independence: Majority of BOD members should be independent, scored 1 if 
so or 0 otherwise.  
Dimension 2: Risk Committee (RC) determinants: 
• RC_existence: if a risk committee exists in bank this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• RC_Activity: if the bank’s board risk committee met more frequently during the year 
compared to other banks on average this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise  
• RC_Authority: if the RC is at board level and not at the management level this is 
scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• RC_Chair: if the chair of the RC is independent, this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• RC_Independence: if most of the RC members are independent directors this is scored 
1 or 0 otherwise.  
Dimension 3: Audit Committee (AC) determinants: 
• AC_existence: if an audit committee exists in bank this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• AC_Activity: if the bank’s board audit committee met more frequently during the year 
compared to other banks on average this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise.  
• AC_Authority: if the AC reports directly to BOD i.e. is at board level this is scored 1 
or 0 otherwise 
• AC_Chair: if the chair of the AC is independent, this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• AC_Independence: if most of the AC members are independent directors this is 
scored 1 or 0 otherwise.  
Category 2: Senior Management Level of Risk Governance 
Dimension 4: Chief Risk Officer (CRO) Determinants: 
• CRO_Present: if the CRO is present in the bank, this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• CRO_Stature: if CRO reports to BOD, this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• CRO_Independence: if CRO has an independent function (no dual-hatting), this is 
scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
Dimension 5: Internal Audit (IA) determinants: 
• IA_Existence: if the IA function is present in the bank, this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise 
• IA_Stature: if IA reports to AC this is scored 1, if it reports to the CEO this is scored 
0 
• IA_Chair: if the person who leads the IA (Chief Audit Executive/ Head of or Chief 
IA) is named this is scored 1 or 0 otherwise.  
                                                             
14 Following theory Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
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2.5 Results and Analysis 
2.5.1 Univariate Analysis and Descriptive Statistics 
As can be seen in Table 2.5, the 53 banks’ balance sheets show total assets of 19440164.37 
Million USD on average with Islamic banks showing an average of total assets of 10654151.04 
Million USD while conventional banks show an average of 26053292.68 Million USD. 
Regarding equity, the entire sample average is of 2580085.93 thousand USD with 1714850.39 
thousand in Islamic banks and 3231338.49 thousand in conventional banks. The deposits and 
short-term funding show an average of 15169059.62 thousand USD out of which an average of 
12609834.90 thousand USD comes from the total customers’ deposits. In Islamic banks, the 
average of deposits and short-term is of 8150677.80 thousand and of 20451712.60 thousand in 
conventional banks. Also, data from the 53 banks’ income statements show an average of net 
income of 342602.41 thousand USD out of which an average of 513641.64 thousand USD is 
estimated on the net interest revenue. The average score of RGI on the entire sample shows an 
average of 9. Nonetheless, the average RGI in conventional banks is of 9.17 which is higher 
than the average of RGI in Islamic banks which is of 8.   
In Table 2.6, the objective is to start the univariate descriptive analysis of RGI by looking at the 
evolution of the RGI scores’ frequency over the years of the study. This is particularly useful 
as it intends to reflect the raising importance that banks assign to their risk governance 
structures and mechanisms which is in turn translated by reporting more information about its 
features in their annual reports and financial statements. As can be seen in the first column of 
Table 2.6, the aggregate RGI scores for all banks in the sample (regardless of their type) over 
the selected time period display values ranging from 0 to 17 which also signifies that no bank 
disclosed or fulfilled the conditions of the nineteen items that compose the risk governance 
measure. In the last column of the table, it is shown that the mode -which represents the most 
frequent value of the RGI across the sample- is 10 with a frequency of 14.15%. The largest RGI 
scores of 16 and 17 were scored only three times each but together they represent less than 2% 
of the frequencies scored by the whole sample (Table 2.6). It is useful to note that these occur 
in 2009 onwards which means right after the global financial crisis (GFC). The RGI values 
below the overall mean of 8.69 constitute 56% of the obtained scores on the entire sample and 
throughout 2006 to 2012 (Tables 2.6 and 2.12). These results indicate the relatively low level 
of overall disclosures related to risk governance functions in the 53 banks of the sample.  
 
 
 
63 
 
Table 2.5: Sample Descriptive Information 
Bank Financial 
Information  
Sample Average  Islamic Banks’ 
Average 
Conventional 
Banks’ Average 
Total Assets (million USD) 19,440,164.37 10,654,151.04 
 
26,053,292.68 
 
Total Customers Deposits 
(thousand USD) 
12,609,834.90 7,332,143.37 16,466,609.49 
 
Deposits and Short-term 
Funding15 (thousand USD)  
151,69,059.62 8,150,677.80 
 
20,451,712.60 
 
Equity (thousand USD) 2,580,085.93 1,714,850.39 3,231,338.49 
Net Income (thousand 
USD) 
342,602.41 213,450.99 
 
439,813.16 
 
Net Interest Revenue 
(thousand USD) 
513,641.64 343,590.87 
 
637,979.84 
 
Risk Governance Index 
‘RGI’ 
9 8 9.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
15 The BankScope Database defines “Deposits and Short-term Funding” as the total of customers’ deposits 
(including the current, saving and term) and the short-term funding (including commercial paper and short-term 
part of debt securities, (i) at amortised costs, (ii) at fair value, (iii) in issue).  
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Table 2.6: Overall RGI Score and Frequencies 
 
 Year   
Risk 
Governance 
Index 
Scores 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Frequency Frequency in % 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.31 
1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 6 1.85 
2 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 9 2.77 
3 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 8 2.46 
4 2 5 4 4 5 2 4 26 8.00 
5 5 3 1 1 2 2 0 14 4.31 
6 1 6 6 3 3 2 2 23 7.08 
7 3 5 4 6 4 4 4 30 9.23 
8 7 4 4 7 3 2 4 31 9.54 
9 4 7 4 6 5 5 3 34 10.46 
10 1 4 11 8 6 5 11 46 14.15 
11 2 2 3 4 3 8 4 26 8.00 
12 1 2 3 3 4 5 4 22 6.77 
13 0 1 2 2 4 6 5 20 6.15 
14 0 0 0 1 4 3 6 14 4.31 
15 0 0 0 0 3 2 4 9 2.77 
16 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 0.92 
17 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 0.92 
Total 38 43 45 48 48 50 53 325 100.00 
 
2.5.1.1 Descriptive results of RGI by country and by dimension 
 
In this section, the interest dwells in looking at the evolution of the total RGI scores as well as 
its two main dimensions namely the board of directors and the senior management at each 
country level and over the entire period of study. To proceed, the average for each dimension 
is calculated for both the Islamic and conventional banks in each country from 2006 to 2012. 
The results are reported in columns 2 and 3 in Tables 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11. To recall, the 
board of directors’ dimensions includes three categories where the role of the board, the risk 
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and audit committees are assessed. The senior management’ dimension includes two categories 
where the role of the chief risk officer and the internal audit are identified. Also, the average 
for RGI for all the banks in each country for each year is reported in the last columns of the 
same tables. The results from these tables are then transformed into histograms to visually 
assess the development and trends of the dimensions as well as the RGI averages over the period 
of the study in each country (Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7).   
In Saudi Arabia for instance, the average score of the board of directors’ dimension shows an 
evolutive trend between 2006 and 2012 (Table 2.7 and Figure 2.3). If all the conditions are 
satisfied for each item in this category, the highest result that can be scored by each bank is 
thirteen as there are thirteen items in the three categories. However, the average for the board’s 
dimension -although improving overall during the period- does not exceed 7.5. In fact, it almost 
doubles from 3.62 in 2006 to 7.5 in 2012. For the senior management’s dimension, if all the 
conditions are satisfied for each item in this category, the highest result that can be scored by 
each bank is six as there are three items in the CRO category and three items in the internal 
audit category. Similar to the board of directors’ category, it is noticed that the scores are 
improving. The average evolves from 0.87 in 2006 to 3.37 in 2012. With respect to the 
aggregate RGI, the average improves from 4.5 in 2006 to 10.87 in 2012.  
 
Table 2.7 Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Saudi Arabia 
 
Years 
Board of Directors 
Dimension (Average) 
Senior Management Dimension 
(Average) 
RGI 
(Average) 
2006 3.62 0.87 4.5 
2007 3.37 1.12 4.5 
2008 5.37 2.25 7.62 
2009 6.5 2.87 9.37 
2010 5.12 2.62 7.75 
2011 7.12 2.87 10 
2012 7.5 3.37 10.87 
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
In Kuwait, it is noticed that the scores of the two dimensions are lower than the ones in Saudi 
Arabia but improve along the time interval (Figure 2.4). In fact, the average score for the board 
of directors’ dimension varies between 0.8 in 2006 and 4.9 in 2012 as can be found in Table 
2.8. The senior management’s dimension also shows an improving average from 0.9 in 2006 to 
3.8 in 2012. As a consequence, the RGI average scores show a similar evolving trend with 
averages improving from 1.7 in 2006 to 8.7 in 2012 (Table 2.8).  
 
Table 2.8 Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Kuwait 
 
Years Board of Directors Dimension (Average) 
Senior Management Dimension 
(Average) 
RGI 
(Average) 
2006 0.8 0.9 1.7 
2007 2.3 2 4.3 
2008 3.2 2.1 5.3 
2009 3.2 2.8 6 
2010 2.6 2.5 5.1 
2011 3 2.7 5.7 
2012 4.9 3.8 8.7 
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Kuwait 
 
 
 
In Bahrain, it is noticed that the average scores for the two dimensions as well as the aggregate 
RGI average scores are higher than the ones scored by banks in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait but 
similarly shows and improving trend (Figure 2.5). Effectively, the average scores for the board 
of directors’ dimension evolves from 4.6 in 2006 to 7.8 in 2012 and the average scores for the 
senior management’s dimension improves from 3.3 in 2006 to 4.8 in 2012. The aggregate RGI 
scores show averages improving from 7.8 in 2006 to 12.3 in 2011 and 12 in 2012 (Table 2.9).  
 
 
Table 2.9 Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Bahrain 
 
Years 
Board of Directors 
Dimension (Average) 
Senior Management Dimension 
(Average) 
RGI 
(Average) 
2006 4.6 3.3 7.8 
2007 4.9 3.8 8.7 
2008 5.1 4.3 9.4 
2009 5.8 4.2 9.9 
2010 7.6 4.3 11.9 
2011 7.4 4.8 12.3 
2012 7.8 4.2 12 
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Bahrain 
 
 
 
In Table 2.10, results from Qatari banks also show an evolutive trend between 2006 and 2012 
(Figure 2.6). For the board of directors’ dimension, the average score improves from 2.4 in 
2006 to 6.9 in 2012. For the senior management’s dimension, the average scores evolve from 
1.5 in 2006 to 4 in 2012. The RGI aggregate score also improves gradually from 3.9 in 2006 to 
10.9 in 2012.  
 
Table 2.10 Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Qatar 
 
Years 
Board of Directors Dimension 
(Average) 
Senior Management Dimension 
(Average) 
RGI 
(Average) 
2006 2.4 1.5 3.9 
2007 3.1 2.1 5.3 
2008 3 2.5 5.5 
2009 5 3 8 
2010 5.6 3.1 8.8 
2011 6.6 3.6 10.3 
2012 6.9 4 10.9 
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Figure 2.6: Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in Qatar 
 
 
 
Finally, in the United Arab Emirates it is also noticed that the trend develops positively 
throughout the sample period for the three variables (Figure 2.7). The board of directors’ 
dimension shows an average that improves from 1.5 to 6 in 2006 and 2012 respectively while 
the senior management’s dimension has an average that evolves from 1 in 2006 to 4 in 2012. 
The aggregate RGI shows an average that improves from 2.5 in 2006 to 10 in 2012.  
 
Table 2.11 Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in UAE 
 
Years 
Board of Directors Dimension 
(Average) 
Senior Management Dimension 
(Average) 
RGI 
(Average) 
2006 1.5 1 2.5 
2007 3.3 2.2 5.5 
2008 3.7 2.4 6.1 
2009 4.3 2.9 7.2 
2010 5.6 3.3 8.9 
2011 5.5 3.8 9.3 
2012 6 4 10 
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Figure 2.7: Evolution of RGI average scores by dimensions in United Arab Emirates 
 
 
 
Overall and from the figures 2.3 to 2.7 and their related tables (Table 2.7 to 2.11), it can be 
deduced that while the disclosures on the risk governance structures in the banks considered in 
this study are relatively low, there is a positive and evolutive trend from the banks in reporting 
the relevant aspects that convey the structure and quality of their risk governance frameworks.  
 
2.5.1.2 Comparison between RGI results in Islamic and Conventional Banks  
 
In the previous sections, the interest was to explore the results of RGI in terms of frequency by 
year as reported in Table 2.6 then to visually assess the trends and developments of each of its 
dimensions as well as its aggregate scores over the entire period of time however at each country 
level as reported in Figures 2.3 to 2.7 and Tables 2.7 to 2.11 above. In this sub-section, the 
interest is to introduce the comparison between the RGI scores of Islamic and non-Islamic banks 
by comparing the frequency for each RGI result scored by the 53 banks in the sample. As 
mentioned earlier, the scores of RGI varied between 0 and 17. In Table 2.12, each calculated 
RGI value is reported with the number of conventional and Islamic banks that scored it. For 
instance, the aggregate RGI score of 7 reported in the first column of Table 2.12 has been scored 
11 times by conventional banks and 19 times by Islamic banks which together sum up to 30 
times in the last column of Table 2.12. One main motivation for this table of results dwells in 
showing which of the two bank types scored the highest RGI aggregate value and which type 
of banks scored the lowest. As can be seen in Table 2.12, the highest value of RGI, that is 17, 
has been scored three times by conventional banks while the lowest value of 0 has been scored 
once and by an Islamic bank.    
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Also, it appears that conventional banks have an average RGI of 9.17 which is higher than the 
average of RGI in Islamic banks (8.10). The standard deviation however is almost equal for the 
two banks’ types, 3.45 and 3.58 for conventional and Islamic banks respectively.  
 
Table 2.12: Risk Governance Index: Comparison of Scores between Islamic and 
Conventional banks 
 
Risk Governance 
Index Conventional Islamic Total 
0 0 1 1 
1 2 4 6 
2 4 5 9 
3 6 2 8 
4 10 16 26 
5 7 7 14 
6 10 13 23 
7 11 19 30 
8 15 16 31 
9 25 9 34 
10 31 15 46 
11 12 14 26 
12 13 9 22 
13 13 7 20 
14 11 3 14 
15 4 5 9 
16 1 2 3 
17 3 0 3 
Mean  
Std Dev. 
Total Observations 
9.174 
3.452 
178 
8.102 
3.582 
147 
8.689 
3.546 
325 
 
2.5.2 Risk Governance Variations between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
To test the stated null hypotheses in section 2.3 above, two-tailed inferential statistics are used 
to explore whether the means of the two bank types are statistically different from each other.  
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In this study, parametric tests are possible to use as the data for RGI follows a normal 
distribution. Normality has been tested for both numerically through the skewness and kurtosis 
tests and graphically through the box-plot command on STATA as is shown in Table 2.13 and 
Figure 2.8. Specifically, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that posits that the variable is 
normally distributed as the p-value (0.068) is not statistically significant. Graphically, the 
distribution of the RGI data displays a bell-shape as can be seen in Figure 2.8.  
   
Table 2.13 Normality / Skewness and Kurtosis Tests for RGI 
Variable Observations Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) Adj chi² (2) Prob>Chi² 
RGI 325 0.4473 0.0292 5.36 0.0687 
 
Figure 2.8 Graphical Test for Normality of RGI – BOX-PLOT (STATA Output) 
 
First hypothesis tests whether there exists any statistical difference between the risk governance 
structures in Islamic and Conventional banks regardless of the countries over the entire period. 
A t-test is run to test H01, the results are reported in Table 2.14.  
 
H01: There is no difference between risk governance structures (RGS) in Islamic and 
Conventional banks throughout the sample period.  
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Table 2.14: RGI Variation between Islamic and Conventional Banks –T-test results 
  RGI - CB RGI - IB 
Mean 9.174 8.102 
Variance 11.918 12.831 
Observations 178 147 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 
df 307 
 
t-Stat 2.729 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003 
 
t-Critical one-tail 1.649 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.006 
 
t-Critical two-tail 1.967   
 
The t-Stat of 2.72 is significant at 1% level (p-value is equal to 0.006). Hence, the first null 
hypothesis H01 is rejected acknowledging that significant differences of risk governance 
structures between Islamic and mainstream banks exist with the former (8.10) being lower than 
the latter (9.17). As Siraj and Pillai (2012) explain, in contrast with Islamic banks and because 
of their age, conventional counterparts have a longer experience in dealing with regulatory 
issues pertaining to Pillar 1, 2 and 3 of the Basel frameworks which is also likely to explicate 
the above findings. Conventional banks are therefore better prepared to implement the 
enhancements proposed by the regulators on various aspects of the risks assessment and 
management. Similarly, they are more familiar with the processes of risk management related 
to their loan-based products and to their business operations (from risks identification to risk 
control and continuous monitoring) and possess a stronger knowledge on how to curb them. 
Nonetheless, while their counterparts seem to have a significant competitive advantage of 
longer experience, Islamic banks (IB) should normally capitalize on its distinctive 
supplementary supervisory framework that is based on Islamic law. In fact, IB must achieve 
the Shari’ah principles in all aspects of their business including their products, operations, 
practices and management (Elasrag, 2014). For instance, one aspect of compliance with 
Shari’ah that is required from the strategic management is to establish and maintain the best 
risk governance frameworks that can guarantee the protection and interests of depositors and 
investment account holders and avoid putting at stake their savings. Thereafter, an ensuing 
aspect of compliance with Shari’ah dwells in being as transparent as possible regarding all 
matters of the Islamic banking business and most importantly on the matters pertaining to 
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setting risk tolerance levels, risk identification processes and options for risk management. It is 
worth noting also that Pillar 3 of the Basel II framework is centred on the disclosure 
requirements among which specifications relating to capital adequacy, risk weighted assets, risk 
exposures and risk assessments are put on the top list of concerns for regulators, the market and 
the public as a means to enhance market discipline (BCBS, 2009).  
 
2.5.3 Risk Governance Variations before and after the GFC 
To explore whether risk governance structures varied before and after the global financial crisis 
regardless of the banks’ type and the countries, a t-test is run to test the second null hypothesis 
H02. The period before the GFC comprehends the years 2006 and 2007 while years 2008 to 
2012 cover the post-GFC period. Results are reported in Table 2.15.  
 
H02: There is no difference in the risk governance structures before and after the global 
financial crisis regardless of the banks’ type. 
Table 2.15: RGI Variation after the GFC – T-test results 
  RGI - Ante RGI - Post 
Mean 5.584 9.150 
Variance 16.231 16.156 
Observations 159 213 
Hypothesized Mean Difference  0 
 
df 340 
 
t-Stat -8.452 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 4.25E-16 
 
t-Critical one-tail 1.649 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 8.505E-16 
 
t-Critical two-tail 1.966965734   
 
As the p-value of the t-Stat (8.45) is extremely small (8.50905E-16) and highly significant at 
1% level, the second null hypothesis H02 can be rejected confirming that Risk Governance 
Structures did vary significantly after the GFC as compared to before the financial turmoil. As 
weaknesses in the risk management systems were spotted among the root causes of the GFC 
(OECD 2009) and international financial authorities reacted to them by issuing guidelines for 
better corporate governance practices (BCBS 2014, BCBS 2015, FSB 2013) it is expected that 
banks have reviewed their approaches to the governance and management of their risk 
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management entities, systems and human resources. Also, this positive variation for banks in 
the Gulf region could also be explained by the growing role that the HAWKAMAH Institute 
for Corporate Governance –which was established in 2006 by renowned international 
institutions such as the OECD, the IFC, the World Bank, the Union of Arab Banks and the 
Dubai International Financial Centre Authority. Not only did HAWKAMAH raise more 
awareness on corporate governance, it also started to provide financial institutions and 
companies in the region with practical tools to ameliorate their corporate governance 
manoeuvres based on the results of their conducted surveys, case studies and research reports16.  
 
2.5.4 Risk Governance Variations within each banks’ type before and after the 
GFC 
To supplement the results of Table 2.15 with in-depth analysis, further statistical examinations 
are conducted to explore the differences between the means of RGI before and after the crisis 
however within each type of banks. Therefore, using the t-test the inferential analysis is run 
first for conventional banks with RGI scores sorted before and after the crisis (using the 
financial crisis dummy variable). The method is applied identically for Islamic banks afterward. 
Results are reported in Table 2.16.  
 
Table 2.16: RGI Variation before and after the GFC in the two bank types  
 Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Pre-GFC 51 8.941 3.956 40 7.65 3.984 
Post-GFC 127 9.267 3.240 106 8.273 3.440 
Combined 178 9.174 3.452 146 8.102 3.594 
t-statistic   -0.569   -0.934 
p-value   0.569   0.351 
 
From the above table, it is noted even though the RGI for both bank types improve, the 
differences are not statistically significant differences between means of their RGI scores before 
and after the financial debacle. For conventional banks for instance, the mean of the risk 
governance index was 8.94 before the GFC and increased to 9.26 in the years 2008 to 2012. 
                                                             
16 One of the first surveys on the practices of corporate governance in the region was published by 
HAWKAMAH and the Institute of International Finance in September 2006 where it listed preliminary steps to 
improve the investment environment in the GCC (for more information, please refer to (Hawkamah and IIF, 
2006)) 
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However, the mean difference is not statistically significant as the t-stat is equal to 0.56 in 
absolute value. Likewise, the index score in Islamic banks was on average 7.65 before the GFC 
and improved to 8.27 after it. As the t-statistic also shows a p-value that is higher than 10%, it 
can be concluded that the difference in means is not statistically significant in Islamic banks 
too.  
2.5.5 An exploration of the Risk Governance Status in Islamic and Conventional 
Banks at Country Levels  
Additional detailed investigation on the differences between the two types of banks in different 
countries of the GCC is carried out in this section. For this purpose, the sample is split into 
banks in the five countries accordingly then further descriptive and inferential statistics are 
performed. Results are reported in Tables 2.17 to 2.21.  
 
H03: There is no difference between risk governance structures in Islamic and Conventional 
banks within each GCC country. 
First in Saudi Arabia, there is no statistically significant difference between risk governance 
structures as measured in its local conventional and Islamic banks (Table 2.17). Interestingly, 
the mean RGI of Islamic banks (10.11) is greater than that of their conventional counterparts 
(9.44). However, the t-statistic of -0.647 indicates that the difference is not significant (p-value 
is 0.52).  
 
Table 2.17: RGI Variations between Islamic and Conventional Banks in Saudi Arabia 
  CB IB 
Mean 9.444 10.117 
Variance 4.564 15.485 
Observations 27 17 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 22  
t-Stat -0.647  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.261  
t-Critical one-tail 1.717  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.523  
t-Critical two-tail 2.073   
 
In Kuwait also, there is no statistically significant difference between risk governance structures 
as measured in its local mainstream and conventional banks (Table 2.18). The means of RGI 
are respectively of 6.93 and 5.71. The t-statistic (1.60) is not significant (p-value is 0.11). The 
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results suggest that the observed difference between the two sub-sample means does not permit 
to reject H03 which posits that RGI scores differ significantly between Islamic and non-Islamic 
banks in Kuwait.  
 
Table 2.18: RGI Variations between Islamic and Conventional Banks in Kuwait 
  CB IB 
Mean 6.933 5.714 
Variance 11.305 5.544 
Observations 30 28 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 52  
t-Stat 1.607  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.056  
t-Critical one-tail 1.674  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.113  
t-Critical two-tail 2.006   
 
In contrast in Qatar, the RGI mean in conventional banks is of 9.72 and 7.41 for Qatari Islamic 
banks. The t-statistic of 2.27 is statistically significant at 5% significance level (p-value is 0.02). 
This result suggests that there is a significant difference between risk governance structures 
between the two types of banks (Table 2.19).  
 
Table 2.19: RGI Variations between Islamic and Conventional Banks in Qatar 
  CB IB 
Mean 9.72 7.416 
Variance 16.96 8.427 
Observations 25 24 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 43  
t-Stat 2.270  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.014  
t-Critical one-tail 1.681  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.028  
t-Critical two-tail 2.016   
 
The RGI Scores in Bahrain are the highest in the GCC region where Islamic banks show a mean 
score of 10 slightly lower than conventional banks with 10.59. Unsurprisingly, based on the 
observed difference between the sample means, there is no statistically significant difference 
between risk governance structures as measured in Bahraini local mainstream and conventional 
banks (Table 2.20) as the t-statistic is 0.95 but not significant (p-value is 0.34).  
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Table 2.20: RGI Variations between Islamic and Conventional Banks in Bahrain 
  CB IB 
Mean 10.595 10 
Variance 8.441 7.902 
Observations 42 42 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 82  
t-Stat 0.954  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.171  
t-Critical one-tail 1.663  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.342  
t-Critical two-tail 1.989   
 
Finally, conventional banks in the United Arab Emirates display RGI scores of 8.92 on average 
which is higher than the average RGI in Islamic banks which is of 7.25. With a positive and 
significant t-statistic of 2.06, it can be inferred that there exists a statistically significant 
difference at 5 percent between the two banks’ types in the UAE. Results are reported in Table 
2.21.  
Table 2.21: RGI Variations between Islamic and Conventional Banks in United Arab 
Emirates 
  CB IB 
Mean 8.925 7.25 
Variance 12.484 15.45 
Observations 54 36 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 70  
t-Stat 2.062  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.021  
t-Critical one-tail 1.666  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.042  
t-Critical two-tail 1.994   
 
2.6 Implications of the Study & Conclusions 
Improving risk governance has become part of the core recommendations that international 
financial authorities came out with in a post global financial crisis era. The first empirical 
chapter of the thesis discussed the importance and necessity of developing efficient risk 
governance mechanisms within the overall corporate governance frameworks in banks. 
Referring to the most recent publications on risk governance in the banking industry from the 
regulatory and supervisory bodies in addition to the available academic literature, a novel and 
comprehensive metric named the Risk Governance Index (RGI) has been developed to assess 
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and evaluate the robustness of the risk governance structures in GCC banks since 2006 and until 
2012. In contrast with previous academic papers on corporate governance and the scarce 
research on risk governance particularly, the measure incorporates nineteen determinants under 
two dimensions that lay out the centrality of risk management key functions in banks at board 
of directors and senior management’s levels.  
The RGI enabled an assessment of the frameworks’ solidity within a sample of 27 mainstream 
banks and 26 Islamic banks in five Gulf Cooperation Council countries. As the timeframe 
covered years before and after the last global financial crisis, one of the main research objectives 
is to examine the evolution and / or variation of the practices in terms of risk management 
governance throughout this critical period where flaws in these have been attributed among the 
causes of the turmoil. The statistical exploration (both descriptive and inferential) indicates a 
positive evolution in the implementation of healthier risk governance practices in the two types 
of banks. The difference in RGI means for the whole sample regardless of the banks’ type, 
before and after the GFC is also statistically significant which indicates the strengthening of the 
strategic organizational mechanisms in line with the recommendations of the financial 
regulatory authorities. Also, a subsequent t-test shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference between risk governance practices in bank types with the conventional banks 
recording on average better RGI results than their Islamic counterparts. These results could be 
explained by the bigger size, the larger market shares and the longer experience that 
conventional banks have in dealing with risk management and regulatory issues which is in 
contrast with the nascent Islamic banking industry.  
 
There are two implications of the present study. First, as a comprehensive metric RGI can be 
used continuously to monitor the development of risk governance structures in any bank. It can 
be used internally to enable banks to ameliorate their risk governance practices but most 
importantly it can be used by supervisory bodies and regulators to assess, monitor, control and 
compare them at national, regional and global levels. Authorities and regulators such as Central 
Banks, Capital Markets and Stock Exchange regulators can refer to it to track weak practices 
and promote more efficient risk management and governance architectures. RGI can also be 
further enriched by more desirable attributes for healthy risk management mechanisms, 
functions and practices. A second implication of the study dwells in the need to use RGI as a 
proxy for robust risk governance structures in the subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis. 
While this chapter introduced the methodology of construction of the index and preliminary 
statistical analysis of the results, the following chapters will be looking at the impacts of sound 
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risk governance on the banks’ profitability then on their financial stability. The genesis for these 
two next studies stems from the essential need to find out whether robust risk management 
strategic mechanisms compromise (or not) the profitability levels and enhance (or not) the 
financial stability of banks.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The banking industry is inherently unstable as it confronts a multiplicity of risks. They perform 
important functions of liquidity and maturity transformation by collecting deposits and issuing 
loans. In addition to their risks arising in their banking book, they are exposed to the dynamics 
of contemporary financial markets that expose them to continuous fluctuations in market prices 
such as exchange and interest rates that affect their trading books (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 
2000; Schroeck, 2002). Risk management is hence a function that is at the heart of the overall 
banking business. 
The 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) revealed the weaknesses in the risk management 
function and highlighted the gaps in the governance structures related to risk oversight and 
management (Adam and Mehran 2011, FSB 2013). OECD (2009) acknowledges that the 
failures in risk management were one of the key factors contributing to the GFC, highlighting 
that in a number of cases boards were ignorant of the risks faced by the banks (OECD 2009, 
p.8). Drawing on the key lessons following the GFC, the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) published “Principles for enhancing corporate governance” in October 
2010 that provides guidelines to enhance corporate governance both at bank and supervisory 
levels. Furthermore, BCBS published “Corporate governance principles for banks” in 2015 that 
includes guidelines to strengthen risk governance regimes. Among others, the specific issues 
identified include board’s role in ascertaining risk appetite, management and control and 
defining the responsibilities of risk committee, CRO and internal audit to promote the long-
term soundness of banks.  
In addition to these BCBS’s guidelines, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) also led a peer 
review dedicated to Risk Governance frameworks and practices in financial institutions and 
presented its results in February 2013. The FSB shed light on some of the flaws in governance 
practices associated with risk related functions. The lack of sound financial industry experience 
by board members, the massive volume and complexity of information provided to the directors 
in addition to insufficient checks and balances were also found to be behind their inability to 
fulfil their responsibilities. They identified a key component of risk governance framework to 
be a dedicated independent risk committee at board level that would provide consequential 
insight on the bank’s exposures and challenge the management proposals and decisions. At 
senior management level weaknesses included lack of authority, stature and independence of 
Chief Risk Officers (CRO) and internal audit functions were found to impede efficient 
monitoring and settlement of identified weaknesses by the internal auditing and controls.  
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The FSB peer-review results suggested improvements in various aspects of risk governance by 
taking a more holistic approach to risk governance instead of looking at each feature singly 
(FSB 2013). A key recommendation was to further enhance the authority and independence of 
CROs and national authorities to strengthen “their ability to assess the effectiveness of a bank’s 
risk governance and its risk culture” (FSB 2013, p.5). It advised them as well to “engage more 
frequently with the board and its risk and audit committees” (FSB 2013, p.5). The Basel 
Committee has highlighted the importance of the supervisory oversight being central to 
enhancing risk governance and the proper functioning of the banking sector. The main 
developments identified by BCBS includes effective board oversight, rigorous risk 
management, strong internal controls, establishment of standalone risk committees, creation 
and elevation of the CROs role and integration of discussions between board audit and risk 
committees (BCBS 2014, p.3-4). 
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, academic literature exploring the role of risk 
governance in banks is meagre principally because it is a subject of relatively new interest. 
Nonetheless, as a nexus has been already established in literature between the centrality of 
corporate governance in financial institutions and the multiple recent financial scandals that 
revealed shortcomings in controls, transparency and above all public responsibility (Copeland 
et al., 2013; Saito et al, 2013), the peculiar stance of risk management governance in a post 
GFC period necessitates exploration by academicians and regulators alike.  
Research on corporate governance in both conventional and Islamic banking systems mainly 
focuses on the concept, its status, role and structure of the board of directors (Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2009; Adams and Mehran, 2008, 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Al-Suhaibani and Naifar, 2014; Caprio 
et al., 2007; Levine, 2004; Macey and O’hara, 2003; Safieddine, 2008). Other studies look at 
the association between some or only a few bank governance attributes on the corporate 
performance (Aebi et al., 2012; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Caprio et al., 2007; Mollah et al., 
2016; Mollah and Liljeblom, 2016; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Pathan, 2009; Pathan and Faff, 
2013) or evaluate the effectiveness of its disclosures in annual reports (such as corporate risk 
disclosures in Abdallah et al. (2015); Linsley and Shrives (2006). Academic studies on risk 
governance in banking are even scant. Only Aebi et al. (2012), Battaglia and Gallo (2015), Ellul 
and Yerramilli (2013) and Hines and Peter (2015) use risk management and risk governance 
determinants in their studies.  
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The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the literature related to banking risk governance and 
study its impact on three widely used financial performance indicators namely ROAA, ROAE 
and Cost-to-income for banks in the GCC region. The present chapter uses the previously 
developed holistic risk governance index (RGI) as the focus variable in the econometric 
estimations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature on risk governance and financial performance Section 3.3 develops the research 
context, overall objective and hypotheses. After presenting the methods used to collect and 
analyse data, Section 3.4 discusses the empirical findings. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance and Financial Performance in Conventional 
Banking 
A plethora of academic research examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance. These papers apply various proxies for corporate governance that they 
use in causality studies. For instance, using a sample of 35 banks holding companies (BHC) 
from 1959 to 1999 the empirical study led by Adam and Mehran (2005) focus on the board 
structure -including its size and composition- and how it relates to their performance. They find 
that the proportion of outsiders on the board is not significantly related to the bank’s 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. Yet the natural logarithm for board’s size does have a 
significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. One possible explanation they give to this 
finding that contrasts with previous literature is the increase of mergers and acquisitions which 
subsequently led to an increase in the board size. Using the same sample, Adam and Mehran 
(2011) put forth more evidence on how adding more directors who also sit in subsidiaries to the 
board adds more value to the banks compared to other industries (Adam and Mehran 2011, p.5). 
They point out that bank governance has some specific features that need to be considered when 
elaborating reforms referring importantly to the difficulty of measuring the independence of the 
bank’s board. This is of particular interest to them as they investigate the relationship between 
the board’s independence and the bank’s size as well as its effect on the bank’s performance 
(Adam and Mehran 2011, p.10-13).  
Caprio et al (2004) used a sample of 244 banks in 44 countries to assess the implications of 
ownership, shareholders’ protection laws and bank supervisory and regulatory policies -as 
proxies for corporate governance mechanisms- on bank valuations. They find that larger cash-
flow rights boost valuations while weak shareholders protection laws lower them. Using a total 
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620 bank-year observations from a sample of 69 banks in 6 OECD countries, Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms to monitor 
managers’ behaviour and to advise them on strategy identification and implementation, on the 
bank’s performance. Their main hypothesis maintains that the size, composition and 
functioning of the board of directors reflect its motivation and abilities in its supervisory and 
advisory duties.  
Andres and Vallelado (2008) use Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA) and annual shareholder 
market return as measurements of bank performance and size and composition of the board 
(proxied by the proportion of non-executive directors in the board) and the functioning of the 
board of directors (BOD) (measured by the number of meetings held per year). Their results 
challenge the idea that smaller boards are more efficient. In fact, they find that there is a trade-
off related to board size with the advantages of more monitoring being able to deal with 
problems and disadvantages being control and coordination problems. They estimate the 
optimum limit for a board to efficiently coordinate, control and make proper decisions to be 
around 19 directors. Their results also show that the executive directors should be represented 
optimally with non-executive directors as the former group bring their knowledge of the bank 
that is as essential to the advisory function of the latter but additionally enables the lessening of 
conflicts of interest.    
In line with the results from the above studies, Salim et al. (2016) explore the effects of the 
corporate governance reforms introduced in 2003 on the performance of 11 Australian banks 
between years 1999 and 2013. Using two-stage double bootstrap Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), they find a positive and significant association between board size and committee 
meetings with bank efficiency, no significant impact of the number of independent board 
members, the board meetings and large shareholdings on the banks’ technical performance.  
In the MENA region, Ghosh (2018) examine the categories of corporate governance disclosures 
that influence the performance and stability of 102 banks from 12 countries between years 2000 
and 2012. The author’s main finding suggests that disclosures related to the board independence 
and the assessment of potential risk factors are the two major categories that improve the banks’ 
profitability measured by ROA. Interestingly, the magnitude of this positive influence is almost 
similar in the two cases enabling an increase of profitability by roughly 0.4%. With regards to 
stability proxied by the z-score, it is found that the disclosures relating to the executive’s 
compensation lowers the banks’ stability whereas those that relate to risks and ethics enhance 
it.  
86 
 
From the above empirical papers, the general pattern that emerges from the literature induces 
overall a positive contribution of the corporate governance mechanisms as well as their 
disclosures to the achievement of higher bank profitability levels. Although it is acknowledged 
that the corporate governance reforms in countries such in the MENA region are not as effective 
as ones in more developed countries such as the United States or Australia (Ghosh, 2018), 
evidence shows that some aspects of corporate governance augment financial performance 
regardless of the level of development of the country under study. It can be therefore inferred 
that similar trends in the relationships between some corporate governance mechanisms mainly 
ones referring to the board of directors, and common performance indicators (such as the ratio 
of returns on assets) can be expected in different samples from different geographical regions.  
3.2.2 Corporate Governance and Financial Performance in Islamic banking 
As far as it could be ascertained, the only empirical study that explored the associations between 
corporate governance and performance in Islamic banks is by Mollah and Zaman (2015) who 
provide evidence of the impact of Shari’ah supervision, and corporate governance on bank 
performance. They use a match-paired sample of 86 Islamic banks and 86 conventional banks 
across 25 countries from 2005 till 2011 to explore the impact of SSB and corporate governance 
(CG) on their performance. Using the Shari’ah board size as the measurement of SSB, board 
size (log number of members on the BOD), independence of the BOD (proportion of 
independent non-executives in the board), duality of the CEO (when chairing the BOD as well) 
and internal recruitment of the CEO as variables for CG, they apply random-effect GLS 
technique to assess the effect of Shari’ah Supervision, board structure and CEO power on bank 
performance. Proxies of the dependent variables measuring bank performance were ROIAE 
(operating profit divided by average equity), ROIAA (operating profit divided by total assets), 
ROAE (net income divided by average total equity), ROAA (net income divided by average 
total assets) and Tobin’s Q. Their study shows that SSB impacts IB’s performance positively 
when they achieve a supervisory role rather than a mere advisory function. CG variables in 
contrast do not seem to impact their financial performance. However, they find a negative 
relationship between the board size and performance implying that large boards are less 
efficient which is inconsistent with Andres and Vallelado (2008). From a comparative 
standpoint, Mollah and Zaman (2015) find that Islamic banks have more independent boards 
than their conventional counterparts and are less likely to recruit CEOs internally. They also 
find a significant link between SSB and CG practices where Shari’ah boards play an important 
role in protecting shareholders’ interests.  
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Using a sample of 6 Islamic banks operating in the UAE, Ahmed (2017) explored the impact 
of the Corporate Governance Index on their financial performance between years 2011 and 
2016. Specifically, they used responses to interviews with the top management in each of these 
6 banks to construct a corporate governance index that entails the following categories: the 
board size, the presence of female members in the board, the duality of the CEO, the presence 
of block 30 holders, the existence of a Shari’ah committee and its size. To proxy financial 
performance, the author uses ROA, ROE and earnings per share. Results from the regression 
models show that there is a direct positive relationship between the corporate governance index 
and ROE and between the corporate governance index and the earnings per share. Nonetheless, 
the author finds no significant association between the corporate governance index and ROA.  
Prior to these studies, Ghayad (2008) examined the elements that determine the operational 
performance of Islamic banks in Bahrain. In addition to financial inputs, the author finds that 
managerial variables also impact the performance of Islamic banks with, in particular, a 
hampering influence of the Shari’ah board on the banks’ directors. The author explains that 
such obstruction is due to directors and members of the Shari’ah board not speaking the same 
language and having little knowledge about finance and commerce to ensure a clearer 
understanding of the banks’ business operations as well as a better quality of supervision.  
One of the objectives of Farag et al. (2017) in their empirical paper (and that pertain to this 
section) is to examine the relationship between the Islamic banks’ board structures and their 
financial performance as well as the nature of the association between the size of the Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) and the financial performance of Islamic banks. They use data of 90 
Islamic banks from 13 countries between years 2006 to 2014. Interestingly, the authors find 
that there is a significant positive relationship between the Islamic banks’ board size and return 
on operating equity (ROOE) and return on equity (ROE) as two proxies for financial 
performance. Precisely, results from two models out of the four-estimated show that a 1% 
change in the board of directors’ size is likely to lead to a change of 0.27% and 0.23% of 
financial performance respectively. Also, the authors find out that a 1% change in the size of 
the SSB may lead to a change of 0.133% and 0.145% in financial performance measured by 
ROOE and ROE respectively. In other words, the authors infer that the greater the size of the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board the better the financial performance of the Islamic bank. The study 
of Farag et al. (2017) brings empirical evidence about the importance of the role of the SSB in 
certifying and issuing the Shari’ah compliance of the new Islamic financial products that enable 
Islamic banks to meet the growing demands of the industry in terms of Islamic micro-finance 
products and Islamic financial derivatives.  
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3.2.3 Risk Governance and Financial Performance  
While empirical research on corporate governance examine some specific aspects related to the 
board size, composition and independence only a few studies include risk governance variables. 
Aebi et al (2012) explore whether the presence of a CRO and their reporting line (to the CEO 
or directly to the boards of directors) were associated with better returns. They find that 
effectively when a CRO reports directly to the BOD and not to other corporate entities, the bank 
displays higher buy-and-hold stock returns and ROE during GFC. Using a sample of 72 U.S 
bank holding companies, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) develop “RMI” (Risk Management Index) 
to assess the strength and independence of risk management function. The RMI integrates two 
set of variables related to risk-related functions. The first set aims to measure the importance of 
the CRO in the banking holding company (BHC) through its presence, quality as an executive 
officer of the firm, compensation and their centrality. The second set of variables include 
experience level of the risk committee members in banking and finance and the number of 
meetings held during the year relative to the average of other BHCs. Results of their study 
reveal that banks with high RMI before GFC (i.e. in 2006) had lower tail risk, less 
nonperforming loans, higher operating performance and higher annual returns during the years 
of the financial crisis (i.e. 2007 and 2008). Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) further use their sample 
to compute RMI from 1994 to 2009 and find that while BHCs scoring high RMI have also high 
stock returns during crisis years, there is no relationship between them in normal years. Such 
relevant findings imply that when a bank has a strong and independent risk management 
function, it better succeeds in sheltering itself from large losses and are profitable.  
A study by Hines and Peter (2015) investigates whether financial institutions that have 
voluntary risk management committees (RMC) witness any effect on their short-term: risk 
outcomes, hedging and trading derivative structures and profitability. Based on a sample of 47 
financial institutions in the U.S, they elucidate that ones that have international banking activity, 
higher leverage, larger and more independent board, a Big N auditor, merger and acquisition 
activity and lower financial reporting quality are more likely to form a risk management 
committee. They also find that RMC has a symbolic effect of governance practice on short-
term changes in risk outcomes, notional values of hedging and trading derivatives as well as on 
profitability. 
Battaglia and Gallo (2015) use 15 Chinese banks and 21 Indian banks over the period 2007-
2011 to investigate the effect of risk governance on their performance. They select board size, 
independence of directors and frequency of BOD’s meetings as determinants for the 
effectiveness of a BOD to monitor and advise managers. They also consider two features of 
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risk committees namely the number of directors sitting in them and the number of meetings 
they held. 
They conclude that over the period of 2007-2011, risk committee’s size is positively related to 
the banks’ ROE and ROA, the larger the risk committee the higher the profitability. In terms of 
market valuation however and expected market growth, it is found that banks with smaller risk 
committees tend to have higher Tobin’s Q and price-earning-ratios. The corporate governance 
measure of number of meetings has limited impact on Tobin’s Q with no evidence that small 
size and independence of BOD affect the banks’ profitability. Notwithstanding, one limitation 
of the paper is that it uses one bank-year observation (specifically 2007) for boards and risk 
committees’ variables on the full period of investigation from 2007 to 2011. As explained by 
the authors, such decision is motivated by the need to overcome any endogeneity concern 
relating to board structure variables as has been also done by Pathan and Faff (2013). Therefore, 
they assume that the strength of governance mechanism incorporated in 2007 is reflected in the 
bank’s overall performance. While they rationalize this assumption on previous literature 
(Battaglia and Gallo 2015, p.9), it can be argued that as there was more attention given to risk 
governance following the GFC, it is very likely that boards and risk committees’ determinants 
could have changed as also acknowledged by Hines and Peters (2015)17. 
3.3 Research Context, Objective and Hypotheses 
The new understanding on risk governance as advanced by international multilateral financial 
authorities (FSB and BCBS) entails broader aspects and additional functions that existing 
empirical literature, including the most recent ones have not covered. The aim of this paper is 
to contribute to this relatively new area on risk governance by looking at the existing 
associations between risk governance frameworks and banks’ performance. As Islamic banks 
showed more resilience during and after the GFC (Beck et al., 2013b; Hasan and Dridi, 2010; 
Mirakhor and Krichene, 2009; Parashar, 2010), an appealing angle of research is to compare 
whether their risk governance and management mechanisms carry a different impact on 
profitability than the one carried by their conventional counterparts.  
As operations and management of Islamic banks are subject to more stringent legal 
requirements of Shari’ah compliance, a preliminary assumption presupposes that significant 
differences between risk governance architectures in Islamic and non-Islamic banks are likely 
to affect differently the sources of banks’ income hence their profitability. This assumption is 
                                                             
17 For specific elucidation, see (Hines and Peters 2015, p.22). 
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formed on the basis that Islamic banks observe stricter rules regarding (i) the religiously 
permissible types of investments (that is to say the involvement in ethical, Shari’ah compliant 
and socially responsible investments only) and (ii) the risk management practices. The 
implications of risk governance and management on returns, however cannot be presumed a-
priori.  
Building up on the discussion above, the objectives of the present chapter are twofold: first is 
to examine the overall effect of strong risk governance frameworks on the banks’ profitability 
and second is to explore the variations occurring in a post-financial crisis period. For both cases, 
the exploration is achieved on the overall sample and then by distinguishing between the two 
banks’ type to examine whether any existing differences similar / different results.   
 
To reach the above listed objectives, the following hypotheses are postulated:  
H01: There is no relationship between risk governance and banks performance.  
H02: There is no relationship between risk governance and the performance of Islamic banks.  
H03: There is no relationship between risk governance and banks’ performance in the post-GFC 
period. 
H04: There is no relationship between risk governance and the Islamic banks’ performance in 
the post-GFC period.  
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Sample, data and explanatory variables 
Being a comparative study, it uses a sample of 27 conventional banks and 26 full-fledged 
Islamic banks in five GCC countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the 
United Arab Emirates for the period 2006 to 2012 as listed in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in the previous 
chapter. Oman is excluded from the study as it launched its first Islamic banks in 2013. The 
GCC was chosen for the study as most countries have adequate number of Islamic banks 
compared to their conventional counterparts. Furthermore, the GCC region counts the highest 
number of Islamic financial institutions that experienced the largest asset growth18 in the decade 
between 2006 and 2016 as reported in The Banker Magazine’s top ten movers by asset growth 
(The Banker, 2016). Only full-fledged Islamic banks were included, and Islamic windows of 
conventional banks were excluded due to conceptual and technical reasons specifically for the 
                                                             
18 In the Top Ten, the GCC region alone counts five institutions, two in Iran then the remaining three in Asia. 
(The Banker, 2016) 
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focus variable that is the RGI as explained in detail in section 2.4.3 of the previous chapter.  
As the aim of the chapter is to examine the impact of risk governance on performance of banks, 
the Risk Governance Index (RGI) previously developed is used as a proxy. To recall, the higher 
the score of RGI the more robust and the better the risk governance mechanisms. While the 
information needed to score the RGI was hand-collected from annual reports, financial 
statements and corporate governance reports as introduced earlier, the remaining variables 
(dependent and explanatory) used in the econometric models were downloaded from 
BankScope Bureau Van Dijk and the World Bank databases. A description of the data used in 
the empirical model and the sources are given in Table 3.1. 
 
3.4.2 The Empirical Model and Estimation Method  
To test the null hypotheses posited above, the following dynamic model is constructed: 
FPIi,t = α0 + β1FPIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + γXi,t + ζBKi,t+ θZi,t + β2Islamic_Dummy + β3Crisis_Dummy + 
εi,t (3.1) 
Where: 
FPIi,t stands for the Financial Performance Indicator (measured by ROAA, ROAE and Cost-to-
Income) of bank i at time t, FPIi,t-1 is the lagged value of the financial performance indicator, 
RGIi,t is the Risk Governance Index for bank i at time t, Xi,t is a matrix of bank accounting 
explanatory variables, BKi,t is a matrix of bank specific control variables, Zi,t is a matrix of 
macroeconomic variables. Islamic_Dummy is the dummy variable that permits to account for 
the distinctiveness of the Islamic banks’ business model compared to their conventional 
counterparts in the four equations as will follow19. Crisis_Dummy is the dummy variable that 
permits to distinguish between the years before the inception of the crisis (that is 2006 and 
2007) and the period following the inception of the crisis (that is from 2008 to 2012). α0 is the 
constant, β1, δ, γ, ζ, θ, β2 and β3 are the vectors of parameter estimates for their respective 
matrices and ε is the error term. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 Please note that in Models 2 and 4, where the focus is on the case of RGI in Islamic banks, an interaction term 
is incorporated in the models whereby the RGI scores in Islamic banks only acts as an additional variable from 
which an inference of the effect on every financial performance indicator is drawn. 
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Table 3.1: Description of Variables Used in the Study 
Variables Definition, Coding and Data Source 
Panel A: Dependent Variables   
ROAA Return on Average Assets as equal to the ratio of Net Income on 
Average Assets (Source: BankScope)  
ROAE Return on Average Equity as equal to the ratio of Net Income on 
Average Equity (Source: BankScope) 
C2I Cost to Income Ratio as equal to Operating Expenses divided by 
Operating Income (Source: BankScope) 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables  
RGI  Risk Governance Index developed by author (Source: Annual 
Reports and corporate governance reports)  
Islamic Dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bank is Islamic 
and 0 otherwise 
Crisis Dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the year of the 
observation is during and post crisis (that is 2008 to 2012) and 0 
otherwise  
TEA Total Earning Assets concern assets that generate interest or 
dividends. It includes stocks, bonds, income from rental property, 
certificates of deposit and other interest or dividend earning 
accounts or instruments. (Source: BankScope) 
NL Net Loans defined as interest-earning balances with central banks 
and loans and advances to banks net of impairment value including 
loans pledged to banks as collateral, incl. reverse repos with banks 
(Source: BankScope) 
Op_Inc Operating Income that is income gained from the operating 
activities (Source: BankScope) 
Ovh_C Overhead Costs which refer to all the costs in the income statement 
including accounting fees, insurance, rent, repairs among others 
(Source: BankScope) 
Bank Level Control Variables  
LnTA Natural Logarithm of total assets (Source: BankScope). Total assets 
include: cash and due from banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed 
assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax, 
discontinued operations, other assets 
DSTF Total deposits and short-term funding (Source: BankScope) 
Eq_TA Leverage ratio as equal to Equity divided by Total Assets (Source: 
BankScope) 
NL_TA Ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets (Source: BankScope) 
LLR_GL Ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans (Source: BankScope) 
IRS Interest Rate Spread as equal to lending rate minus deposit rate in % 
(Source: World Bank Database) 
Macroeconomic Control 
Variables 
 
lnGDP_Grw Natural Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate 
(Source: World Bank Database) 
Infl  Inflation rate (Source: World Bank Database) 
Pol_Stab Political stability is defined by the World Bank as a measure of the 
“perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, including terrorism”. Estimates 
ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance. (Source: World Bank Database) 
Gov_eff Government efficiency is defined by the World Bank as reflecting 
the “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
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pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies”. Estimates ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance. (Source: World Bank Database) 
Reg_Qual Regulatory quality is defined by the World Bank as reflecting the 
“perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. Estimates ranges from approximately -
2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. (Source: World 
Bank Database) 
  
The econometric model is estimated using twostep generalized methods of moments (GMM) 
with instrumental variables. Therefore, the first-differences of the dependent variables are used 
to remove the unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects and the explanatory variables 
are instrumented in these first differences equations by using levels of their series lagged two 
periods (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Theoretically, GMM suits the study for various reasons. 
First, the sample size entails more cross-sectional variables than time periods (Blundell and 
Bond 1998, Roodman 2008). As the number of time periods is relatively small, a 
straightforward fixed effects model is unlikely to handle the potential dynamic panel bias20 
where the lagged value of the dependent variable is correlated with the fixed effects in the error 
term (Nickell, 1981). Second, the financial performance is very likely to be dynamic as the 
realizations of the ROAA, ROAE and Cost-to-income at time t are influenced by their past 
realizations, i.e. at t-1. Also, as demonstrated by Caselli et al (1996) and Bond et al (2001), 
GMM dynamic panel estimation enables correction for frequent severe econometric issues such 
as: unobserved heterogeneity, omitted variable bias and measurement error that loom when 
modelling panel data. Also, when heteroscedasticity is present, GMM is more efficient in 
dealing with endogeneity as compared to the use of simple instrumental variables estimator. 
Indeed, the suspected endogenous variables, i.e. ones that might be correlated with the error 
term, are specified in the dynamic model and their lags are used as instruments. 
 
Therefore, heteroscedasticity is controlled for in the three econometric models and the second 
lag of the following variables is defined (defined in Table 3.1) as endogenous regressors: RGI 
IS_DV lnTA TEA NL Op_Inc Ovh_Cost EQ_TA and NL_TA for models where ROAA and 
ROAE are the dependent variables and the following RGI IS_DV Op_Inc Ovh_Cost NL IRS 
LLR_GL lnTA EQ_TA NL_TA for the model with Cost-to-Income (C2I) as the dependent 
variable. With regards to the exogenous variables, the following are used as instruments in the 
                                                             
20 For a comprehensive discussion on overcoming the dynamic panel bias, see Roodman (2008) pages 20-23. 
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STATA command in the three models: Crisis_DV DSTF Pol_Stab Gov_eff Reg_Qual 
lnGDP_Grw and Infl.  
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
As reported in Table 3.2, the focus variable RGI has 325 observations with a mean of 8.68 
across the sample and standard deviation of 3.54. The financial performance indicators ROAA, 
ROAE and C2I used as dependent variables have means of 2.10, 11.80 and 41.88 respectively. 
The explanatory variables TEA, NL, Op_Inc and Ovh_C have means of USD 17.1 million, 
USD 15 million, 749,416.5 and 253,213.4 respectively. The IRS, which measures the margin 
between the cost of mobilizing liabilities and the earnings on assets, is on average 4.07% 
varying between a minimum of 2.57% and a maximum of 6.57% throughout the sample time 
period. 
The bank-level control variables lnTA, DSTF, Eq_TA, NL_TA and LLR_GL have means of 
respectively 16.21, USD 15 million, 16.27, 56.70 and 3.50. 
To account for country specific effects, the macroeconomic control variables selected are 
economic growth (lnGDP_Grw) and the inflation rate (Infl). Additionally, three macro-level 
governance indicators from the World Bank Database are incorporated in the model as it is 
expected to find an influence of the differences in the political stability, government efficiency 
and regulatory quality despite the sociocultural and institutional similarities that are known 
between the GCC countries (Abdallah et al., 2015). As can be seen in Table 3.2, lnGDP_Grw 
and Inflation rate show averages of 1.74% and 4.74% respectively. The World Bank 
Development Indicators have a scale that ranges from -2.5 standing for weakest governance to 
+2.5 for strongest governance. The results show that the average of political stability for the 
GCC countries is 0.29, while it is 0.50 and 0.45 for government efficiency and regulatory 
quality respectively.  
 
3.4.4 Effect of Risk Governance on Banks’ Financial Performance: Overall 
Results 
First, the interest dwells in looking at the overall impact of risk governance on the three 
financial performance indicators. To do so, the following variables are included in the first 
model: RGI, the dummy for bank’s type and the dummy for the post-crisis year in addition to 
the previously listed matrices of explanatory bank and country-level control variables. Results 
of the twostep GMM estimations are reported in Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.3.  
As can be seen, RGI shows a negative impact on ROAA, ROAE and C2I. The coefficients -
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0.11 and -0.92 for respectively ROAA and ROAE are statistically significant at 99% confidence 
level and the coefficient for C2I -2.22 is significant at 90% confidence level. At this stage, it 
can be hypothetically deduced that strong risk governance compromises general levels of bank 
profitability but increases operational efficiency. A potential explanation could be that, among 
other, sound governance determinants such as tight monitoring from the board of directors and 
senior management due to the presence of higher proportion of independent directors, direct 
reporting lines of the CRO and internal audit to the board (reflecting less conflicts between 
management and shareholders) constrain the allocation of loans based on tighter credit scoring 
methodologies, limits the investment in riskier trading book activities and restricts financing 
through excessive leverage. Aebi et al. (2012) also found a negative and statistically significant 
influence of the presence of the risk committee on the ROE while the reporting line of the CRO 
to the board rather than to the CEO has a positive influence on ROE. Hines and Peter (2015) 
also find a negative yet insignificant association of the presence of risk committee on the change 
of Risk Adjusted ROA as a measure of profitability. They further argue that the formation of a 
risk management committee does not necessarily improve financial performance, nor does it 
produce substantive short-term risk adjustments on the change in non-performing assets, the 
change in loan charge-offs and derivative trading. Nonetheless, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) find 
that strong risk management function, which they measure by developing a Risk Management 
Index, drives better operating performance and lowers non-performing loans before the GFC 
and increases the returns after the crisis.  
The results for the cost-to-income model produces a negative coefficient (-2.22) signifying tight 
risk monitoring does not lead to higher expenses related to risk management but in contrast it 
helps reduce the operational costs to improve the banks’ operational efficiency. 
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Table 3.2 – Descriptive Statistics of all Variables 
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
ROAA 355 2.10 5.19 -7.17 90.62 
ROAE 355 11.81 17.26 -136.0 174.2 
C2I 351 41.88 29.21 0.22 394.0 
IS_DV 371 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Crisis_DV 370 0.71 0.45 0 1 
RGI 325 8.68 3.54 0 17 
TEA 325 1.716e+07 1.728e+07 208.47 9.419e+07 
NL 324 1.152e+07 1.220e+07 31.11 6.866e+07 
Op_Inc 325 749.41 775.77 11.09 3.678e+06 
Ovh_Cost 325 253.21 255.54 5.58 1.393e+06 
IRS 210 4.07 1.28 2.57 6.57 
TA 325 1.922e+07 1.944e+07 255.984 1.008e+08 
lnTA 325 16.21 1.17 12.45 18.43 
DSTF 325 1.497e+07 1.552e+07 26.291 8.035e+07 
EQ_TA 320 16.27 10.25 0.76 98.93 
NL_TA 324 56.71 13.81 6.42 87.09 
LLR_GL 310 3.50 2.60 0 14.69 
lnGDP_Grw 336 1.74 0.67 0.49 3.26 
Infl 371 4.74 4.37 -4.86 15.0 
Pol_Stab 371 0.29 0.67 -1.14 1.21 
Gov_eff 371 0.50 0.41 -0.32 1.15 
Reg_Qual 371 0.45 0.26 -0.06 0.81 
ROAA is return on average assets, ROAE is return on average equity, C2I is cost-to-income ratio, IS_DV is the 
Islamic bank dummy, Crisis_DV is the crisis dummy, RGI is the risk governance index, TEA is total earning 
assets, NL is net loans, Op_Inc is operating income, Ovh_Cost is overhead costs, IRS is Interest Rate Spread, 
TA is total assets, LnTA is natural logarithm of TA, DSTF are deposits and short-term funding, EQ_TA is the 
ratio of equity to total assets, NL_TA is the ratio of net loans to total assets, LLR_GL is the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross loans, LnGDP_Grw is the natural logarithm of GDP growth, Infl is inflation, Pol_Stab is the 
indicator for political stability, Gov_eff is the indicator for government efficieny and Reg_Qual is the indicator 
for the regulatory quality.  
 
With regards to the remaining explanatory variables, TEA is found to have a relatively small 
negative and significant association with ROAA and ROAE. As expected, positive operating 
income as part of the banks’ net income increases both return on average assets and return on 
average equity and reduces cost-to-income ratio. The overhead costs do not seem to influence 
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ROAA but slightly reduce ROAE and increase C2I. Also, the three profitability measures are 
found to be negatively impacted by the bank size similar to the result of Beck et al. (2013b) on 
cost-to-income and of Pathan (2009) on assets return risk21 as their used proxy for profitability.  
Deposits and short-term funding are not significantly impacting ROAA as anticipated but they 
positively influence ROAE as higher leverage naturally increases return on equity. Aebi et al., 
(2012) find in contrast a negative yet insignificant influence of the ratio of deposits to total 
assets on ROE. With regards to the ratio of equity-to-assets, that is the inverse of leverage ratio, 
it is found to have a statistically significant negative association with ROAA and ROAE. The 
coefficients are -0.029 for ROAA significant at 90% confidence level and -0.324 for ROAE 
significant at 95% confidence level. In literature, Mollah and Zaman (2015) find a negative but 
insignificant coefficient of Eq_TA on ROAA and a positive but insignificant coefficient of the 
ratio on ROAE. Beck et al. (2013b) find too a negative but insignificant coefficient of Eq_TA 
on stock market performance, their proxy for profitability.  
Logically, the result on ROAA is explained as a relatively higher ratio reflecting a larger 
proportion of assets that are financed by and tied up to the banks’ shareholders rather than 
financed by debt. Therefore, profitability from total assets is expected to be lower. With respect 
to ROAE, it is expected to find opposite relationship with equity-to-assets ratio since when the 
latter is high, the profitability from equity will be lower. The negative coefficient on cost-to-
income ratio -0.09 is insignificant. Additionally, we notice a negative impact of the ratio of net 
loans to total assets on the three dependent variables. Also, referred to as the liquidity ratio, 
NL_TA represents the percentage of assets that are tied up in loans. Obviously, a lower ratio is 
considered as a positive signal of the banks’ liquidity profile. Hence, its negative coefficient on 
ROAA -0.04 which is significant at 99% confidence level demonstrates that when a high 
quantity of loans out of the banks’ total assets is issued, exposure to insolvency is likely to 
increase if the quantity is accompanied by higher proportion of bad loans and therefore the 
banks need to set aside more loan loss provisions which in turn reduce the net income generated 
from total assets that is ROAA. Consistent with Aebi et al. (2012), I find a negative yet 
insignificant relationship between NL_TA and ROAE. Mollah and Zaman (2015) in contrast 
find a positive yet insignificant impact of NL_TA on both ROAA and ROAE. The negative 
estimate -0.8 for C2I is significant at 99% confidence level. This result can be explained by the 
fact that when the ratio NL_TA increases, so does the likelihood of shrinking liquidity and net 
income as explained earlier. Under such circumstances, it is expected that the bank reduces its 
                                                             
21 Pathan (2009) defines Assets Return Risk as the standard deviation of the daily stock returns times the ratio of 
market value of equity to market value of total assets times square-root of 250.   
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operational expenses due to increasing returns to scale. The ratio of LLR_GL (1.974) is positive 
and statistically significant at 99% confidence level showing that potential loan losses 
reverberate in a reduction of the banks’ cash and increased costs (legal, human and IT resources 
and administrative) to manage the customers’ defaults through the renegotiation of the loans’ 
terms or the setting off of the pledged collaterals among other credit risk management related 
instruments.  
With respect to macroeconomic control variables, the indicator of political stability has 
obviously a negative and highly significant impact on ROAA and ROAE. The coefficients -
1.007 and -6.16 respectively are significant at 99% confidence level. Under circumstances of 
high likelihood of political turmoil, the banking sector similar to all economic sectors is very 
likely to be adversely affected in terms of issuance volume and settlements of loans, and 
severely increasing the credit and liquidity risk exposures. The parameter estimate on C2I is 
positive but insignificant. The indicator of government effectiveness that reflects the 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation show negative yet insignificant associations with ROAA (-0.99) and ROAE (-
0.42). It is positive yet insignificant (23.72) on cost-to-income ratio. In terms of regulatory 
quality, the effect of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that promote the private sector development does not show a statistically 
significant association with any of the three financial performance indicators. The parameter 
estimates for ROAA, ROAE and C2I are 0.7, 4.35 and -17.95 respectively.  
Economic growth as captured by the natural logarithm of GDP growth shows the expected signs 
for the dependent variables. Hence, the impact is positive on ROAA and ROAE where the two 
coefficients are respectively 0.46 and 2.75 and significant at 99% confidence level. In times of 
political stability and sound economic growth policies, the private and public sectors engage in 
multiple projects (infrastructure, equipment, working capital, etc.) for which they demand 
financing from financial intermediaries. Naturally, economic dynamism enhances the banks’ 
profitability. On cost-to-income, lnGDP_Grw’s estimate is negative (-3.63) and statistically 
significant at 95% confidence level which indicates that under sound economic conditions, the 
proportion of operating costs out of the operating income decreases particularly when exposures 
to customers’ insolvency is relatively low and does not require extra monitoring costs as 
discussed above. The inflation rate seems to significantly impact ROAE only. The negative 
coefficient -0.16 is significant at 90% confidence level and could be explained by the increase 
of lending interest rates as a result of higher inflation which in turn reduces the proportion of 
net income that is derived from little equity but higher debt.  
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Table 3.3: Dynamic Panel Two-Step GMM Estimations – Models 1 and 2 
 ROAA ROAE Cost-to-
Income 
ROAA ROAE Cost-to-Income 
VARIABLES (Model1) (Model 1) (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 2) (Model 2) 
       
L.ROAA 0.273***   0.197***   
 (0.0301)   (0.0341)   
L.ROAE  0.106***   0.0589  
  (0.0354)   (0.0458)  
L.C2I   0.0743   0.0139 
   (0.259)   (0.322) 
RGI -0.118*** -0.922*** -2.222* 0.221*** 0.777** -1.979 
 (0.0324) (0.231) (1.103) (0.0529) (0.374) (1.358) 
IS_DV 0 0 -6.119 0 0 0.806 
 (0) (0) (8.411) (0) (0) (29.92) 
Crisis_DV -0.235* 0.403 0.751 -0.0110 -0.122 -0.0388  
 (0.121) (0.887) (3.007) (0.182) (1.027) (2.850) 
RGI*IS_DV    -0.527*** -2.674*** -0.0610 
    (0.0803) (0.722) (3.140) 
TEA -1.21e-07** -1.17e-06***  -1.18e-07* -7.49e-07  
 (4.77e-08) (4.29e-07)  (6.27e-08) (6.19e-07)  
NL 7.74e-08 -2.04e-06*** 1.16e-06* 3.65e-08 -1.89e-06** 1.11e-06* 
 (8.41e-08) (7.38e-07) (6.10e-07) (1.17e-07) (8.41e-07) (5.45e-07) 
Op_Inc 4.26e-06*** 5.45e-05*** -4.14e-05** 2.64e-06** 5.15e-05*** -4.71e-05*** 
 (8.59e-07) (1.12e-05) (1.70e-05) (1.31e-06) (1.13e-05) (1.61e-05) 
Ovh_Cost -1.72e-06 -4.21e-05*** 8.25e-05** -4.58e-06* -5.44e-05*** 0.000117** 
 (1.89e-06) (1.12e-05) (3.60e-05) (2.56e-06) (1.88e-05) (4.49e-05) 
lnTA -1.317*** -8.752** -3.072 -2.452*** -10.15*** -3.122 
 (0.360) (3.918) (6.751) (0.316) (3.457) (7.050) 
DSTF -5.17e-08 1.46e-06**  8.29e-08 1.17e-06  
 (5.45e-08) (5.57e-07)  (6.54e-08) (7.34e-07)  
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EQ_TA -0.0295* -0.324** -0.0989 -0.0504** -0.560*** -0.169 
 (0.0165) (0.127) (0.613) (0.0225) (0.132) (0.634) 
NL_TA -0.0410*** -0.0668 -0.801*** -0.0275** -0.00186 -0.764*** 
 (0.00934) (0.0881) (0.195) (0.0106) (0.0541) (0.194) 
LLR_GL   1.974***   1.841* 
   (0.622)   (0.921) 
IRS   1.247   1.086 
   (0.816)   (0.974) 
lnGDP_Grw 0.461*** 2.752*** -3.636** 0.430*** 3.301*** -2.967* 
 (0.0685) (0.372) (1.658) (0.0669) (0.563) (1.649) 
Infl 0.00569 -0.162* 0.0353 0.0437*** 0.150 0.143 
 (0.0146) (0.0814) (0.291) (0.0131) (0.107) (0.295) 
Pol_Stab -1.007*** -6.163*** 1.200 -1.254*** -5.428** 1.814 
 (0.170) (1.284) (4.995) (0.285) (2.325) (5.113) 
Gov_eff -0.994 -0.420 23.72 -0.859 0.284 21.23 
 (0.637) (5.220) (16.91) (0.915) (6.036) (15.96) 
Reg_Qual 0.700 4.350 -17.95 0.997 0.341 -17.03 
 (0.501) (7.546) (15.35) (0.988) (8.015) (11.61) 
Constant   141.3   136.8 
   (106.9)   (110.2) 
 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1)  
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 
Hansen J-Statistic 
0.948 
 
0.149 
 
0.814 
0.329 
 
0.299 
 
0.657 
0.101 
 
0.627 
 
0.945 
0.404 
 
0.817 
 
0.809 
 
0.294 
 
0.506 
 
0.971 
0.25 
 
0.629 
 
0.581 
       
Observations 144 144 109 144 144 109 
Number of Bank_ID 45 45 28 45 45 28 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.5 Risk Governance and Financial Performance: The specific case for Islamic 
Banks 
In a second model, an interaction term between risk governance and the Islamic dummy 
variable is included in the base equation (3.1) to explore whether any idiosyncrasies exist in the 
case of Islamic banks. This is further motivated as the previous t-test in Table 2.10 (in Chapter 
2) showed differences between RGI in the two types of banks. The equation developed to 
estimate the second model is as follows: 
FPIi,t = α0 + β1FPIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + λRGI*IS_DVi,t + γXi,t + ζBKi,t+ θZi,t + β2Islamic_Dummy + 
β3Crisis_Dummy + εi,t (3.2) 
The results of the GMM estimations from Model 2 in Table 3.3 show clear differences in this 
specific case. First, it is noticed that the index RGI now has positive and highly significant 
coefficient 0.22 and 0.77 in the regressions where ROAA and ROAE are respectively the 
dependent variables (Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3.3). Interestingly, when interacted with the 
Islamic dummy the RGI shows a negative highly significant parameter estimate -0.52 on ROAA 
and -2.67 on ROAE which are both significant at 99% confidence level.  
 
The key result that can be deduced is that the preliminary findings from the previous estimations 
in section 3.4.4 were mainly driven by the negative result of Islamic banks. In other terms, the 
positive parameter estimates for RGI on both ROAA and ROAE in conventional banks reflect 
their tighter risk governance structures, i.e. one that comply with the regulators and 
academicians’ exigencies, succeed in generating higher profitability for both average total 
assets and for shareholders’ average equity. Specifically, tighter risk governance that observes 
a majority of independent directors in the board and in the risk and audit committees, privileges 
independent chairs for the board and in each of the two committees in addition to direct 
reporting lines of the CRO and internal audit to the board rather than to the CEO, among other 
determinants as detailed in Chapter 2, enables the attainment of balanced risk-return choices. 
On the contrary, the negative and highly significant statistic estimates of the interaction term 
RGI*IS_DV for the same regressions indicate that the determinants for sound risk governance 
structures in Islamic banks, which reflect the strategic organizational functions in charge of the 
risk management of their business, possibly fail to properly adjust the riskiness of their financial 
products to increase their profitability. In fact, this could be an indication that the peculiarities 
of some profit-and-loss sharing Islamic financial contracts such as Mudaraba and Musharaka 
that are by nature riskier for the banks and can be side-lined to the detriment of higher 
profitability. In contrast with conventional banks, Islamic banks are not allowed to invest in 
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derivatives and debt trading because of Shari’ah compliance restrictions, the involvement in 
riskier activities in the case of Islamic banks can be therefore represented to some extent by the 
proportion of investment in Mudaraba and Musharaka partnerships where the Islamic banks 
operate as the Rabu-Al-Mal22 or capital provider. To support this argument it is worth referring 
to the findings of an interesting study by Alandejani and Asutay (2017). In 2011, Alandejani 
and Asutay (2017) find that the proportion of the profit-and-loss sharing instruments in the total 
Islamic financing modes does not exceed 0.6% in Saudi Arabia, 9.9% in the UAE, 6.2% in 
Bahrain and 2.3% in Qatar. In their empirical paper, the authors also explore the bank-level and 
country-level determining factors of the non-performing loans in Islamic banks in the GCC 
countries. Results from GMM econometric estimations show that despite being perceived as 
high-risk financial instruments an increase of the profit-and-loss sharing contracts could lead 
to a decrease in the NPL while the fixed income debt instruments are likely to increase them. 
This result has important implications to the common practice of Islamic bankers that tend to 
favour fixed income debt instruments such as Murabaha on the basis of their lower levels risks. 
Therefore, taken together results from Alandejani and Asutay (2017) and the present study 
provide some evidence that the valuation of the Islamic financial instruments offered by Islamic 
banks could be inappropriate as it does not permit their levels of profitability to grow on the 
one hand and is likely to cause their NPL to increase. An investigation of the proportion of 
revenue that is generated through trading book operations and its contribution to the overall 
ROAA and ROAE is likely to enrich the inferences of the present study for Islamic and non-
Islamic banks alike, nonetheless the conception is hampered by the unavailability of relevant 
data. As per the remaining parameters in the same equations (columns 4 and 5), the magnitudes, 
signs and significance levels remain almost identical to the results from the first set of 
estimations (see section 3.4.4).  
 
With respect to cost-to-income, the results (reported in column 6 of Table 3.3) show that the 
association of the RGI and the operational efficiency ratio is still negative however insignificant 
when the interaction term RGI*IS_DV is included in the model. The coefficient of the 
interaction term also shows a negative yet statistically insignificant coefficient (-0.06). As 
found in ROAA and ROAE estimations, the remaining parameters explaining the cost-to-
income in Model 2 do not change much in magnitudes, signs and significance levels.  
                                                             
22 Please refer to Table A2.1 in Appendix for definition of Mudaraba contract.  
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3.4.6 Risk Governance and Financial Performance: A Post-Crisis Analysis 
In a second set of estimations, the interest lies on observing the changes occurring immediately 
after the inception of the global financial crisis, that is from year 2008 to 2012. The base 
equation (3.1) is modified as follows: 
FPIi,t = α0 + β1FPIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + λRGI*Crisis_DVi,t + γXi,t + ζBKi,t+ θZi,t + β2Islamic_Dummy 
+ β3Crisis_Dummy + εi,t (3.3) 
At first, the interest is on RGI alone and the state of RGI after the GFC. Results of the twostep 
GMM estimations (Model 3) are reported in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3.4. In accordance 
with the Model 1 estimations (Table 3.3), RGI shows a negative impact on the three profitability 
ratios with coefficients of respectively -0.21, -1.71 and -2.96 for ROAA, ROAE and C2I. 
However only the ones on ROAA and ROAE are significant at 99% confidence level while the 
coefficient on C2I is not statistically significant. Similar to Model 1, the possible interpretation 
of this result could indicate that the more stringent risk governance structures become, the less 
returns it generates through its invested assets and its shareholders’ equity. An explanation 
could be that tight monitoring increases risk aversion and significantly reduces partaking in 
trade on risky securities and investment in highly leveraged transactions. In the same model, 
the interaction between RGI and the crisis dummy does not show any particular impact of the 
strength of the risk governance structures in a post crisis era. The coefficients 0.07, 0.5 and 0.83 
for ROAA, ROAE and C2I correspondingly are all positive but insignificant.  
Proceeding to the remaining explanatory variables, it appears that when comparing results of 
Model 1 (columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.3) and Model 3 (columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.4), there 
are only a few parameters whose estimates slightly change. In particular, on the ROAA equation 
the ratio of equity to total assets on ROAA equation maintains an almost equal magnitude but 
it becomes insignificant while it was significant at 90% confidence level in Model 1. This result 
is in line with (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) but contradicts Beck et al. (2013) who find a positive 
and significant parameter estimate during the crisis. Also, the government efficiency indicator 
turns to be lower (-1.56 in Model 3 compared to -0.99 in Model 1) but significant at 95% 
confidence level.  
On ROAE likewise, a change is noticed in the coefficient of net loans (NL) that decreases to -
8.08e-07 from prior -2.04e-06 and becomes insignificant. However, the ratio of NL_TA 
although it decreases in magnitude from -0.06 to -0.2, it becomes significant at 95% confidence 
level. This shows that there is also a contributing impact of the liquidity ratio (less liquidity 
when the ratio is high) to the profitability from equity as when the bank gets less liquid, i.e. 
when NL_TA is high, the net income as the numerator of ROAE decreases as a result of more 
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provisions that need to be spared. On cost-to-income, we notice the change on the coefficient 
of NL mainly. While it was relatively small (1.16e-06) and significant at 90% confidence level, 
it lost in magnitude and statistical significance (8.18e-07).  
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Table 3.4: Dynamic Panel Two-Step GMM Estimations – Models 3 and 4 
 ROAA ROAE Cost-to-Income ROAA ROAE Cost-to-
Income 
VARIABLES (Model 3) (Model 3) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 4) (Model 4) 
       
L.ROAA 0.303***   0.269***   
 (0.0266)   (0.0291)   
L.ROAE  0.00924   0.0692  
  (0.0348)   (0.0498)  
L.C2I   0.0805   -0.0581 
   (0.252)   (0.238) 
RGI -0.218*** -1.715*** -2.966 0.0640* 0.372 -2.102** 
 (0.0753) (0.515) (2.806) (0.0377) (0.229) (0.994) 
IS_DV 0 0 -6.608 0 0 1.197 
 (0) (0) (9.377) (0) (0) (11.58) 
Crisis_DV -0.867 -4.369 -7.080    
 (0.603) (6.099) (24.41)    
RGI*Crisis_DV 0.0732 0.506 0.837    
 (0.0590) (0.599) (2.381)    
RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV    -0.138*** -0.854*** -0.0434 
    (0.0152) (0.128) (0.929) 
TEA -2.29e-07*** -1.98e-06***  -2.73e-08 -1.14e-06*  
 (6.97e-08) (4.72e-07)  (6.00e-08) (5.91e-07)  
NL 1.29e-07 -8.08e-07 8.18e-07 -5.15e-09 -2.33e-06*** 1.04e-06** 
 (7.78e-08) (5.79e-07) (5.62e-07) (8.96e-08) (6.31e-07) (4.71e-07) 
Op_Inc 4.65e-06*** 5.07e-05*** -3.74e-05** 5.12e-06*** 5.38e-05*** -4.23e-05*** 
 (7.72e-07) (9.59e-06) (1.56e-05) (8.28e-07) (1.22e-05) (1.46e-05) 
Ovh_Cost -1.79e-06 -5.87e-05*** 9.34e-05** -5.34e-06*** -4.37e-05** 9.96e-05** 
 (2.36e-06) (8.65e-06) (3.58e-05) (1.76e-06) (1.65e-05) (3.91e-05) 
lnTA -1.277*** -5.829* -2.645 -3.664*** -16.56*** -2.484 
 (0.347) (2.934) (6.689) (0.406) (4.816) (6.258) 
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DSTF 9.44e-09 1.47e-06***  6.90e-09 1.76e-06***  
 (4.94e-08) (5.45e-07)  (5.29e-08) (5.03e-07)  
EQ_TA -0.0228 -0.283* 0.00421 -0.0704*** -0.540*** -0.204 
 (0.0175) (0.152) (0.509) (0.0137) (0.115) (0.548) 
LLR_GL   2.069***   2.194*** 
   (0.584)   (0.505) 
IRS   1.227   1.255 
   (0.764)   (0.767) 
NL_TA -0.0618*** -0.201** -0.777*** -0.0508*** -0.126 -0.786*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0873) (0.205) (0.0156) (0.103) (0.198) 
Pol_Stab -1.212*** -7.612*** 2.168 -0.943*** -5.054*** 0.470 
 (0.175) (1.534) (5.079) (0.244) (1.408) (4.886) 
Gov_eff -1.568** -4.194 20.56 -0.360 1.556 19.77 
 (0.595) (5.432) (17.42) (0.760) (4.737) (13.12) 
Reg_Qual 0.845 11.67 -11.05 0.355 -4.087 -13.53 
 (0.860) (8.125) (12.18) (0.728) (5.887) (10.24) 
lnGDP_Grw 0.467*** 2.816*** -3.503** 0.561*** 2.626*** -2.832 
 (0.0819) (0.421) (1.603) (0.0690) (0.482) (2.029) 
Infl -0.00979 -0.223** -0.0252 0.0330** 0.0297 0.0741 
 (0.0131) (0.0872) (0.302) (0.0141) (0.0878) (0.213) 
Constant   134.9   129.7 
   (116.3)   (94.51) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1)  
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 
Hansen J-Statistic 
0.757 
 
0.342 
 
0.81 
0.329 
 
0.451 
 
0.652 
0.161 
 
0.676 
 
0.943 
0.474 
 
0.396 
 
0.615 
0.359 
 
0.607 
 
0.894 
0.203 
 
0.433 
 
0.878 
       
Observations 144 144 109 144 144 109 
Number of Bank_ID 45 45 28 45 45 28 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.7 Risk Governance and Financial Performance: A post-crisis analysis in 
Islamic Banks: 
To look at the specific case of Islamic banks, I start first by looking at how well they performed 
financially after the global financial crisis and whether their performance impacted in one way 
or another the estimates of RGI as used in Model 3. To do that, an interaction variable between 
the Islamic and the post-crisis dummy is included in each of the equations where ROAA, ROAE 
and C2I are the outcome variables recursively. The results are reported in Table 3.5.  
 
The findings show that Islamic banks performed worse than conventional banks in years 2008 
to 2012, that is after the GFC. The estimated coefficients for the interaction between IS_DV 
and Crisis_DV are all negative -0.85, -4.67 and -5.5 for ROAA, ROAE, C2I respectively. 
However, they are only significant at the highest confidence level for ROAA and ROAE. In 
fact, when comparing the two estimates for IS_DV*Crisis_DV, it can be noticed that the effect 
of the crisis on the Islamic banks’ shareholders’ returns was forcefully chaotic as it represents 
more than five times its effect on returns generated from average total assets. It is noticed in 
Table 3.5 that estimated coefficients of RGI are -0.06, -0.44 and -2.35 for ROAA, ROAE and 
C2I respectively and are all negative and statistically significant at 90% confidence level in the 
ROAA model while they are at 95% confidence level in the ROAE and C2I models. These 
results serve as a robustness check for the Model 3 findings as they confirm the robustness of 
the sign, magnitudes and statistical significance for each parameter estimate and motivate the 
need to investigate the specific impact of risk governance on generating less returns as found 
in Model 3.  
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Table 3.5: Dynamic Panel Two-Step GMM Estimations – Post-Crisis Financial 
Performance in Islamic Banks 
 
VARIABLES ROAA ROAE Cost-to-Income 
L.ROAA 0.298***   
 (0.0212)   
L.ROAE  0.108***  
  (0.0335)  
L.C2I   -0.00263 
   (0.219) 
RGI -0.0613* -0.444** -2.350** 
 (0.0330) (0.200) (0.996) 
IS_DV*Crisis_DV -0.852*** -4.678*** -5.508 
 (0.0752) (1.024) (6.561) 
TEA -1.06e-07** -1.20e-06**  
 (4.51e-08) (4.88e-07)  
Loa 7.93e-08 -2.56e-06*** 1.22e-06** 
 (8.75e-08) (5.27e-07) (5.20e-07) 
Op_Inc 3.22e-06*** 5.72e-05*** -4.13e-05*** 
 (7.80e-07) (6.46e-06) (1.47e-05) 
Ovh_Cost -1.98e-06 -4.19e-05*** 8.95e-05** 
 (1.87e-06) (1.18e-05) (3.43e-05) 
lnTA -2.618*** -10.07** -4.962 
 (0.325) (4.208) (7.452) 
DSTF 1.29e-08 1.81e-06***  
 (4.89e-08) (4.70e-07)  
EQ_TA -0.0501*** -0.499*** -0.317 
 (0.0124) (0.106) (0.472) 
Lev_Rat1 -0.0491*** -0.156* -0.811*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0801) (0.205) 
Pol_Stab -1.118*** -5.288*** 0.365 
 (0.190) (1.259) (4.888) 
Gov_eff -0.504 2.645 26.20* 
 (0.571) (3.782) (13.33) 
Reg_Qual 0.413 -4.621 -18.71 
 (0.687) (5.489) (11.37) 
lnGDP_Grw 0.471*** 2.637*** -3.131* 
 (0.0647) (0.386) (1.806) 
Infl 0.0196 -0.00674 0.0702 
 (0.0136) (0.0938) (0.268) 
LLR_GL   1.881** 
   (0.686) 
IRS   1.505** 
   (0.703) 
Constant   175.0 
   (112.5) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.779 0.348 0.078 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.231 0.371 0.459 
Hansen J-Statistic 0.697 0.882 0.983 
    
Observations 144 144 109 
Number of Bank_ID 45 45 28 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Referring back to Table 3.4, the results in Model 3 do not show any significant impact of risk 
governance immediately after the inception of the crisis, it is suspected that results might be 
driven differently by the variations in Islamic banks as was the case in the former estimations 
(Model 1 and Model 2) and as lower financial performance was found post-crisis in Islamic 
banks particularly. Furthermore, it could also be argued that the impact of the crisis can hardly 
be ignored theoretically as the GFC was acknowledged to be a crisis of poor risk management 
(OECD, 2009).  
Therefore, another model is constructed whereby specificities of risk governance in Islamic 
banks in the post crisis period are measured apart. In Model 4, RGI is considered together with 
the interaction term RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV as well as the matrices of bank and country control 
variables. Equation (3.4) is constructed to estimate Model 4.  
FPIi,t = α0 + β1FPIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + λRGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DVi,t + γXi,t + ζBKi,t+ θZi,t + 
β2Islamic_Dummy + β3Crisis_Dummy + εi,t (3.4) 
 
The results are reported in columns 4, 5 and 6 in Table 3.4. In the ROAA equation, RGI’s 
estimate increases in magnitude from -0.21 to 0.06 and becomes significant only at 90% 
confidence level. It also increases from -1.71 to 0.37 in the ROAE equation but it changes to 
statistically insignificant. In Cost-to-Income estimation as well, we notice that RGI coefficient 
changes from -2.96 to -2.1 and becomes significant at 95% confidence level while it was not in 
Model 3. Consequently, it is noticed that the inclusion of the interaction term 
RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV brings about more elucidations which distinguish clearly between the 
distinct impacts of risk governance on the profitability of mainstream and Islamic banks. The 
results of RGI on ROAA and C2I are consistent with Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) who find that 
their developed Risk Management Index contributes to the generation of higher returns during 
the GFC and better operating performance until the crisis.  
 
Looking at the particular case of Islamic banks, the interaction term RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV 
seems to have a highly significant negative influence on the return on average assets and the 
return on average equity. The coefficients -0.13 and -0.85 for ROAA and ROAE respectively 
are significant at 99% confidence level. In line with the previous results from Model 2, it can 
be argued that although the risk governance structures in Islamic banks complied more with the 
recommended rules for sound governance of the risk management practices, they are still unable 
to promote more profitability from potentially lucrative business lines and overcome probably 
the higher risk aversion. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the changes in magnitude between 
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results of Model 2 and Model 4 might translate an improvement in the efficiency of strategic 
risk management decisions at board and senior management levels.  
Effectively, for ROAA the severity of the coefficient of RGI*IS_DV changed from a highly 
significant -0.52 to -0.13 post-crisis (RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV). This improvement can be an 
indicator for more efficient risk management techniques to tackle currency exchange 
fluctuations, the volatility of Shari’ah compliant securities as well as the transmission effect of 
the markets’ interest rates changes on the Islamic banks’ portfolios and assets. Likewise, for 
ROAE an important change from -2.67 to -0.85 both significant at 99% confidence level is 
noticed. The reduced impact of RGI after the crisis is likely to translate the inclination of Islamic 
banks to possibly generate relatively more revenues from the pool that is invested in assets 
rather than shareholders’ equity.  
In the C2I regression, the coefficient of RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV -0.04 is found to be negative 
however insignificant. Hence, the result from Model 2 (-0.06) did not vary much post crisis 
neither did the statistical significance. It could be potentially inferred that operational efficiency 
is not associated directly with risk governance practices in Islamic banks.  
 
The remaining explanatory variables show merely a few changes between estimations in Model 
3 and Model 4. For instance, in the ROAA equation the TEA’s parameter estimate decreases 
and loses the statistical significance while it is expected to increase ROAA and ROAE. TEA 
concerns the assets that generate interest or dividends such as stocks, bonds, income from rental 
property, certificates of deposits and other interest or dividend earning accounts or instruments. 
Hence, a negative coefficient signifies that the assets falling under this category failed to 
generate the expected returns probably as a consequence of the contagion effect from lower 
interest rates and increasing credit risk during and after the crisis. The overhead costs reduce 
the net income naturally therefore the coefficients in both ROAA and ROAE equations are 
negative and highly significant with respectively -5.34e-06 significant at 99% confidence level 
for ROAA and -4.37e-05 significant at 95% confidence level for ROAE. The inverse of the 
leverage ratio EQ_TA holds a negative and statistically significant coefficient in the ROAA (-
0.07) and in the ROAE (-0.54) equations. Normally, the higher EQ_TA the better as the less 
leveraged the bank is. Less leverage also signifies a larger proportion of assets that is financed 
through equity. As the cost of equity is higher than debt, the coefficients hold hence the 
expected sign negatively influencing the returns. Beck et al. (2013) find a positive and 
significant parameter estimate on stock market performance during the crisis while Mollah and 
Zaman (2015) find a negative and insignificant coefficient on ROAA and a positive but 
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insignificant coefficient on ROAE. We also notice that the ratio of NL_TA only changes much 
in ROAE becoming negative and insignificant (-0.126) similar to Aebi et al. (2012).  
 
3.4.8 Additional Robustness Analysis 
To check the robustness of the results, several tests were run mainly to check for the 
autocorrelation in residuals and the validity of the instruments used in each of the five GMM 
estimations.  
The aim of estimating equation 3.1 is to examine the effect of the “Risk Governance Index” (as 
an independent variable) on three financial performance indicators namely ROAA, ROAE and 
Cost-to-Income ratio as dependent variables.  
First, in each of the five model estimations (in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) were carried out using 
the first lag of the endogenous variables. Although the results produced significant parameter 
estimates with the expected signs, one problem that rises with the first lag is that it is often 
correlated with the error term while the second lag is not (Roodman, 2009). As the sample 
counts a relatively small number of countries, it is advised to include the second lag of the 
covariates in levels in the first differenced equations (Roodman, 2009). Opting for higher 
number of lags, that is higher than two, introduces an additional constraint of decreasing the 
sample size. Therefore, after several tests two lags are used in the final two-step estimations.  
The autocorrelation tests of the Arellano-Bond AR (1) tests in the five models (Table 3.3, Table 
3.4 and Table 3.5) show probabilities that are high enough to fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. The Arellano-Bond AR (2) tests in first 
differences also do not detect autocorrelation in levels as the p-values exceed the 5% 
significance level.  
 
Additionally, I incorporated the sub-option collapse to the models looking at the effect of risk 
governance on cost-to-income to reduce the number of instruments with respect to the number 
of groups in the estimation. Finally, I also test for the validity of the specifications and the over-
identified restrictions through the Hansen statistical test which is more robust than the Sargan 
test. The p-values for the Hansen J’s statistics for each model are reported under their 
appropriate columns in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. The high p-values for the Hansen J 
statistics in each of the five models fail to reject the Hansen test’s null hypothesis which posits 
that instruments as a group are exogenous. Therefore, as all of the p-values are greater than 5% 
significance level, it is inferred that the instruments used are valid and that the models are 
correctly specified.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
As weak risk management was considered a key factor contributing to the GFC, different global 
standard setting bodies and national regulatory authorities have taken steps to enhance risk 
governance in banks. While the academic literature is also paying attention to risk governance 
issues, the research on the theme is scattered and meagre. After developing a risk governance 
index based on contemporary academic and regulatory literature, this chapter examines the 
impact of risk governance on performance on mainstream and Islamic banks in the GCC region. 
The results from a dynamic panel two-step GMM model show that robust risk governance 
structures enable the mainstream banks to adequately identify, measure and monitor the 
plethora of risks they face to generate higher returns (measured by ROAA and ROAE) while 
maintaining satisfactory operational efficiency (measured by cost-to-income). The reverse 
results found in the case of Islamic banks suggest that although risk governance architectures 
improved over time, they failed to achieve the objectives of increasing the banks’ profitability. 
Negative and statistically significant estimates were found for RGI in Islamic banks in all 
estimations. Nonetheless, in the post crisis period an amelioration of the effect of RGI on return 
on average assets and on return on average equity in Islamic banks -although negative- could 
translate an effective positive change in strategic risk management that enables better yields 
from riskier equity-based financial products and more efficient management of the currency 
exchange fluctuations, the volatility of Shari’ah compliant securities as well as the transmission 
effect of the markets’ interest rates changes on the Islamic banks’ portfolios and assets.  
The findings of this chapter shed more light on the risk management governance and practices 
in two banking models that are theoretically different. The contrasting results between the 
conventional and Islamic banks indicate that risk aversion is likely to be higher in Islamic banks 
as it is found that tight risk governance generates less returns and / or the risk management 
strategies and instruments applied are not germane to the multiple idiosyncrasies of their 
financial contracts and their business model. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The large and visible costs of financial instability constitute a policy priority for Central Banks, 
supervisory authorities and policymakers (Allen and Gale, 2004) as default of only one bank 
has the potential to spill over affecting other financial institutions and ultimately trigger 
economy-wide systemic risk (Ellis et al., 2014; Greenwood et al., 2015). Therefore, it is their 
foremost duty to ensure that banks maintain sufficient capital and liquidity cushions to avert 
their failure in providing the customary financial services to depositors and investors. The 
micro-prudential regulation aims at guaranteeing the financial stability of financial institutions 
at their individual level to limit their insolvency likelihood (Creel et al., 2015; Dewatripont and 
Tirole, 1994).  
The recent global financial crisis (GFC) illustrated the contagion effect that one or two banks’ 
bankruptcies23 can swiftly transmit to an interconnected financial system. The crisis exposed 
the faults and flaws in the modern banking business model where excessive leverage and trade 
in risky securities, such as debt securities and derivatives, constitute the main sources of banks’ 
profitability (Brunnermeier, 2009; Leung et al., 2015). As a consequence, the aftermath of that 
financial debacle induced a major change in the banking regulation through mainly the revision 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) accords requiring banks to hold more 
capital buffers in addition to the minimum capital requirements to cover the risks they run 
(BCBS, 2010a; Blundell-Wignall et al., 2014). While Pillar 1 of Basel III increased the capital 
buffers and holdings of banks, Pillar 2 enhanced the supervisory overview role to ensure that 
banks hold adequate capital to mitigate different types of risks. The revised Basel III also comes 
up with micro-prudential regulation to mitigate banks’ exposure to severe liquidity shortages 
under stressed market conditions. Two liquidity standards, namely the Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), were designed to reduce the probability 
of the hostile event occurring and to limit the damage when it does (BCBS, 2010a; Hong et al., 
2014).  
The multiplicity and complexity of risks that banks face in performing their traditional and 
innovative business activities can expose them to a distress when they are not adequately 
managed, controlled and supervised. For instance, the aftershock of the global financial collapse 
shed light on the incomplete financial reforms which substantially contributed to the systemic 
risk and disruption of the financial markets (Ellis et al., 2014). The Basel Committee on 
                                                             
23 Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns are two main examples, but a detailed sequence of financial institutions’ 
failure is provided in (Becht et al., 2011, p. 439) and in (Brunnermeier, 2009, pp. 88–90) 
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Banking Supervision, the International Monetary Fund as well as the Financial Stability Board 
reacted post crisis by identifying new strategies and measures to tackle systemic risk through 
both macro and micro-prudential policies (BCBS, 2010a, 2013, FSB, 2011a, 2011b; IMF, 
2009). Nonetheless, Ellis et al (2014) argue that while an extensive literature covers relationship 
of systemic risk -and financial instability-with bank competition, resolution policies, 
supervisory, auditing and valuation policies, very few studies examine the role of bank 
governance in contributing to the global financial stability despite the strong relationship 
between governance and risk-taking. More specifically, the recent financial crisis exposed 
several bank governance failures such as: “managers failing to control risk-takers, boards 
failing to control managers and investors failing to discipline either managers or boards” (Ellis 
et al., 2014, p. 176). Prior to their study, such association has been empirically tested in Laeven 
and Levine (2009), Beltratti and Stulz (2009), Dewatripont et al (2010), Becht et al. (2011) and 
others as will follow in larger details in section 4.2.  
 
Considering this significant gap, the aim of this chapter is to contribute to the scarce empirical 
literature by examining the extent of the impact of banks risk governance on their financial 
stability. Specifically, it uses the previously developed metric of Risk Governance Index (RGI) 
as a focus variable and examines its association and the nature of its causality with several 
indicators of the financial soundness of banks. The analysis starts by assessing the impact of 
risk governance on the overall financial stability of banks by using the commonly-used proxy 
of z-score and then examining its impact on three core variables of capital adequacy, asset 
quality and liquidity levels.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section reviews the literature on 
the relationship of bank corporate governance and financial stability. Section three introduces 
the research hypotheses and develops the methodological approach used in the study. The 
section outlines how data was collected and analysed. Subsequently, the empirical results are 
presented in section 4.4 which also includes a separate discussion on the robustness tests. 
Section 4.5 concludes the paper.  
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Nexus between bank governance and financial stability 
The nature of banks’ business activities have systemic importance due to their size, 
interconnectedness, complexity and lack of substitutability (BCBS, 2013; Ellis et al., 2014). 
The risk-taking behaviour of banks is associated with financial insecurity and economic 
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frailness as asserted by Bernanke (1983) and Keeley (1990). The question about how risk-taking 
is shaped within banks has interested more researchers, experts and regulators coinciding with 
the growing number of financial and economic crises since the late 1980s until the most 
disrupting turmoil of 2007-2008. The exploration inevitably leads to the concept of corporate 
governance whereby organizations define how the corporate decisions are made, the way 
authority and responsibility are allocated and the methods of attaining the corporation’s 
objectives (BCBS, 2015b). Or as Stulz (2014) asserts, governance enables the distinction 
between the good risks that have an ex ante private reward for the bank on a standalone basis 
and maximizes the shareholders wealth, and the bad risks which do not yield such reward. 
Therefore, the role of risk management cannot be dissociated from the corporate governance 
structure and mechanisms in the specific case of banks as failures in setting sensible risk 
appetite echelons and mishandling the methods and processes to increase the institution’s value 
are very likely to engender severe consequences at macro levels. An illustration of this is 
provided by the OECD (2009) which finds that failures in risk management were one of the 
greatest underlying causes of the financial crisis. OECD (2009) asserts that the requirement for 
financial institutions and particularly for banks to cautiously manage risks is more stringent as 
the volatility of their risks tend to be greater due to maturity transformation and the potential 
systemic risk it can induce.  
Acknowledging the impairments and weaknesses of the risk management functions that 
contributed to the systemic risks of 2008, several international multilateral bodies such as the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the OECD and 
the IMF published a rich corpus of principles and guidelines to improve the practices in bank 
corporate governance in general (BCBS, 2015a, 2015b; IMF, 2009; OECD, 2009, 2015) and in 
risk governance in particular (FSB, 2013a).  
 
Academic literature on the impact of corporate governance on bank’s risk-taking as well as 
financial stability has similarly emerged with renewed interest following the global financial 
turmoil. Laeven and Levine (2009) for instance were first to empirically assess the governance 
theories pertaining to risk-taking by banks. The authors looked at the potential conflicts between 
the bank managers and the shareholders over risk-taking and whether risk-taking varies with 
the comparative power of equity holders. They also examined whether the national regulations 
and bank risks depend on ownership structure. Their main findings suggest that banks with 
large and powerful owners with substantial cash-flow rights tend to engage in higher risk in line 
with theory. They also find that banks with powerful equity holders respond to stricter capital 
117 
 
regulations and activity restrictions by taking greater risk as a way of compensation for the 
utility loss stemming from these two bank regulations’ proxies. The same type of owners is also 
prone to tolerate more risk when the country has formal deposit insurance compared to those 
without explicit deposit insurance.  
 
A review of the theory of bank governance has been done by Becht et al (2011) who also 
investigated the latent correlation between the banks’ failure during the crisis and their 
organizational forms shaped by their corporate governance structures. The authors surveyed the 
post-crisis empirical literature on the core failures in governance specifically related to board 
independence, ownership and control as well as executive compensation and internal controls. 
Becht et al ( 2011) argue that overall bank corporate governance should be broadened to 
appropriately consider the interests of other constituencies in addition to ones of the 
shareholders, all of which are at risk from banks’ activities. In fact more than a decade before 
the GFC, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) recommended in their “representation hypothesis” that 
corporate governance features of non-financial corporations should be similarly applied to 
banks as well as insurance companies and pension funds. This signifies that corporate 
governance in these financial firms should represent and target the protection of the debtholders 
besides the shareholders’ interests. Likewise, Becht et al (2011) maintain that this can be 
achieved by empowering the depositors and other creditors, transaction counterparties and, 
taxpayers by their adequate representation within the board of directors. In terms of 
remuneration reform, they assert that it must be adjusted for risk and directly aligned with debt 
holders rather than with shareholders.  
Similarly, Dewatripont et al (2010) highlight from their extended diagnosis of the financial 
meltdown that key prudential reforms should include some corporate governance reforms. For 
instance, they argue that to restrain the risk-taking incentives of the managers, it is necessary to 
implement adequate internal governance measures and risk management systems along with 
some control over the senior management’s remuneration. The authors estimate that regrettably 
these issues that monitor risk-taking behaviour remained vague and were not given the required 
importance in Pillar 2 of the Basel II accords. Yet regrettably, even with Basel III reforms and 
enhancement of Pillar 2 little headway has been made as argued by Ellis et al. (2014). In a 
detailed exploration of the nexus between bank governance systemic risk and financial stability, 
Ellis et al. (2014) discuss three important risk-taking incentives by managers which are 
anchored in bank corporate governance mechanisms. These are shaped in three distinct 
“principal-agent” problems. The first principal-agent problem arises through the payoff 
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asymmetry between the shareholders and the debtholders. In fact, equity-holders perceive their 
payoffs as an out of money call option on the bank’s assets with a strike price given by its debt 
liabilities. When the level of debt liabilities (deposits and wholesale funding) is high combined 
with thin capital base and exceeds the total assets, the bank is likely to become balance sheet 
insolvent in the case large amounts of loans default and capital is depleted to cover the 
unexpected losses (Farag et al., 2013). Therefore, to boost the equity payoffs, the authors assert 
that they opt for either more investment in riskier assets or by leveraging them. Either 
alternative causes the risk exposure to increase disfavouring the debt-holders. The second 
principal-agent problem is the well-known divergence of interests of the shareholders and the 
managers. However, this issue has long been overcome by aligning the compensation of the 
latter with the objectives of the former. As banks’ managers are heavily rewarded by equity, 
they have increased incentives to engage in riskier activities and for risk-shifting in stressed 
times. The last principal-agent problem arises between the debtholders and the society. Since 
governments pursue bail-out policies, the debtholders are inclined to exercise less disciplinary 
measures on banks’ managers who are continually incentivised to take on more risk as 
explained earlier. If the state offers explicit insurance to depositors and implicit insurance to 
investors, the expected corrective effect from the investors on the banks’ managers is totally 
dismissed (Merton, 1977). Consequently, the state and hence the taxpayers bear the ensuing 
repercussions. For Ellis et al. (2014), some solutions to these risk-taking incentives that exist 
in the bank governance entail: increasing regulatory capital to reduce the risk exposure of 
debtholders, shifting the compensation packages of managers from equity to debt through 
deferred or clawed-back rewards and substituting the bail-out state policies by bailing-in the 
creditors. Although the authors acknowledge that most of these solutions have been already 
proposed in Basel III reforms and by the Financial Stability Board and in a few jurisdictions 
they are being implemented (Ellis et al., 2014, p. 180), their consistency on how well they can 
efficiently curb the risk-taking incentives are controversial. One last suggestion they put 
forward is to amend the structure of the company law in a way that broadens the control rights 
to the banks’ stakeholders instead of the shareholders solely.  
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4.2.2 Bank Governance and Financial Stability: Empirical Explorations  
Although theoretical and conceptual academic literature has established a direct linkage 
between bank governance and financial stability24, the empirical literature on the subject is still 
scant. While the associations between bank governance and financial performance has been 
well documented both before (Adams and Mehran, 2008; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Caprio 
et al., 2003, 2007) and after the GFC (Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2009, 2012; Mollah 
and Zaman, 2015) little has been accomplished so far to empirically test the possible 
associations and causality effects of sound governance on the insolvency probability of banks 
mainly in cross-country studies.   
One of the first studies that empirically investigated governance and disclosure characteristics’ 
influence on risk shifting in the financial industry before the GFC is by Akhigbe and Martin 
(2008) who studied changes in the risk shifting behaviour of financial firms after the enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley law in the US. They used a sample of 768 US financial services firms 
including banks, savings institutions, insurance companies and securities firms and examine 
how risk shifted between periods before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley law enactment. They 
compute the changes in the total risk (that is the variance of stock returns), the unsystematic 
risk (through the variance of residuals) and the systematic risk (as measured by an OLS 
estimation of an augmented market model25) in the short-term (100 days pre-SOX and post-
SOX) and long-term (36 months pre-SOX and post-SOX). The disclosure variables used in 
their study are the degree of independence of the audit committee, the existence of an 
independent financial expert in the audit committee and the degree of disclosure through 
financial footnotes (that is the number of footnote pages scaled by the total number of pages in 
the 2002 annual report). For governance characteristics, they consider aspects related to the 
board composition, CEO involvement, board independence, the independence of the 
nomination committee and the independence of the compensation committee. They also add 
the proportion of the board members who own stock in the firm as this can signify higher 
incentives towards investments in riskier activities. Finally, they account for the credibility of 
the board by looking at the percentage of the board that holds seats on other boards as this 
feature indicates extensive experience that makes these members to be sought after.  
For the CEO characteristics, they construct an index that measures the power of the CEO by 
summing up the number of high profile roles that the CEO holds such as: being a chairman of 
                                                             
24 As is also known, such linkage is established from the early papers on agency theory as in (Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
25 Details of this model can be found in (Akhigbe and Martin, 2008, p. 2127) 
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the board, a member in each of the nomination, compensation and audit committees. Akhigbe 
and Martin (2008) also capture the status of internal and external monitoring by gathering data 
related to the percentage of managerial and institutional ownership in the firm’s capital. Their 
results show that disclosure and governance are inversely related to the risk shifts: financial 
institutions with stronger governance and stronger disclosure experience small increases in the 
short-term risk measures of total risk, systematic and unsystematic risks. Likewise, in the long-
term, financial firms with stronger governance and stronger disclosure observe larger decreases 
in the total and unsystematic risk measures.  
Pathan (2009) examines the board and CEO characteristics of 212 US large bank holding 
companies (BHC) and finds that between 1997 and 2004, strong boards positively affect risk-
taking and CEO power negatively affects it in line with theory. While the results are in contrast 
with Akhigbe and Martin (2008) whose study is limited to year 2002, Pathan (2009) uses the 
same measures as Akhigbe and Martin (2008) for the three risk variables, however at level 
instead of in changes. He considers size, independence and less restrictive shareholders as the 
board characteristics and the CEO power is measured by a dummy for whether s/he chairs the 
board and if internally hired. Pathan (2009) also adds the percentage of the CEO’s shareholding 
in the BHC as an indication of the alignment of their risk-taking incentives with ones of the 
shareholders.  
Aebi et al. (2012) were the first to include the role of risk management in the banks’ corporate 
governance structure to investigate their potential relationship with the banks’ performance. 
They use a sample of 573 banks in North America for which they manually collect most of the 
corporate governance data for the year 2006 only. Specifically, their risk governance variables 
are: the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in the executive board, their reporting line 
(whether to the board or the CEO) and the presence of a risk committee at board level. Under 
risk committee attributes, they look at the number of its meetings during 2006, the number of 
its directors and the percentage of independent directors. Besides, they use the following as 
corporate governance variables: the board size, board independence and the percentage of 
directors with finance expertise. The authors also add attributes for each of these broad 
corporate governance variables following the methodology of the G-Index developed by 
Gompers et al. (2003). The study is limited to the financial crisis year (set between July 2007 
and December 2008) during which the authors find that the reporting line of the CRO, that is 
when they report directly to the board, plays an important role in enhancing the performance of 
the bank during the financial crisis. Nonetheless, they do not find any positive association or 
significant result with respect to the other corporate governance mechanisms on the banks’ 
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performance as measured by the buy-and-hold returns, return on equity (ROE) and return on 
assets (ROA).  
By using bank capitalization as a proxy for the probability of a bank failure at its individual 
bank level and at the systemic level, Anginer et al. (2016) show that banks with shareholder-
friendly corporate governance structures tend to be less capitalized than banks who serve less 
the interests of the shareholders. For the period between 2003 and 2011, the authors use four 
accounting measures of capitalization, namely Tier 1 capital, total capital (including Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 divided by risk-weighted assets), common equity and tangible capital ratio and one 
market-based measure26.  
On corporate governance, Anginer et al. (2016) shortlist the following variables: board 
independence, intermediate board size27, the separation of roles between the CEO and the 
chairman, and anti-takeover provisions which is a dummy that equals one if the bank is 
incorporated in a state (for U.S banks) or country (for non-U. S banks) that permits anti-
takeover provisions and if the bank did implement them. The separation of roles between the 
CEO and the board chairman in addition to the intermediate board size and the absence of anti-
takeover provisions are found to be negatively associated with the accounting capitalization 
proxies. The authors explain that the results could be an indication that when the corporate 
governance structures favour the interests of the shareholders, the banks maintain low 
capitalization levels, which implies that they shift their risk exposure to the creditors or to the 
financial safety net.  
 
In a more recent study, Mollah and Liljeblom (2016) examine the power of the CEO over the 
bank’s risk, profitability and asset quality during the last credit crisis and the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis. Using information of 378 banks between 2007 and 2011, the authors 
assess the CEO power through a set of six dummy variables that they sum up to construct a 
single metric28. The authors find that powerful CEOs enabled banks to perform better during 
the sovereign debt crisis although they accepted higher insolvency risk (measured by the 
                                                             
26 Anginer et al., (2016) compute it as follows: the ratio of the market value of the bank’s common equity divided 
by the sum of the book value of total assets and the market value of common equity minus the book value of 
common equity.  
27 The authors allocate scores between 1 and 3 to this variable, where the highest score 3 is given to a board with 
an intermediate number of members ranging between 9 and 12.  
28 In their study, the criteria used for the dummy variables are as follows: the CEO-chair duality, if the CEO is 
internally recruited, the age of the CEO if it is greater than the median age, the CEO’s tenure if it is greater than 
the median tenure, the CEO banking experience if it is greater than the median of the sample and finally the CEO’s 
qualifications if they exceed the median number of qualifications. Additionally, they account for two main board 
characteristics namely the board size and its share of independent directors. 
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reciprocal of z-score). However, they do not seem to find any effect of strong CEOs on the bank 
performance (measured by ROA). In addition, they find that board independence enhances both 
bank performance and solvency.  
 
4.2.3 Islamic Bank Governance and Financial Stability: Empirical Explorations 
Empirical research on the assessment of the role of corporate governance in general and of risk 
governance in particular in promoting the financial stability of Islamic banks is scant. This is 
despite the high growth rates of this niche industry during the last decade and some evidence 
showing its resilience to the shocks during the last global financial turmoil. Effectively, figures 
from The Banker (2016) on the latest global Islamic finance industry size and trends show an 
impressive growth of the total global Shari’ah-compliant assets from $386bn in 2006 to 
$1440bn in 2016. Data from the same source shows an increase in total assets by 13.7% in 2016 
after a first-time drop by 8.48% one year earlier. The total profits of standalone banks increased 
to $13.68bn in 2016 while they reached $12.53bn in 2015.  
Hasan and Dridi (2010) showed that the financial shocks during the GFC did not adversely 
impact the profitability of Islamic banks in 2008 although their profit levels were higher during 
the pre-crisis period between 2005 and 2007 and not driven by fierce risk-taking strategies. 
They contend that the business model peculiar to Islamic banks as well as their adherence to 
Shari’ah principles sheltered them from chaotic losses as they are not allowed to invest in or 
finance products that harmed significantly their counterparts. Furthermore, they found that the 
credit and asset growth in Islamic banks were at least twice higher than that in mainstream 
banks. In terms of external rating by credit ranking agencies, Islamic banks were generally 
better assessed than conventional banks. While exploring how the differences between the 
business models of the two banks’ types affect the banks’ efficiency, asset quality and stability, 
Beck et al. (2013b) find that within countries and years29, Islamic banks have higher loan-
deposit ratios, higher cost-to-income ratios, higher overhead costs but lower non-performing 
loans and higher capital-asset ratios. In other terms, their findings indicate that Islamic banks 
have higher intermediation efficiency, lower cost-efficiency and higher capitalization.  
 
In a cross-country empirical study covering a pre-crisis time interval between 1993 and 2004, 
Čihák and Hesse (2010) were first to explore the role of Islamic banks in financial stability. 
                                                             
29 (Beck et al., 2013b) use a sample of 510 banks, out of which 88 are Islamic, in 22 countries over the period 
1995 to 2009. They add data of 209 listed banks from 21 countries covering the period 2005-2009 to investigate 
the shocks of the GFC on their market performance.  
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They use a sample of 77 Islamic banks and 397 commercial banks from 20 countries where 
both types of banks operate. The authors split their sample into large and small banks to look 
at any significant differences due to the banks’ size. Interestingly, they find that on average 
Islamic banks’ z-scores (as a proxy for financial stability) are higher than those of commercial 
banks suggesting that overall the former is more stable than the latter. Nonetheless, when 
accounting for size they find that small Islamic banks are more stable than large Islamic banks 
and that large commercial banks are more stable than large Islamic banks. Čihák and Hesse 
(2010) explain these findings by the credit risk exposure that increases together with the 
growing size of the Islamic banks as they start to operate on a larger scale. In other words, the 
credit risk exposure is not sufficiently accompanied by the adequate risk management tools that 
consider the idiosyncrasies of Islamic financial products that make them different and more 
complex to manage. As argued by Abedifar et al. (2013) and Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) even 
debt based Islamic financial contracts are not as straightforward as conventional loan contracts. 
Furthermore, greater credit risk might stem from the complexity of Islamic loan contracts, 
limited default penalties and moral hazard induced by profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contracts 
(Abedifar et al., 2013). For instance, Islamic banks are not allowed to transfer the ownership of 
the commodity underlying sale contracts such as Murabaha and Salam or leasing (Ijara) 
contract, hence they are exposed to both credit and commodity price risks.  
Unlike their mainstream counterparts, Islamic banks are restricted from hedging their exposure 
using derivatives as well as through different types of collateral as part of their compliance with 
Shari’ah principles (Khan and Ahmed, 2001).  
Although banking corporate governance features have not been considered in Abedifar et al. 
(2013)’s study, it is worth noting that they examined comparative stability of Islamic and 
conventional banks. Similar to Čihák and Hesse (2010) they also use the z-score to proxy 
insolvency risk, and in line with their results they find that small Islamic banks are more 
capitalized and exhibit greater stability than conventional banks. However, they do not find a 
significant difference in the overall z-score difference in mean test between the two types of 
banks. Abedifar et al. (2013) use a large sample of 118 Islamic commercial banks, 81 
commercial banks with Islamic windows and 354 conventional commercial banks. The data 
retrieved covers 24 countries over the period 1999 to 2009. Also, Abedifar et al. (2013) 
empirically find that Islamic banks have lower credit risk than conventional banks which 
contradicts the conceptual explanation of Čihák and Hesse (2010) as discussed above. In 
addition, they find that the loan quality, the (implicit) interest income and (implicit) interest 
expense of Islamic banks are less sensitive to domestic interest rates.  
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Mollah et al. (2016) appears to be the only paper so far that empirically investigates the 
influence of the governance structure on the risk-taking and performance of both Islamic and 
conventional banks. Using a sample of 52 Islamic banks and 104 conventional banks in 14 
countries throughout 2005 to 2013, the authors construct a composite corporate governance 
indicator (CGI) based on 12 governance variables, of which seven concern the board 
characteristics and five address the CEO’s determinants. Specifically, they consider the 
following for the former: the board size, board independence, number of female directors, 
number of meetings per year, board attendance, number of board committees and the 
independence of the chairperson. As for the latter, they include the CEO’s role duality, if the 
CEO is internally recruited, the CEO’s qualifications, their banking experience and tenure. The 
dependent variables approximating risk-taking is measured by the log z-score and financial 
performance through return on assets (ROA). The findings suggest that the governance 
structures in Islamic banks -which reflect their peculiarity in including Shari’ah-supervision in 
addition to the traditional corporate governance mechanisms- tend to be less risk-averse than 
conventional banks. However, this does not signify that they undergo a higher insolvency 
exposure as the coefficients of the Islamic dummy variable on the one side and of the CGI on 
the other side both indicate a positive effect on the log z-score although the former is not 
statistically significant. It is the interaction term between the Islamic dummy and the CGI that 
is negative and significant at 5% level. The authors explain that such result is not unexpected 
and is supported by the magnitude and signs of some controlling factors such as the capital 
adequacy, the deposit insurance, profit volatility, the country-level bank supervision and the 
inflation rate.  
4.3 Research Hypotheses & Methodology 
4.3.1 Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses 
As has been introduced in Chapter 2, the underlying theories for these studies start from the 
implications of the capital structure theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and the agency 
theory Eisenhardt (1989b) on the specific case of banking institutions as financial 
intermediaries following the contemporary banking theory of Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). 
In Modigliani and Miller (1958), the decisions over the proportions of debt and equity in the 
firm’s capital structure are profoundly examined considering the implications these proportions 
have on the value of the firm and consequently on the returns on equity to shareholders. 
Specifically, an increasing level of debt through the issuance of corporate bonds for instance is 
likely to increase the riskiness of the corporation for which shareholders will demand higher 
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risk premiums. Nonetheless, for managers the hardship dwells in reaching the optimal capital 
structure where having recourse to debt ensues tax benefits and lowers the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC). On the other hand, a larger equity proportion, which is likely to reduce 
the risk profile of the corporation and therefore increase its credit worthiness, does not offer 
such advantage as dividends payments are not tax deductible. These implications of the optimal 
capital structure evoke the divergences between the shareholders as owners of the firm and the 
executive managers as its agents which form the foundations of the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). Under agency theory, the differences between the risk preferences of the principals and 
agents are inspected. Particularly, the principal-agent relationships, which should reflect an 
efficient organization of the information and the risk-bearing costs, in fact ensues contracting 
agency problem of moral hazard and adverse selection and risk sharing problems between the 
shareholders and the firm managers due to their opposite goals. Divergences will therefore 
reside in compensation packages, leadership and regulation among others. Unsurprisingly, an 
approach to overcoming such problems suggested the coalignment of incentives between ones 
of the owners and those of the agents which proved to be an efficient solving mechanism. In 
the case of financial intermediaries all of the above concerns apply. Nonetheless, in the specific 
case of deposit-takers more concerns are raised as their funding streams include in addition to 
the proportions of equity and debt cash deposits and savings from households and corporations. 
The implications of the assets and liabilities’ structure and management are broadened to further 
economic agents. Specifically, the qualitative asset transformation which bankers use in the 
management of their assets and liabilities processes risk by altering the attributes of the claims 
being transacted (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). Two key questions that are consequently 
explored by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) wonder about how banks should be financed 
considering the riskiness of the liquidity transformation process and how should the regulators 
address the moral hazard arising from the system of protection to the banks’ customers known 
as the public safety net? Building up on one another, these theoretical explorations ensued 
propositions from academics and regulators whereby the safety of banks as sensitive financial 
intermediaries is approached from different angles including: the agency problems that are very 
specific to their business (Ellis et al., 2014) as well as their funding streams, valuations and risk 
management mechanisms.  
 
Given the discussion in the previous sections, multiple motivations drive carrying out the 
present study. First, the linkage between governance and risk-taking behaviour has long been 
established by the theory (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976). Second, the matter is of acute importance in the banking industry where banks 
act as financial intermediaries, hold public funds and are highly leveraged institutions (Becht 
et al., 2011; Brunnermeier, 2009; Dewatripont et al., 2010; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Ellis 
et al., 2014). Third, although prudential recommendations were constantly updated and strived 
to restrain the risk-taking tendencies of bankers (senior managers and shareholding investors) 
they proved to be insufficient to prevent the last financial crisis that disrupted the economies 
globally. Finally, to test the theoretical assertions in addition to the need of accompanying 
prudential and regulatory authorities in ensuring financial stability, there is a need to enrich the 
empirical literature that model and test the relationship between the bank-level corporate 
governance, risk-taking behaviour and banks’ exposure to instability that can result in fine in a 
systemic risk.  
With the rationale of these four research interests, this chapter carries out comparative study of 
Islamic and mainstream banks to explore and compare the results for two distinct banking 
business models since earlier studies found the former to be more stable and resilient to shocks 
(Abedifar et al., 2013; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Mollah et al., 2016). As 
the GFC enabled the detection of the weaknesses in the risk management function, the study 
will also compare the variations between the pre-and post-crisis periods to assess the 
contribution of risk governance in promoting financial stability at bank level.  
Finally, in contrast with previous studies, this chapter does not limit the measure of financial 
stability to one proxy. While literature on the subject extensively employs the log z-score as a 
measure of bank insolvency risk (such as Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013b; Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Mollah et al., 2016), this study includes three additional 
indicators of a bank’s soundness. Explicitly, after discussing the results from regressions where 
the z-score is the dependent variable, the following regressands are also included: the capital 
adequacy ratio, the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans as well as the ratio of liquid assets 
to deposits and short-term funding. These three additional indicators are used as proxies for the 
banks’ capital adequacy, the asset quality and liquidity through the deposit run-off ratio 
respectively.  
 
To fulfil this research aim, the research develops the following hypotheses: 
H01: Overall there is no relationship between risk governance and banks financial stability 
regardless of the banks type.  
H02: There is no relationship between risk governance and Islamic banks’ financial stability.  
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H03: There is no relationship between risk governance and banks financial stability in the post-
GFC period.   
H04: There is no change in the effect of risk governance in Islamic banks on their resilience to 
shocks, liquidity penuries and higher capitalization after the crisis. 
 
The econometric model set out in equation (4.1) will be used to test H01.  
FSIi,t = α0 + β1FSIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + γXi,t + ζBKi,t+ θZi,t + β2Islamic_Dummy + β3Crisis_Dummy + 
εi,t (4.1) 
Where: 
FSIi,t stands for the Financial Stability Indicator of bank i at time t, (four models of FSI used 
are LnZScore, CAR, LLR_GL and LiqA_DSTF), FSIi,t-1 is the first lag value of the financial 
stability indicator, RGIi,t is the Risk Governance Index for bank i at time t, Xi,t is a matrix of 
explanatory variables, BKi,t is a matrix of bank specific control variables, Zi,t is a matrix of 
macroeconomic variables. Islamic_Dummy is the dummy variable that permits to account for 
the distinctiveness of the Islamic banks’ business model compared to their conventional 
counterparts in the four equations as will follow30. Crisis_Dummy is the dummy variable that 
permits to distinguish between the years before the inception of the crisis (that is 2006 and 
2007) and the period following the inception of the crisis (that is from 2008 to 2012). Finally, 
α0 is the constant, β1, δ, γ, ζ, θ, β2 and β3 are the vectors of parameter estimates for their respective 
matrices and ε is the residual term.  
Variations of equation (4.1) that are used to test the null hypotheses H02 to H04 will be 
introduced further in the results’ analysis in section 4.4.  
 
4.3.2 Sample, Data and Explanatory Variables 
The same sample introduced in the two previous chapters is used for this empirical study. 
Specifically, the sample entails 27 conventional banks and 26 full-fledged Islamic banks from 
the GCC countries excluding Oman since it launched its first Islamic banks until 2013. Data for 
the period 2006 to 2012 were collected for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United 
Arab Emirates. The motivations behind the choice of only full-fledged Islamic banks and not 
Islamic windows of conventional banks as well as the choice of the GCC region were previously 
detailed in section 2.4.3 in chapter two.  
                                                             
30 Please note that in Models 2 and 4, where the focus is on the case of RGI in Islamic banks, an interaction term 
is incorporated in the models whereby the RGI scores in Islamic banks only acts as an additional variable from 
which an inference of the effect on every financial performance indicator is drawn. 
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While data to construct RGI required manual collection from the annual reports, financial 
statements (including the notes sections) and corporate governance reports, the remaining 
dependent and explanatory variables used in the econometric models were extracted from 
BankScope Bureau Van Dijk and the World Bank databases. A description of the data used in 
the empirical model and the sources are given in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Description of Variables used in the Empirical Models 
Variables Definition, Coding and Data Source 
Panel A: Dependent Variables  
LnZScore Natural Logarithm of the z-score following the method of (Lepetit 
and Strobel, 2013)31 (Data Source: BankScope & Author’s 
Calculations)  
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio as equal to (Tier1 + Tier 2) divided by Risk 
Weighted Assets and Off-Balance Sheet risks (Source: BankScope) 
LLR_GL Ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans (Source: BankScope) 
LiqA_DSTF Deposit Run-Off Ratio equal to Liquid Assets divided by Total 
deposits and short-term funding (Source: BankScope) 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables  
RGI  Risk Governance Index developed by author (Source: Annual 
Reports and corporate governance reports)  
Islamic Dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bank is Islamic 
and 0 otherwise 
Crisis Dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the year of the 
observation is from the post crisis period (that is 2008 to 2012) and 
0 otherwise  
Tier1_K Tier 1 Capital entails shareholder funds plus perpetual non-
cumulative preference shares plus disclosed reserves. Financial Data 
are in USD (Source: BankScope) 
C2I Cost-to-Income Ratio as equal to Operating Expenses divided by 
Operating Income (Source: BankScope) 
NL_TA Ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets (Source: BankScope) 
TEA Total Earning Assets. concern assets that generate interest or 
dividends. It includes stocks, bonds, income from rental property, 
certificates of deposit and other interest or dividend earning accounts 
or instruments. Financial Data are in USD (Source: BankScope) 
Net_Inc Net Income defined as profit after income taxes and profit/loss from 
discontinued operations (Source: BankScope) 
LnTA Natural Logarithm of total assets (Source: BankScope) 
NIR Net Interest Revenue (Source: BankScope) 
Eq_TA Leverage ratio as equal to Equity divided by Total Assets (Source: 
BankScope) 
NPL_GL Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans (Source: BankScope) 
Macroeconomic Control 
Variables 
 
lnGDP_Grw Natural Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate (Source: 
World Bank Database) 
Infl  Inflation rate (Source: World Bank Database) 
                                                             
31 The method of (Lepetit and Strobel, 2013) is explained in the section  
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Pol_Stab Defined by the World Bank as a measure of the “perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated 
violence, including terrorism”. Estimates ranges from approximately 
-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. (Source: World 
Bank Database) 
Gov_Eff Defined by the World Bank as reflecting the “perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies”. Estimates ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. 
(Source: World Bank Database) 
Reg_Qual Defined by the World Bank as reflecting the “perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. 
Estimates ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance. (Source: World Bank Database) 
 
4.3.3 Evaluating the Bank Level Financial Stability 
The selection of the four bank-level stability indicators (dependent variables in Table 4.1) is 
not new and all have been widely used in empirical financial literature. For instance, the z-score 
has been used, among others, in the studies of (Beck et al., 2013a; Creel et al., 2015; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Mohsni and Otchere, 2014; Pathan, 2009; Tabak et al., n.d.) in conventional 
finance and in the studies of (Abedifar et al., 2013; Ashraf et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2013b; 
Mollah et al., 2016) in Islamic finance. The z-score is a widely used measure for a bank’s 
soundness as it reflects its probability of insolvency. A bank will be insolvent if the numerator 
(Capital-to-Assets Ratio + ROA) ≤ 0 in the formula: 
 
Z ≡ !"#$%"&'%('"))*%)	,"%$(-./012/01  (4.2) 
 
Where: µROA and σROA stand for respectively the mean and the volatility of the ratio of return 
to assets.  
As discussed in Lepetit and Strobel (2013), there are various approaches to calculating the time-
varying z-score by either using the moving mean and standard deviation on a window width of 
generally three time periods for each period t є{1,2,…T} or combine the current values of 
capital-to-assets ratio and of ROA with estimates of the standard deviation of ROA computed 
over the full sample among other methods. Nonetheless, the alternative approach developed by 
Lepetit and Strobel (2013) is followed in this chapter. In this method, the mean and standard 
deviation of the returns on assets are calculated over the full sample then combined to the 
current values of the capital-to-assets ratio. When tested on a panel of 14658 commercial, 
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cooperatives and savings banks from the G20 countries over the period 1992 to 2009, Lepetit 
and Strobel (2013) find that this method showed low levels of intertemporal volatility at each 
bank’s individual level hence eliminates the introduction of spurious volatility in the 
computation of the z-score.  
The second dependent variable to use in equation (4.1), introduced in section 4.3.1 above, is 
the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). CAR is amongst the most important bank regulatory 
requirements that expresses the amount of capital that deposit-takers hold as a percentage of 
their risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 2010a). Capital adequacy determines “the degree of 
robustness of financial institutions to withstand shocks to their balance sheets” (IMF, 2006). It 
has also been extensively used in empirical literature as a fundamental explanatory variable in 
financial stability studies such as in (Beck et al., 2013a; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; Ng and 
Roychowdhury, 2014; Souza, 2016) or as an outcome variable as in Anginer et al.(2016).  
The third dependent variable used in equation (4.1) reflects the bank’s asset quality. The loan 
loss reserve to gross loans (LLR_GL) is a ratio that indicates the quality of the entire loan 
portfolio32 as assessed by the bank’s managers. From an accounting perspective, loan loss 
reserves reflect predicted cash-flow losses on the loan portfolio (Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). 
Therefore, the higher the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans, the poorer the quality of the 
loan portfolio hence the greater the exposure to risk of bank’s failure during recession as the 
value of the bank’s assets deteriorates. In their seminal work on the risk and stability of Islamic 
banks, Abedifar et al. (2013) used the ratio of LLR_GL as a proxy for credit risk for a large 
sample of conventional and Islamic banks (553 banks in total) across 24 countries between 
1999 and 2009. In another noteworthy study, Ng and Roychowdhury (2014) explored the 
influence of loan loss reserves on the risk of bank failure during the recent crisis. More 
specifically, the authors wanted to find out whether the loan loss reserves serve as a capital 
buffer against insolvency risk therefore whether they would enhance the capital’s quality.  
The fourth and final dependent variable to input in equation (4.1) is the ratio of liquid assets to 
deposits and short-term funds (LiqA_DSTF). This ratio captures the liquidity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities. It is also called the deposit run-off ratio as it indicates the extent 
to which deposit-takers can meet the short-term withdrawal of funds without facing liquidity 
difficulties (IMF, 2006). Effectively, in a stress scenario depositors and savers are very likely 
to run to banks fearing an early closure of the bank and the sale of illiquid assets. The crucial 
importance of having sufficient liquidity has been outlined in the reforms of the Basel III 
                                                             
32 The loan portfolio that includes performing and non-performing loans (Abedifar et al., 2013) 
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accords by the elaboration of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR) to ensure respectively the availability of a portfolio of contingent liquid assets. 
The former measures liquidity to cover cash outflows lasting 30 days in a tense context and the 
later assesses portfolio of permanent assets to finance stable funds including off-balance sheets 
commitments over a one-year horizon (BCBS, 2010). Similar to Beck et al. (2013b), the ratio 
LiqA_DSTF is used as an additional indicator of bank stability.  
 
4.3.4 The Estimation Method 
The econometric model that is set out in section 4.3.1 above is estimated using two-step 
generalized methods of moments (GMM) with instrumental variables for several reasons. 
Firstly, considering the nature of the four dependent variables and their interactions with the 
selected explanatory variables, there is a high probability that past realizations (especially ones 
at time t-1) of the equity to assets ratio and the return on assets that both compose the z-score 
in addition to the past realizations of the CAR, LLR_GL and LiqA_DSTF will influence their 
values at time t. Therefore, the panel data model bears an autoregressive dynamic that needs to 
be allowed for even if the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is not of direct interest 
(Bond, 2002). Secondly, considering the sample size (53 conventional and Islamic banks, 371 
maximum bank-year observations) and time interval (seven years) it appears that the context of 
the study falls within the “large N, small T” which poses a few econometric issues if estimated 
through static panel models. In fact, Nickell (1981) explains that one problem that arises with 
one-way fixed effects model concerns the bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. Effectively, the process where the individual’s mean value of y and each 
independent variable X is subtracted from the respective variable is likely to produce correlation 
between the regressors and the error component. Likewise, in the one-way random effects 
model, the ui error component will join every value of yit hence the lagged dependent variable 
cannot be independent of the composite error term. One solution to this problem is to use first 
differences transformation of the original model to eliminate the potential bias that arises from 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  
Thirdly, our model of interest contains predetermined explanatory variables among which some 
are endogenous, and others are exogenous. Hence, there will be a need to tackle endogeneity 
by using some variables as instruments (IV-Style).  
Given the above issues, it can be deduced that the generalized method of moments (GMM) fits 
well our process of interest and will enable the obtainment of robust estimators under fewer 
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assumptions. The Arellano-bond system estimator specifies a system of equations (the original 
and the transformed) that also allow the introduction of more instruments and increase 
efficiency. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), I similarly use the system two-step GMM estimator 
and control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic relationship between 
current values of the explanatory variables and the past values of the dependent variable.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the statistical and 
econometric analysis. The focus variable RGI has 325 observations with a mean of 8.68 across 
the sample and a standard deviation of 3.54. The financial stability indicators LnZScore, CAR, 
LLR_GL and LiqA_DSTF used as dependent variables have means of 2.52, 21.08, 3.50 and 
36.68 respectively. The explanatory variables, Tier1_K and TEA have means of USD 2.27 
million and USD 17.1 million respectively while the Total Assets are on average USD 19.22 
million. The ratio of operating expenses as a percentage of operating income (C2I) shows an 
average of 41.88. The ratio of net loans to total assets -which indicates the proportion of the 
banks’ assets that are tied up in loans- varies between 6.42 and 87.09 and displays an average 
of 56.71. The NIR is on average 507.71. Also, one of the major indicators of protection in case 
of a bank’s distress is the ratio of equity to total assets (EQ_TA). Ideally, the higher the ratio 
the better and more protected the bank. The data from our sample shows an average of 16.27. 
With respect to the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL_GL), it can be noted that 
on average NPL_GL is not very high (4.565) compared to its minimum and maximum values 
ranging from 0 to 33.28%.  
To account for country specific effects, the macroeconomic control variables selected are 
economic growth (lnGDP_Grw) and the inflation rate (Infl). Table 4.2 shows lnGDP_Grw and 
Infl have averages of 1.74 and 4.74 respectively. Additionally, three macro-level governance 
indicators from the World Bank Database are incorporated in the models to account for further 
differences that may exist among the GCC countries despite the sociocultural and institutional 
similarities (Abdallah et al., 2015). These stand for the differences in the political stability, 
government efficiency and regulatory quality The World Bank Indicators have a scale that 
ranges from -2.5 standing for weakest governance to +2.5 for strongest governance. The results 
show that the average of political stability for the GCC countries is 0.29, while it is 0.50 and 
0.45 for government efficiency and regulatory quality respectively.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of all Variables 
VARIABLES N Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
z-score 371 20.94 20.06 -2.63 118.5 
LnZScore 361 2.52 1.28 -1.61 4.77 
CAR 296 21.08 16.34 0.65 204.4 
LLR_GL 310 3.50 2.60 0 14.69 
LiqA_DSTF 319 36.68 61.91 2.46 944.0 
IS_DV 371 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Crisis_DV 370 0.71 0.45 0 1 
RGI 325 8.68 3.54 0 17 
Tier1_K 282 2.27e+06 2.04e+06 42.76 9.44e+06 
C2I 351 41.88 29.21 0.22 394.0 
TA 325 1.92e+07 1.94e+07 255.98 1.008e+08 
lnTA 325 16.21 1.17 12.45 18.43 
Net_Inc 325 338.23 459.47 -1.30e+06 2.31e+06 
NL_TA 324 56.71 13.81 6.42 87.09 
NIR 321 507.71 556.91 -11.17 2.53e+06 
EQ_TA 320 16.27 10.25 0.76 98.93 
NPL_GL 291 4.56 5.30 0 33.28 
TEA 325 1.71e+07 1.72e+07 208.47 9.41e+07 
lnGDP_Grw 336 1.74 0.67 0.49 3.26 
Infl 371 4.74 4.37 -4.86 15.05 
Pol_Stab 371 0.29 0.67 -1.14 1.21 
Gov_eff 371 0.50 0.41 -0.320 1.150 
Reg_Qual 371 0.45 0.26 -0.060 0.810 
LnZScore is the natural logarithm for z-score, CAR is the capital adequacy ratio, LLR_GL is the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross loans, LiqA_DSTF is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding, IS_DV is the 
Islamic bank dummy variable, Crisis_DV is the crisis period dummy variable, RGI is the risk governance indicator, 
Tier1_K is Tier 1 capital, C2I is the cost-to-income ratio, TA is total assets, LnTA is the natural logarithm for TA, 
Net_Inc is net income, NL_TA is the ratio of net loans to total assets, NIR is the net interest revenue, EQ_TA is 
the ratio of equity to total assets, NPL_GL is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans, TEA is total earning 
assets, LnGDP_Grw is the natural logarithm of GDP growth, Infl is inflation, Pol_Stab is the indicator for political 
stability, Gov_eff is the indicator for government efficieny and Reg_Qual is the indicator for the regulatory quality. 
 
4.4.2 Risk Governance and Financial Stability: Overall Results and Analysis 
As introduced in section 4.3 above, the analysis of the associations between risk governance 
and financial stability will be carried out for pre-and post-crisis periods and by examining the 
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role that sound risk governance frameworks might play in enhancing the four indicators of 
banks’ stability.  
In this section, the first and second null hypotheses are tested. Technically, the dynamic panel 
model set out in equation (4.1) is constructed to assess the association between the financial 
stability indicators, the RGI and the explanatory variables on the overall sample. A second 
modified model investigates null hypothesis H02 (see equation 4.2).   
As introduced earlier and to test null hypothesis H01, equation (4.1) is run recursively on 
LnZScore, CAR, LLR_GL and LiqA_DSTF. The results of the dynamic regression are reported 
in Table 4.6.  
H01: Overall there is no relationship between risk governance and banks financial stability 
regardless of the banks type. 
 
The statistical results relating to H01 for the four measures of stability are reported under Model 
1a in Table 4.6. For LnZScore, RGI bears a small yet positive and highly significant effect 
which signifies that the stronger the risk governance structure in place the lower the probability 
of insolvency. Specifically, for each unit increase in the RGI, the bank’s probability of 
insolvency declines by 0.018. Mollah et al. (2016) also find a positive coefficient although 
significant at only 10% level for their corporate governance index on the logarithm of the z-
score. Nonetheless, the Islamic dummy variable in Model 1a shows a negative coefficient of -
0.186 significant at 1% significance level. The negative coefficient clearly shows that bank 
soundness is relatively lower in Islamic banks compared to their mainstream counterparts. In 
fact, when conducting a two-sample t-test with equal variance, indeed significant differences 
between the means of raw z-score as well as of LnZScore are found in the two types of banks 
where more stability is found in the case of conventional ones (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). This 
result is similar to Mollah et al. (2016) who also find that conventional banks are more stable 
than Islamic banks. Nonetheless, Čihák and Hesse (2010) find that the large mainstream banks 
are financially stronger than the large Islamic banks whereas the small commercial banks are 
less stable than the small Islamic banks. Beck et al. (2013b) do not find any significant 
difference in z-score results between the two types of banks neither during normal times nor 
during the GFC.  
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Table 4.3: Two-sample t-test with equal variance between z-score in Conventional & 
Islamic Banks 
 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interv.] 
Conv. Banks 189 29.193 1.493 20.525 26.248 32.138 
Islamic Banks 182 12.36746 1.149 15.503 10.099 14.635 
Combined 371 20.93922 1.041 20.064 18.890 22.987 
t-statistic 8.884      
Pr(|T| > |t|) 0.000      
 
Table 4.4: Two-sample t-test with equal variance LnZScore between Conventional & 
Islamic Banks 
 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interv.] 
Conv. Banks 187 3.087 .0651 .891 2.958 3.215 
Islamic Banks 174 1.915 .102 1.356 1.712 2.118 
Combined 361 2.522 .067 1.280 2.389 2.654 
t-statistic 9.767      
Pr(|T|>|t|) 0.000      
 
The regression on capital adequacy (Model 1b, Table 4.6) also shows the coefficient of RGI 
(0.238) to be positive and significant at 5% significance level. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
when the strength of the risk governance structures in place ameliorates Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
and reduce their assets’ exposure to credit, market and operational risks. It is worth noting that 
the crisis dummy variable is negative with a magnitude of -1.885 and is highly significant. This 
indicates that the crisis caused the depletion of the capital most likely to cover the losses 
resulting from the GFC. Most of the other statistically significant explanatory variables bear 
the expected signs such as Tier1_K, C2I and EQ_TA with coefficients of 5.89e-07, -0.0468 and 
0.609 respectively.  
The effect of RGI on the ratio of LLR_GL (Model 1c, Table 4.6) is negative (-0.0289) but not 
statistically significant. The Islamic dummy shows a negative and statistically significant 
parameter estimate of -0.574 indicating that in Islamic banks the quality of the loan portfolio is 
likely to be better than one of their mainstream counterparts. The effect of the crisis improves 
the loan portfolio as the coefficient of the dummy variable (-0.514) is significant at 1% level. 
A possible explanation could be that the inception of the crisis and the resulting instability 
modified the banks’ managers’ behaviour to be more cautious in the issuance of loans and being 
more stringent on delivering these to customers with low credit ratings. The ratio of NL_TA is 
naturally positive and significant at 5% (0.0169) as a high ratio is a sign of higher exposure to 
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default which should require more loan loss reserves. Note that the ratio of Eq_TA -0.0384 is 
significant at 1% level. When the equity ratio increases and is apparently used to finance parts 
of the assets, managers are likely to be more cautious to safeguard the shareholders’ investments 
by maintaining a satisfactory quality of the bank’s loan portfolio hence decreasing the 
institution’s exposure to default from doubtful counterparties. As expected, the ratio of 
NPL_GL is positive and highly significant. Such situation inevitably necessitates more reserves 
to cover the expected losses.  
The last financial soundness indicator estimated LiqA_DSTF. Ideally, this liquidity ratio needs 
to be as high as possible to cover liabilities from depositors particularly in the case of a sudden 
bank run. Model 1d, Table 4.6 shows that overall RGI positively and significantly improves 
this ratio. Available liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding are likely to increase by 
1.27 when the RGI increases by one unit. Nevertheless, the coefficients of two dummy variables 
IS_DV and Crisis_DV are negative and highly significant. The t-test results from the mean 
comparison in Table 4.5 shows a statistically significant difference between LiqA_DSTF in 
Islamic and non-Islamic banks where the mean of the former (47.56) is substantially higher 
than the latter’s (28.37) although Beck et al. (2013b) found no statistically significant difference 
between means of the ratio in the two bank types. Previous literature suggested that Islamic 
banks had excess liquidity, at least until the recent crisis, and had more stable funds as they rely 
heavily on retail deposits (Hasan and Dridi 2010). As for the coefficient of the Crisis_DV, a 
negative highly significant coefficient signifies that liquid assets are depleted to meet the banks’ 
commitments to their counterparties during the stressed times following the markets turmoil.  
 
In summary, results from the estimations of Model 1 for the overall sample (without 
distinguishing between the status of RGI in the two banks’ types or between pre- and post-crisis 
periods) indicate that robust risk governance structures promote various aspects of banks’ 
financial stability such as their distance from insolvency, capital adequacy and liquidity profile. 
The effect of risk governance does not appear to improve the asset quality in this initial model. 
Nonetheless, the preliminary set of estimations indicate that the effects of the banks business 
models as well as the crisis cannot be ignored as their estimated coefficients were statistically 
significant in almost all of the regressions. 
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Table 4.5: Two-sample t-test with equal variance LiqA_DSTF between Conventional & 
Islamic Banks 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interv] 
Conv Banks 181 28.375 1.241 16.702 25.926 30.825 
Islamic Banks 138 47.565 7.764 91.210 32.212 62.919 
combined 319 36.677 3.466 61.908 29.857 43.497 
t-statistic -2.771      
Pr(|T| > |t|) 0.005      
 
 
4.4.3 Risk Governance and Financial Stability: Specific Case of Islamic banks  
As noted in the previous section, the Islamic dummy variable is statistically significant in the 
four estimations of Model 1. As some previous literature suggests, Islamic banks showed better 
resilience to shocks during 2008. Hasan and Dridi (2010) explain that the business model of 
Islamic banks enabled them to safeguard their profitability and maintain higher credit and asset 
growth than ones performed by their conventional counterparts. Interestingly, the authors point 
out that weaknesses in the risk management function in Islamic banks engendered a decline in 
their profitability later in 2009. Therefore, the interest in this section, as laid out in H02, is to 
explore the interaction between the risk governance frameworks in place in Islamic banks and 
examine whether these bore a different impact on the stability indicators. This is done by 
modifying equation (4.1) by including an interaction term between the RGI and the Islamic 
dummy variable while keeping all other explanatory variables in the model. The new equation 
estimated is set out:  
 
FSIi,t = α0 + β1FSIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + λRGI*IS_DVi,t+ γXi,t + ζBKi,t+ θZi,t + β2Islamic_Dummy + 
β3Crisis_Dummy + εi,t (4.2) 
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Table 4.6: Dynamic Panel Two-Step GMM Estimations – Overall Results and Specific Case of Islamic Banks 
 LnZScore CAR LLR_GL LiqA_DSTF LnZScore CAR LLR_GL LiqA_DSTF 
VARIABLES (Model 1a) (Model 1b) (Model 1c) (Model 1d) (Model 2a) (Model 2b) (Model 2c) (Model 2d) 
         
L.lnZScore 0.862***    0.868***    
 (0.0218)    (0.0302)    
L.CAR  0.186***    0.186***   
  (0.0219)    (0.0228)   
L.LLR_GL   0.664***    0.640***  
   (0.0357)    (0.0378)  
L.LiqA_DSTF    0.0443***    0.0526*** 
    (0.00620)    (0.00534) 
RGI 0.0181*** 0.238** -0.0289 1.267*** 0.0205*** 0.377*** -0.0652 1.431*** 
 (0.00379) (0.100) (0.0367) (0.255) (0.00436) (0.122) (0.0533) (0.421) 
IS_DV -0.186*** -2.069* -0.574** -12.72*** -0.0506 2.057 -0.809* 5.972 
 (0.0206) (1.029) (0.281) (2.602) (0.0933) (2.562) (0.444) (6.562) 
Crisis_DV 0.0522 -1.885*** -0.514*** -8.202*** 0.0377 -1.743*** -0.612*** -5.885*** 
 (0.0350) (0.644) (0.175) (1.461) (0.0393) (0.574) (0.152) (1.757) 
RGI*IS_DV     -0.0128 -0.244 0.00285 -1.427** 
     (0.0101) (0.228) (0.0490) (0.657) 
Tier1_K -1.44e-08 5.89e-07***   -7.09e-09 5.21e-07***   
 (9.50e-09) (1.43e-07)   (8.49e-09) (1.63e-07)   
C2I -0.364 -0.0468** 0.00759 0.188*** -1.084 -0.0321 0.0120** 0.252*** 
 (0.874) (0.0200) (0.00555) (0.0443) (0.992) (0.0210) (0.00462) (0.0665) 
NL_TA 0.00415*** -0.000500 0.0169** -0.406*** 0.00320*** -0.0290 0.00257 -0.237** 
 (0.000779) (0.0289) (0.00805) (0.0935) (0.000592) (0.0364) (0.0113) (0.111) 
TEA 1.04e-08***   2.64e-07** 7.72e-09***   2.36e-07** 
 (1.44e-09)   (1.16e-07) (1.48e-09)   (1.13e-07) 
EQ_TA  0.609*** -0.0384*** 0.110  0.599*** -0.0292** -0.221** 
  (0.0670) (0.0141) (0.117)  (0.0856) (0.0123) (0.0993) 
Net_Inc  -2.93e-06***  1.56e-06  -2.78e-06***  5.75e-06** 
  (5.86e-07)  (2.37e-06)  (9.54e-07)  (2.72e-06) 
LLR_GL  -0.146    -0.0410   
  (0.169)    (0.137)   
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NPL_GL  0.156** 0.148***   0.172* 0.171***  
  (0.0721) (0.0141)   (0.0900) (0.0114)  
NIR   4.23e-07*    7.55e-07**  
   (2.28e-07)    (3.41e-07)  
lnTA -0.159*** -0.0387 -0.553*** -12.51*** -0.120*** 0.757 -0.714** -13.50*** 
 (0.0223) (0.397) (0.195) (2.123) (0.0198) (0.512) (0.269) (2.465) 
Pol_Stab 0.110*** -1.090 -0.217 6.442*** 0.114*** 0.433 -0.315 4.268** 
 (0.0289) (0.745) (0.207) (1.661) (0.0248) (0.962) (0.248) (1.771) 
Gov_eff -0.0827 3.181** 0.231 -6.695* -0.0643 0.00295 0.812* -10.98*** 
 (0.0567) (1.561) (0.364) (3.490) (0.0528) (1.965) (0.463) (3.644) 
Reg_Qual 0.0727 -2.487 -0.151 6.865 0.0296 1.345 -1.292 19.09** 
 (0.0748) (2.511) (0.627) (5.453) (0.0544) (3.067) (0.907) (7.777) 
lnGDP_Grw -0.0480*** -0.278 -0.242*** 0.393 -0.0459*** -0.471** -0.195*** 0.774 
 (0.00747) (0.189) (0.0603) (0.622) (0.00776) (0.202) (0.0716) (0.545) 
Infl 0.00189* 0.0382 -0.0522*** 0.0584 0.00388*** -0.0129 -0.0395*** -0.0883 
 (0.000965) (0.0432) (0.0129) (0.0515) (0.000827) (0.0429) (0.0108) (0.0724) 
Constant 2.509*** 8.800 10.45*** 237.8*** 1.933*** -5.767 14.02*** 237.2*** 
 (0.361) (7.449) (3.227) (31.53) (0.291) (9.337) (4.382) (36.94) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
(AR1) 
0.299 0.006 0.430 0.974 0.307 0.012 0.541 0.601 
Arellano-Bond test for 
(AR2) 
0.077 0.713 0.100 0.977 0.082 0.660 0.138 0.669 
Hansen J-Statistic 0.992 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 
         
Observations 189 177 184 216 189 177 184 216 
Number of Bank_ID 48 47 45 51 48 47 45 51 
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The results from this second set of estimations are reported under Model 2 of Table 4.6. First, 
it is noticed that the coefficients of RGI in the regressions for LnZScore, CAR, LLR_GL and 
LiqA_DSTF in Model 2 have similar signs and magnitudes and identical significance levels as 
in Model 1. This serves as a robustness test of the influence of risk governance on the stability 
indicators and it is possible to conclude that increase in RGI promotes better protection from 
insolvency, stronger capital buffers and more liquidity to tackle more efficiently unexpected 
withdrawals from depositors. The interaction term of RGI*IS_DV in Model 2 however shows 
that RGI status in Islamic banks does not seem to impact the variations of the LnZScore, CAR, 
or LLR_GL. The only coefficient that is statistically significant is of RGI*IS_DV on the ratio 
of LiqA_DSTF. Although the study of Mollah et al. (2016) is on corporate governance rather 
than risk governance, they find a negative association between the interaction of the Islamic 
dummy and their corporate governance index and the logarithm of the z-score.  
From these results, it could be then inferred that the financial instability of Islamic banks is not 
particularly associated with the strength level of the key risk management mechanisms but 
could be due to other factors. Specifically, RGI does not play a significant role in maintaining 
low probability of insolvency as the coefficient -0.0128 is insignificant.  
Although previous research show that Islamic banks are more capitalized than conventional 
banks (Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013b) as well as the present research (see Table A4.2 
in Appendix)33, healthy risk governance practices are not found to be direct causes of their 
higher capitalization. The coefficient of RGI*IS_DV although negative (-0.244) is insignificant 
in Model 2b. The estimate of coefficient of the interaction term in the LLR_GL regression 
(Model 2c) is 0.0028 but not statistically significant indicating that RGI does not affect the asset 
loan portfolio quality of Islamic banks. Finally, RGI’s coefficient on the ratio of LiqA_DSTF 
is negative (-1.427) and significant at 5% level. While Islamic banks are found to be more liquid 
than their counterparts (see Table 4.5), this result might indicate that their boards and senior 
management’s decisions with respect to maintaining ample liquidity buffers against run-off risk 
were not effective translating probably their confidence in the available liquidity levels or the 
depletion of the liquid assets for other business purposes.  
 
With respect to other independent variables, first it is noticed that the crisis dummy shows a 
coefficient that is negative and highly significant in models where CAR, LLR_GL and 
                                                             
33 Table A4.2 in the Appendix shows the results from the t-test mean comparison of CAR between conventional 
and Islamic banks. The highly significant t-statistic indicates that Islamic banks are more capitalized than their 
conventional counterparts.  
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LiqA_DSTF are the outcome variables. The effect of the crisis is expected to cause the depletion 
of capital to cover unexpected losses. Also, loan loss reserves must have been used to cover the 
increase in customers defaults and bad loans as a result of the financial panic. The proportion 
of available liquid assets out of the total deposits and short-term funding was also expected to 
drop as a result of their conversion to cash to meet the banks’ short-term liabilities. The crisis 
dummy ‘s coefficient is positive yet statistically insignificant in the LnZScore equation. The 
ratio of equity to assets shows a positive and highly significant coefficient (0.599) on CAR 
which translates the anticipated positive association between low leverage and higher capital 
adequacy which is formed of ordinary shares in Tier 1 capital. The coefficient of EQ_TA is 
negative and significant on LLR_GL (-0.0292) and on LiqA_DSTF (-0.221).  
 
Similar to Model 1 results, a higher ratio signifies that a larger proportion of assets is not 
leveraged hence is owned by the bank and its shareholders rather than debtholders. Managers 
taking such decision are likely to privilege safety of the bank which is also translated in their 
safe credit loans allocation to maintain healthy asset portfolio with lower exposure to potential 
defaults from customers. An inverse relationship is noticed between banks’ size, that is LnTA, 
and LnZScore, LLR_GL and LiqA_DSTF. The coefficients are -0.12, -0.71 and -13.5 
respectively. Similar to the finding of Čihák and Hesse (2010) an assumption could be that 
banks in the GCC region get higher exposure to instability with their growing size particularly 
as it gets more complex to adequately manage their credit risk monitoring system. It is also 
worth recalling that Laeven et al. (2016) find strong evidence that systemic risk increases with 
banks’ size.  
In summary, results from the estimations of Model 2 build-up on the previous analysis by 
showing that the positive results of RGI promoting more financial stability are more driven by 
figures of conventional banks rather than Islamic banks. While solid risk governance 
frameworks and practices are found to be positively associated with the four stability indicators, 
evidence is not found for this is the case for Islamic banks. Therefore, their distance from 
insolvency, higher capitalization, asset quality and higher liquidity buffers are due to other 
factors rather than the risk management and governance mechanisms.  
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4.4.4 Risk Governance and Financial Stability: A Post-Crisis Analysis on the 
Overall Sample 
In this section, the objective is to test H03 whereby the interaction between the risk governance 
index and the crisis dummy variable represents the focus variable. This is done by including an 
interaction term between RGI and the crisis dummy and by keeping identical matrices of 
explanatory variables in the base equation (4.1). Results from the econometric estimations of 
the modified equation (4.3) are reported in Model 3 of Table 4.7.  
 
FSIi,t = α0 + β1FSIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + λRGI*Crisis_DVi,t+ γ Xi,t + ζ BKi,t+ θ Zi,t + β2Islamic_Dummy 
+ β3Crisis_Dummy + εi,t (4.3) 
 
Several differences can be noticed in the Model 3 estimations. First, improvements of RGI in 
the post-crisis period (RGI*Crisis_DV) are noted to still contribute to the banks’ solvency 
(LnZScore) however to a lower extent as the coefficient 0.027 is positive yet significant at only 
10%. It is then inferred that while risk governance plays a substantial role in maintaining a low 
probability of insolvency (as found in Model 1 and 2), in the years following the crisis its 
contribution to financial stability remained positive although with a lower magnitude. While 
standalone RGI shows a positive sign (0.935) and is highly significant in the CAR regression 
(Model 3b), the interaction between RGI and the crisis dummy variable bears a negative 
coefficient significant at 10% (-0.799). 
The estimations in Model 1 and 2 showed that the crisis dummy had a highly significant 
negative impact on the total capital ratio which was earlier explained by the depletion of the 
core capital to cover the unexpected losses from the financial turmoil. As a result of the 
interaction with RGI, it is noticed that the crisis dummy becomes positive and loses its statistical 
significance. Similarly, in Model 3c on LLR_GL the coefficient of standalone RGI is negative 
(-0.118) and highly significant. This result signifies that better risk governance mechanisms 
enabled the improvement of the loan portfolio quality.  
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Table 4.7: Dynamic Panel Two-Step GMM Estimations – Post Crisis Analysis 
 LnZScore CAR LLR_GL LiqA_DSTF LnZScore CAR LLR_GL LiqA_DSTF 
VARIABLES (Model 3a) (Model 3b) (Model 3c) (Model 3d) (Model 4a) (Model 4b) (Model 4c) (Model 4d) 
L.lnZScore 0.902***    0.846***    
 (0.0283)    (0.0279)    
L.CAR  0.135***    0.176***   
  (0.0258)    (0.0250)   
L.LLR_GL   0.666***    0.651***  
   (0.0356)    (0.0371)  
L.LiqA_DSTF    0.0558***    0.0331*** 
    (0.00702)    (0.00731) 
RGI -0.00835 0.935** -0.118*** 0.875 0.0213*** 0.253** -0.0793** 0.997*** 
 (0.0128) (0.399) (0.0391) (0.650) (0.00413) (0.104) (0.0339) (0.346) 
IS_DV -0.176*** -1.008 -0.589** -11.42*** -0.196*** -0.517 -1.028** -1.159 
 (0.0284) (1.310) (0.251) (2.666) (0.0438) (1.713) (0.403) (3.366) 
Crisis_DV -0.216 6.498 -1.574*** -11.12 0.0479 -2.134*** -0.658*** -7.475*** 
 (0.145) (4.582) (0.546) (6.893) (0.0421) (0.700) (0.184) (2.128) 
RGI*Crisis_DV 0.0273* -0.799* 0.0991* 0.417     
 (0.0138) (0.445) (0.0500) (0.642)     
RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV     0.00150 0.0150 0.0557 -0.426 
     (0.00444) (0.126) (0.0361) (0.311) 
Tier1_K -2.58e-08** 6.26e-07***   -1.04e-08 5.59e-07***   
 (1.12e-08) (2.13e-07)   (8.60e-09) (1.37e-07)   
C2I -1.529** -0.0455** 0.00896* 0.203*** -0.215 -0.0343* 0.00235 0.260*** 
 (0.733) (0.0182) (0.00493) (0.0343) (1.069) (0.0196) (0.00624) (0.0520) 
NL_TA 0.00560*** -0.0790** 0.0168** -0.262** 0.00312*** -0.0372 0.00970 -0.513*** 
 (0.000881) (0.0302) (0.00807) (0.106) (0.000836) (0.0332) (0.0116) (0.118) 
TEA 8.72e-09***   1.82e-07 8.54e-09***   1.65e-07 
 (1.61e-09)   (1.14e-07) (1.36e-09)   (1.36e-07) 
EQ_TA  0.710*** -0.0440*** 0.0163  0.618*** -0.0284** -0.222* 
  (0.0810) (0.00840) (0.113)  (0.0841) (0.0117) (0.114) 
Net_Inc  -2.48e-06***  2.53e-06  -2.73e-06***  7.41e-06*** 
  (5.87e-07)  (2.35e-06)  (6.25e-07)  (2.42e-06) 
LLR_GL  -0.00441    -0.0764   
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  (0.155)    (0.114)   
NPL_GL  0.175** 0.151***   0.217*** 0.155***  
  (0.0714) (0.0167)   (0.0615) (0.0167)  
NIR   4.13e-07    3.99e-07  
   (2.49e-07)    (2.66e-07)  
lnTA -0.106*** -0.135 -0.469** -11.60*** -0.134*** 0.519 -0.485** -10.08*** 
 (0.0300) (0.835) (0.218) (2.088) (0.0166) (0.577) (0.216) (2.242) 
Pol_Stab 0.112*** -0.769 -0.317 5.589*** 0.107*** -0.0354 -0.397 4.118*** 
 (0.0336) (0.871) (0.289) (1.731) (0.0298) (0.977) (0.355) (1.382) 
Gov_eff -0.124* 3.472* 0.428 -6.967* -0.0292 0.864 0.621 -6.441** 
 (0.0619) (1.902) (0.548) (3.524) (0.0742) (2.106) (0.583) (2.977) 
Reg_Qual 0.164** -3.524 0.0582 12.62** -0.00919 0.610 -0.510 10.13 
 (0.0759) (2.854) (0.817) (5.319) (0.0868) (3.079) (0.894) (6.059) 
lnGDP_Grw -0.0517*** -0.0162 -0.199** 0.486 -0.0481*** -0.276 -0.232*** 0.854 
 (0.00856) (0.255) (0.0974) (0.609) (0.00740) (0.240) (0.0857) (0.520) 
Infl 0.00171 0.00561 -0.0460*** 0.00851 0.00381*** -0.0166 -0.0526*** -0.0342 
 (0.00119) (0.0426) (0.0127) (0.0675) (0.00135) (0.0329) (0.0125) (0.0681) 
Constant 1.777*** 5.655 9.761*** 216.5*** 2.199*** -0.283 10.40*** 204.4*** 
 (0.538) (11.52) (3.552) (30.75) (0.295) (10.92) (3.455) (37.01) 
         
Arellano-Bond test for 
(AR1) 
0.313 0.021 0.217 0.987 0.297 0.009 0.490 0.587 
Arellano-Bond test for 
(AR2) 
0.103 0.864 0.111 0.920 0.048 0.729 0.106 0.491 
Hansen J-Statistic 0.995 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 
         
Observations 189 177 184 216 189 177 184 216 
Number of Bank_ID 48 47 45 51 48 47 45 51 
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Nonetheless, while the crisis dummy shows a negative and highly significant coefficient (-
1.574), the coefficient of risk governance index in a post-crisis period (RGI*Crisis_DV) is 
positive (0.099) and significant at 10% level. This result is contrary to the initial expectation 
that immediately after the crisis, better risk governance frameworks would have improved the 
banks’ asset quality as managers became more prudent and cautious on credit ratings and 
getting more exposed to default risk especially that the crisis dummy was negative and highly 
significant in all the previous estimations and RGI also was negative although insignificant. 
Nonetheless, despite the use of two lags for the endogenous variables incorporated in the GMM 
models, it should be recognized that as the study of risk governance is based on disclosure 
analysis the effects of the change in policies and strategies reported through disclosures are 
likely to take time to ensue the expected outcomes in practice.  
In Model 3d on the liquidity ratio LiqA_DSTF, both RGI and RGI*Crisis_DV have positive 
parameter estimates however both are statistically insignificant. While results from Model 1 
and 2 showed that the better the risk governance structure the more liquidity the bank holds for 
unexpected withdrawals, it appears from Model 3 that RGI in a post crisis period did not 
contribute directly to the reinforcement of the liquidity cushions.  
 
With respect to other explanatory variables, the coefficient of Tier 1 capital holds similar sign, 
positive and highly significant, and approximate magnitudes on CAR as compared to the results 
from the previous Models 1 and 2. It is not expected to witness a change on this variable as Tier 
1 is a component of the capital ratio’s numerator. The equity to assets ratio also enhances capital 
adequacy through lower leverage, its coefficient (0.71) is positive and significant. The 
coefficient for bank size (lnTA) is negative and significant in the models where LnZScore, 
LLR_GL and LiqA_DSTF are the dependent variables but insignificant in the equation of CAR. 
As has been discussed earlier, previous literature has also found opposite associations between 
size and various stability measures indicating greater risk of exposure to instability because of 
growing size (Abedifar et al., 2013; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Laeven et al., 2016; Mollah et al., 
2016). The World Bank political stability proxy shows positive and significant coefficients on 
LnZScore and LiqA_DSTF (0.112 and 5.589 respectively) indicating that the favourable 
macro-conditions bear a positive effect on the stability of banks by lowering their probability 
of insolvency and enabling them to comfortably spare cash convertible assets for future 
unexpected cash withdrawals. In these two equations similar results are found for improvements 
in the regulatory quality with coefficients 0.164 and 12.62 being positive and statistically 
significant in Models 3a and 3d respectively.  
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4.4.5 Risk Governance and Financial Stability: A Post-Crisis Analysis of Islamic 
Banks 
In this last section, the objective is to test null hypothesis H04 whereby it is assumed to find no 
change in the impact of RGI in Islamic banks immediately after the crisis inception as previous 
literature demonstrated their higher capitalization, better asset quality and better resilience to 
liquidity penuries. Nonetheless, considering the statistical significance of the positive 
relationship between risk governance and financial stability from Models 1, 2 and 3, there is a 
need to investigate whether the case is similarly valid for Islamic banks. To test H04, the base 
equation (4.1) is modified by including an interaction term between RGI, the Islamic and the 
crisis dummy variables. The updated equation is set out: 
 
FSIi,t = α0 + β1FSIi,t-1 + δRGIi,t + λRGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DVi,t+ γXi,t + ζBKi,t+ θZi,t + 
β2Islamic_Dummy + β3Crisis_Dummy + εi,t (4.4) 
 
The results from estimations of equation (4.4) are reported under Model 4 in the last four 
columns of Table 4.7. As a robustness check for standalone RGI, the parameter estimates hold 
the expected signs and their magnitudes do not vary much compared to the ones from earlier 
models. Hence, in Model 4a on LnZScore, the risk governance index is found to contribute 
positively to the banks financial solvency with a coefficient of 0.0213 significant at 1% level. 
Also, a unit increase in RGI significantly reinforces total capital ratio by 0.253. The coefficient 
of RGI in Model 4b with CAR (0.253) is positive and significant as was the case in earlier 
models showing the robustness of the results. Similar to Model 3, the coefficient of RGI on 
LLR_GL is significantly negative (-0.079) indicating the amelioration of the asset portfolio 
quality thanks to the inclusion of better risk management governance practices. The last 
robustness check of the regression of LiqA_DSTF (Model 4d) shows similar results from Model 
1 and 2 with a positive and significant RGI coefficient at 1% significance level. Therefore, an 
enhancement of RGI enables the augmentation of the fraction of reserve assets that can easily 
be converted to cash to compensate unforeseen withdrawals from depositors. 
Nevertheless, the focus variable in this last model that is RGI*IS_DV*Crisis_DV has 
coefficients that are not statistically significant in the four equations. The estimates 0.001, 
0.015, 0.055 and -0.426 do not seem to affect LnZScore, CAR, LLR_GL and LiqA_DSTF 
respectively. Hence, null hypothesis H04 cannot be rejected implying that the changes in RGI 
in Islamic banks in a post-crisis period are not directly associated with higher financial stability. 
In fact, and in addition to the positive effect of standalone RGI, LnZScore is more affected by 
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its past value (one lag of LnZScore), the total earning assets (TEA), the ratio of net loans to 
total assets (NL_TA) and the country’s political stability (Pol_Stab). Capital adequacy ratio is 
associated naturally with its lag value (L.CAR) and higher Tier 1 capital (Tier 1_K), higher 
equity to total assets ratio (EQ_TA), lower cost-to-income ratio (C2I), lower net income 
(Net_Inc). The ratio of LLR_GL is impacted by its levels from previous year and importantly 
by the ratio of NPL_GL as expected as the higher the non-performing loans the more provisions 
and reserves are required to cover the expected losses. As found in the previous models too, the 
crisis had certainly prompted more prudence in the loan issuance policy as the negative and 
significant coefficient of Crisis_DV (-0.658) indicates lower LLR_GL hence better loan 
portfolio quality. In terms of liquidity, LiqA_DSTF is tied up positively to its past value in 
addition to standalone RGI as mentioned above. As expected, NL_TA is negatively associated 
with LiqA_DSTF as the higher the proportion of assets tied up in loans, the less liquid is the 
bank and the higher is its exposure to default.  
 
4.4.6 Summary of the Results 
The relationship between risk governance and financial stability through the above extended 
analysis can be summarized as follows. The index translating the strength of the risk 
management governance mechanisms and practices (RGI) is found to be positively associated 
with lnZScore indicating higher probability of financial solvency. In the four estimations also, 
RGI’s parameters are always found positive and statistically significant at least at 5% level on 
CAR translating a good contribution to raising core capital above the minimum regulatory 
requirements. For asset quality proxied by LLR_GL, the coefficient of RGI is found negative 
in the four estimations however significant in the last two models at 5% level at least. Finally, 
RGI is also found to enhance liquidity cushions by holding more of the cash-convertible assets 
to cover unforeseen withdrawals as its estimates are positive and highly significant in three out 
of the four estimations above.  
While it was expected to find significant contribution of RGI in Islamic banks to improve 
financial stability as Islamic law sets the limits of risk-taking and the Islamic financial contracts 
are entrenched in the real economy, evidence suggests that this is not the case. Likewise, in the 
post-crisis period results do not show any statistical significance of the impact of better risk 
governance frameworks on any of the four financial stability indicators.  
Additionally, in the four models discussed earlier it is noted that the bank size is negatively 
associated with almost all the financial stability indicators. Effectively, LnTA shows negative 
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coefficients at 5% significance level (at least) on the models where LnZScore, LLR_GL and 
LiqA_DSTF are the dependent variables. This finding is consistent with Mollah et al. (2016) 
although Abedifar et al. (2013) and Beck et al. (2013b) find negative but insignificant estimates 
of LnTA on the natural logarithm of z-score. The opposite relationship supports the substantial 
analysis of Laeven et al. (2016) who find strong evidence that systemic risk increases along 
with bank size. As for the country specific effects, the proxy for political stability is positive 
and significant at 1% level on all the estimations where LnZScore and LiqA_DSTF are the 
outcome variables. In models with CAR and LLR_GL, its coefficient is never statistically 
significant. Pol_Stab has values that vary between -2.5 and 2.5 where the higher bound signifies 
lower probability of political instability. Country-level political stability enables banks to 
operate in a safer environment where disruptions and shocks from external sources are minimal. 
It is therefore expected to find positive associations between higher values of Pol_Stab and 
lower probability of banks’ insolvency as well as more liquidity available for withdrawals from 
depositors. Among other country-specific control variables, LnGDP_Grw is found to be 
negative whenever statistically significant. Specifically, the natural logarithm of economic 
growth is negatively associated with LnZScore and LLR_GL in models 1 and 3 while it is with 
LnZScore, CAR and LLR_GL in Model 2 and again only with LnZScore and LLR_GL in model 
4. This can be explained by the need for more credit and loans in times of economic expansion 
which also ensues a higher probability of default. Abedifar et al. (2013) and Ghosh (2015) also 
find statistically significant negative relationship between GDP per capita and logarithm of z-
score on the one hand and real GDP and non-performing loans the other hand.  
 
4.4.7 Robustness Tests 
The encouraging results of RGI on the selected financial soundness proxies have been 
supported throughout the four stages of the analysis as explained in the results summary section 
hence are robust in the four estimations. Also, and as part of the postestimation analysis, the 
Arellano-Bond tests for the first and second order serial autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
residuals are reported. The residuals of the differenced equation should possess serial 
correlation, however considering that the original errors are serially independent, the test on the 
differenced residuals will not exhibit significant AR (2) behaviour. The AR (2) result is of 
substantial importance to us as failing to reject its null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation 
will indicate that the second lags of the endogenous variables are appropriate instruments for 
their current values (Baum, 2010). With the exception of LnZScore in Model 4, where the p-
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value is close to 5% (0.048), the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) all other equations show p-
values that are higher than the 5% threshold hence the appropriateness of the second lags of our 
endogenous variables used as instruments effectively holds.  
A further diagnostic test concerns the validity of the overidentifying restrictions in the two-step 
GMM model. The Hansen J-statistic is favoured to Sargan test of overidentified restrictions 
because the latter is not robust although not weakened by many instruments while the former 
is robust although weakened by many instruments. Furthermore, and as is known when 
implementing instrumental variables, having an overidentified model is not an undesirable 
econometric issue as much as would be the case of an under-identified model. Finally, the 
Hansen J-Statistic is a postestimation test of special interest to two-step GMM estimations as it 
is only valid when the weighting matrix is optimal, which means that it equals the inverse of 
the covariance matrix of the moment conditions (Hall, 2005). As all this chapter’s equations 
are estimated through two-step GMM method, results of the Hansen J-Statistic for each 
equation are reported immediately after AR (2). In the eight columns of results in Table 4.6 and 
the eight columns of results in Table 4.7, the p-value for the J-statistic is usually above 0.99 
hence never significant. Consequently, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test 
which posits that the over-identifying restrictions are valid.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Considering the penury of empirical explorations on the substantial role that risk management 
governance might play in promoting banks’ financial stability, the objective of this chapter is 
to contribute to the scarce literature by using the newly developed risk governance index ‘RGI’ 
to evaluate the possible associations between sound risk governance and bank’s financial 
health. In contrast with many academic papers, this research does not limit financial soundness 
to one indicator however extends the investigation to further key features of banks’ status. In 
addition to the log z-score which conveys the distance from insolvency, capital adequacy, asset 
quality and deposits run-off ratio are used recursively as proxies for financial stability.  
Furthermore, the analysis was enriched by using a sample encompassing data from 53 
conventional and Islamic banks in five GCC countries. The robust estimations from two-step 
system GMM suggest that risk governance significantly contributes to the enhancement of key 
financial stability measures. Specifically, improvements in the scores of RGI engender lower 
risk of insolvency, higher capital adequacy ratios, better loan portfolio quality and higher 
proportion of liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding to cover unanticipated bank runs. 
In the post-crisis period, results indicate that better risk governance frameworks lower the 
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probability of bank insolvency. As for Islamic banks, RGI is not found to significantly affect 
their financial stability neither before nor after the global financial crisis. It is important to note 
though that these results are subject to the peculiarities of the oil-exporting countries of the 
GCC region where until 2006, the corporate governance reforms were recognized by 
Hawkamah and IIF (2006) to be far from meeting the expectations of international investors.  
Factors such as globalization and sharp corrections of some of the GCC stock markets 
happening in the beginning of year 2006 are thought to have created a more favourable 
environment to implement changes in the corporate governance frameworks and practices. 
Furthermore, the legislation on corporate governance has essentially centred on the 
improvement of practices and behaviour, integrating the management of business with the 
cultural tenets of the region as well as the commitment of the board and the senior management 
to the success of the organization (Ghosh, 2018).   
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Risk governance in banking institutions has gained importance after financial authorities and 
international regulatory bodies uncovered the weaknesses that contributed to the massive losses 
during the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the national regulators now consider corporate governance as whole and risk governance 
in particular as a key factor that can contribute to the prevention of excessive risk-taking 
behaviour of bank managers to enhance the profitability of the shareholders and theirs as well34. 
As Stulz (2014) puts it, from the equity holders’ perspective ‘better risk management’ cannot 
mean risk management that reduces exposure to risk since reducing risk would also mean 
avoiding valuable investments. Consequently, banks have private incentive structures that are 
more performance and cost-benefit oriented. In contrast, regulatory authorities are more 
concerned about the stability and soundness of individual financial institutions and the overall 
financial sector that are both crucial to protect the interests of all stakeholders including 
depositors and bondholders. Financial authorities are very much concerned about systemic risks 
whereby shocks from the financial sphere spread to the economy at large as experienced in 
2008. Regulators have therefore incentive structures that are more public and socially oriented.  
The main aim of this thesis was to explore whether and how the governance of risks in banks 
contributes to performance and stability. This last chapter synthesizes the results and answers 
to the research questions that were set out in the introduction chapter and that were examined 
in three empirical essays. It discusses how this research contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge and provides reflections on the policy implications of the three studies. The chapter 
concludes by presenting the limitations of the research and suggestions for future research 
development.  
 
5.1 Synthesis of Results 
The objective of the first empirical essay was first to come out with a metric that can facilitate 
the assessment of the risk governance architectures in each bank in the sample and then to use 
this metric, namely the risk governance index ‘RGI’, to compare the robustness of these risk 
governance frameworks between Islamic and conventional banks and evolution from the pre- 
to post-GFC periods. Therefore, the answers to the first and second research questions confirm 
the postulated assumptions that the risk management governance mechanisms were 
strengthened after the GFC and that significant differences existed between the two banks’ type. 
                                                             
34 This refers to the alignment of the managers’ compensation with the interests of the shareholders to overcome 
the known agency conflicts (Ellis et al., 2014).  
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In fact, Islamic banks were found to have lower RGI scores with means that were significantly 
lower than those of conventional banks.  
 
In the second essay, the main objective was to look at whether there is any effect of risk 
governance on the banks financial performance. The preliminary results (for research question 
4) for the overall sample showed that as RGI increases, returns on average assets and returns 
on average equity decreased. The operational efficiency nevertheless improved with higher 
RGI. At this initial stage of the analysis, it could have been assumed that better risk governance 
frameworks induce lower risk tolerance hence lower inclination towards excessively risky 
investments and more constraining loan allocation policies to limit customers’ defaults. 
Nonetheless, when looking at the particular case of Islamic banks through the interaction 
between RGI and the Islamic dummy, it appears that the preliminary findings (negative impact 
of RGI on ROAA and ROAE) are driven by the Islamic banks data because RGI shows a 
different relationship with the performance of conventional banks (positive impact of RGI on 
ROAA and ROAE as shown in Table 3.3). The contrasting results now clearly indicate that the 
more the conventional banks comply with the regulators and the academics recommendations 
in improving their risk management and governance practices the more profitable they become. 
In Islamic banks however there seems to be a failure from the risk governance mechanisms in 
place to properly adjust the riskiness of their specific financial products to increase their 
profitability. In fact, this could be an indication that the peculiarities of some Islamic financial 
contracts that are by nature riskier for the banks, such as Mudaraba and Musharaka partnership 
contracts, are side-lined to the detriment of higher profitability. As is commonly known by 
Islamic bankers and Islamic banking academics, the proportion of profit-and-loss sharing 
contracts is meagre in the total financing offered by Islamic banks. As reported by Alandejani 
and Asutay (2017) in 2011 the percentage of PLS instruments in the total Islamic financing 
varies between 0.6% in Saudi Arabia and 9.9% in the UAE. While these equity products are 
riskier, they are nonetheless expected to generate higher returns for Islamic banks and boost 
their financial performance. A reluctance in engaging in them more aggressively is likely to 
translate their weak risk management function. Such assumption is also based on the 
conclusions reached by Hasan and Dridi (2010) when comparing the effects of the GFC on the 
performance of conventional and Islamic banks.  
 
As per the GFC effect on RGI, knowing that risk governance structures significantly improved 
after the crisis, they do not hold any statistically significant influence neither on the two 
154 
 
profitability measures nor on the operational efficiency proxy (research question 6). In the 
specific case of Islamic banks and after the GFC, the improvement in RGI is noticed to 
ameliorate the returns on average assets as well as the operational efficiency which is measured 
by the cost-to-income ratio (research question 7). 
In the third essay, the main objective was to look at whether there is any effect of risk 
governance on various aspects of the banks’ individual financial stability. The preliminary 
results that concern the overall sample show that enhanced risk governance permit (i) a 
reduction in the exposure to insolvency which was proxied by the commonly used z-score, (ii) 
an improvement of the capital adequacy ratio and (iii) an enhancement of the liquidity profile 
by the provision of higher levels of cash-convertible assets to withstand unexpected bank runs 
(research question 8). Nonetheless, while these results are true for conventional banks, it is 
found that the structure of risk governance in Islamic banks does not play a significant role in 
promoting more of their stability (research questions 9 and 11). This finding is in contrast with 
the postulated expectation that there will likely be a significant contribution of RGI in Islamic 
banks to improve financial stability as Islamic law sets the limits of risk-taking and the Islamic 
financial contracts are entrenched in the real economy.  
5.2 Contribution of the thesis to the existing body of knowledge  
This thesis builds up on the scarce empirical academic literature that investigated the 
relationship between features related to risk management governance and banks’ financial 
performance which is limited to the works of Aebi et al. (2012); Battaglia and Gallo (2015); 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). In addition, this research is the first to explore the relationship 
between risk governance and financial stability regardless of the banks’ type. While the nexus 
between bank governance and risk-taking behaviour has been established by the theory (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the empirical explorations are richer when it 
comes to discussing the banks’ performance with features of corporate governance such as the 
role of the board of directors, the importance of the board committees and the CEO power 
through their remuneration schemes among others. Considering the critical importance of sound 
risk management decisions and their implementation to the soundness of the financial system 
and the prevention of a systemic risk, it is of a pressing need from the academia and the financial 
regulators to identify, explore ex-ante and continuously monitor ex-post the robustness of the 
risk management mechanisms that enable banks to achieve their essential role in the economy 
as financial intermediaries first and contribute to the growth of the real economy without 
compromising their individual stability and business objectives.  
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In addition to filling this gap, this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge by exploring the 
link between risk governance and performance in a different geographical area that is the GCC 
region, hence building on the previous studies performed on banks in North America (Aebi et 
al., 2012), bank holding companies in the U.S (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) and Chinese and 
Indian markets (Battaglia and Gallo, 2015). A convergence is found between the results from 
these three first studies on risk management governance and ones of the present thesis. 
Specifically, for conventional banks in the GCC better risk governance structures are found to 
increase return on average assets and improve operational efficiency. In the North American 
market, Aebi et al. (2012) find that one proxy of sound risk governance that is the direct 
reporting line of the CRO to the BOD induces higher ROE and higher buy-and-hold stock 
returns. In the U.S market, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) find that bank holding companies that 
display stronger risk management index (RMI) have higher returns on assets and lower tail 
risks. This study is the only one that tackles the relationship between risk management 
organizational frameworks and both financial performance and financial stability indicators. 
Hence, results from the empirical work in Chapter 4 also relate to the findings of Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013). Lastly, in the Chinese and Indian markets, Battaglia and Gallo, (2015) find 
that the risk governance proxy of the size of risk committee is positively related to the returns 
on assets and the returns on equity.  
 
Furthermore, the three essays that compose this thesis are the first to include Islamic banks in 
their empirical and comparative investigations on the subject of risk governance. While studies 
on corporate governance in Islamic banks exist, the exploration of the status of risk governance 
within their overall governance architectures has not been performed yet. The inclusion of 
Islamic banks in a comparative study with conventional counterparts operating in the same 
region is motivated by (i) the need to probe whether the boundaries that are set out by Shari’ah 
to monitor the risk-taking behaviour, through the presence of a Shari’ah Supervisory Board, 
either in partnership investments or in consumer financing result in stronger and healthier risk 
management practices and whether these promote higher financial performance and enhanced 
stability. Note that the compliance with Shari’ah and hence the presence of a Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board is the main feature that distinguishes Islamic from conventional banking 
business models and that it is therefore what produces differences in the assets and liabilities 
structure and risk management of their balance sheets. As they follow Islamic moral principles, 
Islamic banks are also expected to widen the scope of their responsibility to encompass the 
observance of the interests of stakeholders and not only ones of the shareholders. These moral 
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principles are reflected in the Islamic corporate governance through the principles that govern 
business ethics, the motivations for transparency and disclosures from a religious perspective 
as well the guidance on the process of elaboration of decision-making and the importance of 
accountability in Islam (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). The role of the SSB is also expected to 
substantiate the corporate governance frameworks in Islamic banks by these Islamic corporate 
governance norms. Nonetheless, results from the empirical work led in this thesis do not valid 
these assumptions. Despite the importance of risk or the concept of gharar in Islamic financial 
and commercial transactions for which the Shari’ah scholars that sit in the SSB are expected to 
set the boundaries between the permissible and prohibited to allow Islamic banks to serve their 
communities and likewise generate profitability, it appears that their strategic organizational 
structures -which include the SSB- do not foster robust risk management mechanisms that can 
enable the achievement of these targets. In addition, the inclusion of Islamic banks in this thesis 
is also motivated by (ii) the need to explore whether the choice and establishment of sound risk 
management governance structures contributed to their higher stability as the study of Hasan 
and Dridi (2010) was first to demonstrate in the troubled times that followed the GFC. The 
results from Chapters 2 and 4 show that first risk governance structures in Islamic banks are 
weaker than the conventional counterparts that operate in the same jurisdictions and second that 
there is no association between their risk governance frameworks and the financial stability 
measures of insolvency likelihood, capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity profile. It is 
important to note as well that the GCC region counts the highest number of Islamic financial 
institutions that experienced the largest asset growth in the decade between 2006 and 2016 (The 
Banker, 2016) and is one of the 14 jurisdictions where Islamic banks are considered as 
systemically important financial institutions. This further explains the rationale behind 
choosing the GCC as the geographical region for this empirical research.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, the contributions of this thesis dwell in the exploration of the 
bank governance mechanisms that enable them to operate under the unique challenges of their 
position as financial intermediaries. Maturity transformation, liquidity risks and balance sheets 
opacity together pose a concern for the banks’ shareholders, depositors, debtholders and 
taxpayers at large (Becht et al., 2011). These concerns portray the implications on corporate 
governance and considering the post-crisis conjuncture the implications are essentially on the 
governance of risk management within the overall corporate governance frameworks and at the 
highest organizational levels. By using advanced econometric methods through the application 
of the two-step system generalized method of moments, the linkages between the governance 
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of risk and financial performance on the one hand and the governance of risk and bank-level 
financial stability have been explored with various robustness tests. On the side of practice, the 
contributions of this research add to the previous empirical literature that has shown evidence 
for the positive effects that sound corporate and risk governance mechanisms can have on 
enhancing the performance of banking corporations and contribute to their individual level 
financial stability. These mechanisms pertain mainly to adequate size of the banks’ board of 
directors, higher degrees of its independence, higher degrees of independence of the audit and 
risk committees, frequent committee meetings, direct reporting lines of the CRO to the board 
and of the internal audit to the audit committee, enhanced awareness about the stature of the 
CRO and of the internal audit function among a few others.  
5.3 Reflections on the Policy Implications of the Research 
The findings of this research bear important policy implications for the international and 
national regulatory authorities and also for the banking institutions. For the international 
standard setting organizations such as Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Islamic 
Financial Services Board, the Financial Stability Board and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, this research provides with results from empirical investigations 
on the application of their recommendations and guidelines to establish and maintain risk 
management governance structures that are expected to better contain the excessive risk-taking 
for the sake of higher profitability. This research provides evidence that the inclusion of more 
independent directors in the board and its audit and risk committees, maintaining a sufficient 
number of board and committee meetings to report and discuss internal risk management issues, 
the separation of roles between the CEO and the chairman, empowering the CRO through a 
direct reporting line to the board and separating their role from the CFO’s in addition to other 
attributes for the internal audit function prove to bring about more financial stability in the 
financial institutions and also enable more profitability. Furthermore, this research also 
provides these international bodies with a composite indicator that they can use to evaluate the 
strength of the risk governance frameworks in all jurisdictions and issue specific 
recommendations to under-performing banks in order to take proactive actions and avoid 
weaknesses that can lead to severe consequences. These policy implications concern the 
national regulatory authorities for the banking sector and the capital markets.  
For banking institutions, the analyses of results from the regressions shed light on the scepticism 
that some bank managers and shareholders might have with respect to complying with the 
above-mentioned governance rules and that do not seem at first sight to be shareholder-friendly. 
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In conventional banks, the results showed a positive association between strengthened risk 
governance frameworks and higher return on average equity and higher return on average 
assets. Therefore, putting in place sound risk governance mechanisms signifies elaborating a 
better risk identification strategy and performing a better evaluation of risks underlying the 
trading and banking book activities without necessarily increasing the banks’ exposure to 
default, insolvency or liquidity penuries that engender severely negative consequences in the 
long run.  
In Islamic banks however, there are different policy implications as the econometric estimations 
showed different results in both the financial performance and financial stability studies. Firstly, 
Islamic banks need to increase efforts to improve their risk management functions and 
governance mechanisms as their risk governance structures showed lower scores compared to 
their conventional counterparts. This recommendation is similar to that of Khan and Ahmed 
(2001) in their comprehensive analysis of the risk management issues and challenges that are 
specific to Islamic banks. The same recommendation has been reiterated by Hasan and Dridi 
(2010) almost two years after the GFC. Managing risks in Islamic banks is known to be 
cumbersome and complex as they face in addition to ‘common risks’ similarly incurred by their 
conventional counterparts a few more ‘specific risks’ that are due to their unique business model 
and the idiosyncrasies of their assets and liabilities structure (Khan and Ahmed, 2001). Risk 
management in Islamic banking institutions is also more challenging as they are faced with two 
additional boundaries from Islamic law that avert them from using conventional hedging 
products and completely transferring risks to third parties.  
Despite these multiple difficulties, Islamic banks cannot ignore the importance of improving 
their risk management systems to the exigencies of a post-crisis era. In fact, as the results from 
the second and third essays show, risk management structures in Islamic banks fail to enable 
them to achieve higher profitability from their distinctive business model and do not seem to 
directly contribute to their stability which is normally expected. As mentioned above (and in 
larger details in chapter three), the inability of sound risk management to yield higher 
profitability could be an indication that the peculiarities of some Islamic financial contracts that 
are by nature riskier for the banks, such as Mudaraba and Musharaka partnership contracts, are 
side-lined probably due to a higher risk aversion from the strategic decision-makers such as 
shareholders or senior bank managers. These profit and loss sharing partnerships are sadly 
benched to the detriment of potentially higher profitability and the fulfilment of the genuine 
moral principles underpinning Islamic banking (Asutay, 2010). 
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One brief and last implication for Islamic banks concerns the quality of their disclosures. 
Throughout the data collection process that involved thorough reading of the annual reports and 
financial statements, it was noticed that conventional banks produce reports that are richer with 
more detailed information about, inter alia, their strategic management, compliance with 
national and international regulations and a section dedicated to risk management policies, and 
internal methodologies. As part of the compliance with Pillar 3 of the Basel accords which 
compliments Pillars I and II (BCBS, 2009), Islamic banks need to improve the quality of their 
disclosures on risk exposures and risk assessment processes. Furthermore, as part of the 
compliance with the spirit of Shari’ah that underpins its business model, Islamic banks need to 
be more transparent about how they carry their financial intermediation business and how they 
protect the interests of direct and indirect stakeholders. The ethics of being transparent and 
accountable include but are not limited to how they manage their relationship with their 
depositors (investment account holders), how they set their risk tolerance levels, how they 
manage all types of risks and the safety plans they elaborate to withstand external shocks.  
5.4 Limitations of the Study and Scope for Future Research Development  
The contributions of this research and its significance introduced in chapter one come along 
with some limitations that leave some leeway to future developments. One important limitation 
to the empirical studies is the nonexistence of a database that provides corporate and risk 
governance data for the GCC market. Unlike the U.S or Europe for which governance data is 
available on RiskMetrics, CompuStat, SEC Edgar, DataStream and Bloomberg among other 
databases, the principal hindrance to performing empirical work in the GCC market using 
advanced econometric methods dwells essentially on the data unavailability. Furthermore, even 
when primary sources exist (such as accessibility to all required annual reports and financial 
statements) then the length of the historical data is unlikely to be long enough as the required 
information will need to be manually collected. The fastidious data collection used in this 
research consisted of a thorough reading and detailed information extraction from 325 annual 
reports and financial statements. This process of constructing a database tailored to the needs 
of this research lasted eight months. As a way of comparison with the invested effort in previous 
studies on the same topic, Aebi et al. (2012) consider a time scope limited to the crisis years of 
2007 and 2008. Using the SEC Edgar’s database, they hand-collect five corporate governance 
variables for the years 2006 and 2007 only and five risk governance variables for 86 banks for 
which the G-index of Gompers et al. (2003) is available (Aebi et al., 2012, pp. 3216–3217). 
Nonetheless, on the number of risk committee meetings they gather data for year 2006 only. As 
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their study covers North American banks, they also use corporate governance data from other 
available databases. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) acknowledge the arduous effort in hand-
collecting data, they therefore use risk management governance variables from 72 U.S largest 
banks out of the 5000 BHCs that existed by the end of 2007 between years 1995 and 2009 as 
only publicly-listed BHCs file the 10-K annual statements with the SEC (Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013, pp. 1764–1765). In Hines and Peter (2015), the focus variable that is the existence or the 
formation of the ‘risk management committee’ is binary. The authors collected the remaining 
data for their analysis from 47 financial institutions between years 1994 and 2008. Finally, 
Battaglia and Gallo (2015) limit the time frame of their study to the years 2007 to 2011 for all 
the publicly listed Chinese and Indian banks, that is 15 and 21 banking institutions respectively. 
The authors manually collect corporate governance data however for year 2007 only which 
means that a total of 36 reports were required.  
 
If the hindrance of the unavailability of a dedicated database to corporate and risk governance 
data is overcome, not only more bank-year observations can be included but a wider 
geographical area can also be covered. In the context of this research, Southeast Asian countries 
where dual banking systems coexist could have been added to increase the sample size and 
provide a larger cross-country analysis. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia or Brunei 
Darussalam have legislation infrastructures that are more proactive in supporting and 
developing the Islamic finance industry since the 1980s (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Wardhany 
and Arshad, 2012). In contrast with the GCC countries, Malaysia has for instance a centralised 
Shari’ah governance model where the Shari’ah supervision operates at a macro level within 
the Central Bank or the regulatory bodies and with the objective of harmonizing the 
standardization of legal opinions (fatwas) (Hamza, 2013). Therefore, if the difficulty of manual 
data collection under strict deadlines was not an issue, a further contribution could have been 
the examination of the impact of different regulative environment and public policy on the 
performance and financial stability of Islamic banks in different jurisdictions.  
It is worth noting that extending the time frame to very recent dates, 2016 data for instance, is 
likely to bring new insights on the developments made so far in enhancing the corporate and 
risk governance frameworks in banks inside and outside the GCC region as banks should have 
gained more awareness on the necessity of complying with the guidelines set out by the national 
and international regulators. It should be acknowledged that while most GCC banks mandated 
their Central Banks to comply with the Basel I and II requirements (and the representatives of 
the majority of these Central Banks confirmed the compliance of their banks with the Basel II 
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requirements on corporate governance (Hawkamah and IIF, 2006)), there are some realities of 
the GCC economies that impeded a faster development and embeddedness of corporate 
governance in the common practice. For instance, the ample liquidity due to the high oil prices 
in the region had an adverse influence on the development of corporate governance practices 
within listed companies as required from international investors. Furthermore, the easy access 
to capital relieved the need for public offerings in the equity market where valuation of the 
companies presupposes transparency, greater disclosure and increased regulation (Hawkamah 
and IIF, 2006). Also, the high reliance on bank-financing in the GCC economies combined with 
the abundant liquidity conjuncture ensued aggressive competition between banks in these 
markets whereby they alleviated stringent lending conditions to increase their market shares. It 
should be noted also that there is also a culture in the GCC whereby banks allocate loans to 
state-owned companies or to several important companies because they are owned by 
prominent families with political ties (Hawkamah and IIF, 2006). Such conduct impeded 
therefore the emergence and development of the culture of sound corporate governance 
practices in the financial markets. It is then acknowledged that these cultural aspects present a 
limitation to the study in the sense that their corporate governance culture is not entrenched to 
a sufficiently mature level where its impact and contributions to financial performance and 
financial stability can be explored. Nonetheless, one of the most important and impactful 
objectives of academic research is to perform investigations and explorations accompanied by 
robust statistical analyses to document, orientate, inform and raise the awareness of policy-
makers and regulators on topics of high importance to the stability of their financial system and 
to the development of the economies they govern.  
 
A second limitation of this research dwells in the unbalanced structure of the dataset. For certain 
years, the data category for either RGI or some other bank level control variables were randomly 
missing. For the variable RGI, these missing observations were at some occasions due to the 
unavailability of the entire annual report or financial statement or sometimes because the bank 
was established after 2006 such as Emirates NBD Bank, AJMAN Bank and Al Hilal Bank in 
the United Arab Emirates, Al INMA Bank and Al Jazira Bank in Saudi Arabia, WARBA Bank 
in Kuwait and BARWA Bank in Qatar. For some other secondary data, there were also random 
missing values in the data source BankScope Van Dijk. While the statistical software used, 
namely STATA, has procedures to handle the missing values in longitudinal panels, from an 
econometrics perspective it is preferable to make estimations from balanced panels to avoid 
any loss of efficiency. Therefore, if all banks in the GCC countries make their annual reports 
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available to the public and share complete historical datasets of their financial and accounting 
ratios with data providers such as BankScope, DataStream, Zawya or Bloomberg, this limitation 
can be overcome.  
Another limitation of this research which can further improve the RGI is to consider more risk 
governance attributes. For the purpose of this thesis, the choice of the items that compose the 
index was drawn from previous academic and financial regulatory literature. The selection of 
items was therefore driven by how the literature evaluates and explains the key importance of 
each determinant. As all of these items required manual extraction to constitute the database, 
the number of items had to remain fairly manageable and the items very likely to be found in 
the annual statements of banks. For instance, the expertise in the financial services measured 
through the educational degrees and/or the number of years gained through practical experience 
is a valuable determinant that can be included in the composition of RGI. Although it features 
in the financial regulators guidelines (BCBS, 2015a; FSB, 2013a), this information is very hard 
to get in the reports of banks from the GCC countries. For instance, while reading the banks’ 
financial documents to collect corporate and risk governance data, the educational background 
and exact number of years gained in financial professional experience was seldom mentioned 
for board members and, never stated for the chief risk officer and / or the head of internal audit. 
Therefore, including such items would not have been meaningful as most of the observations 
will be missing and there will be very little, if any, variation throughout the study’s time 
interval. The composition of RGI can also be further enriched by the inclusion of information 
related to the senior managers’ compensation schemes especially when it indicates their 
alignment with ones of the shareholders. Examples of possible data include but are not limited 
to the range or changes in the base salary, the existence or absence of short-term remuneration, 
and overcompensation. This can provide indications on the risk-taking behaviour of the banks 
when their shareholders permit remuneration policies for senior management that converge 
towards their private interests. This type of data is also not available for banks in the selected 
GCC countries between the years of the study that is 2006 to 2012 neither on their annual 
reports nor in a dedicated database.  
 
Also, for Islamic banks more particularly, the risk governance indicator can be enhanced by the 
inclusion of determinants that are specific to the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), the Internal 
Shari’ah Compliance Units (ISCU) and the Internal Shari’ah Review Units (ISRU) all of which 
ensure that the Islamic banks’ operations, financial instruments and risk management 
instruments do not contain forbidden elements of riba, excessive gharar, and that they are 
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compliant with Islamic law. For the SSB for instance, attributes such as their size, the number 
of Islamic banks’ boards where they sit to measure their credibility (such as the higher this 
number the higher their credibility as it indicates that these scholars are sought after), the 
number of years of experience they have, their level of education, their presence in the risk and 
audit committees can be included among others. For both the ISRU and the ISCU, it will be 
interesting to look at their reporting line, their level of independence from other business units, 
the stature of their chairs and the presence of their chairs in risk and audit committees at the 
board level.  
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Appendices	
 
Table A2.1: Islamic financial contracts Definitions 
 
Islamic Financial Contract Definition 
Qard Al-Hassan 
A benevolent loan of funds (or fungible commodities) 
without any real interest (or excess in quality or quantity). It 
is the only risk-free asset in Islam (Ebrahim, 1999). 
Murabaha 
Instrument used for financing consumer durables, real estate 
and in the industry for purchasing raw materials, machinery 
or equipment through cost-plus (Ebrahim, 1999; Siddiqui, 
2008) 
Mudaraba 
Mode of financing where the Rab Al-Mal (the capital 
provider) and the Mudarib (provider of labor) both share 
profits and in the case of loss, the Rab Al-Mal bears the 
financial losses alone (Usmani, 2012) 
Musharaka 
Mode of financing where the partners (two or more) to a 
joint-venture share the profits according to a specific ratio 
and suffer the losses to the extent of each partner’s 
contribution (Usmani, 2012) 
Salam Sale of commodity whose delivery will be in a future date for cash price paid in advance (Siddiqui, 2008).  
Istisnâa 
Similar to a Salam contract, Istisnâa is used for 
manufactured goods. Instalment payments are set according 
to the actual progress made in producing the goods (Vogel 
and Hayes, 1998). 
Ijara 
Leasing contract used for sale of vehicles, equipment or 
property for conducting business (Ebrahim, 1999; Siddiqui, 
2008) 
Ju’alah 
A contract of commission between the “Ja’il” who offers 
work or task and the “Ju’el” or “Amil” as the worker who 
will achieve a predetermined task (Hassan et al., 2013)  
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Table A2.2: List of Banks included in the Sample 
GCC Country Islamic Banks 
 
Conventional Banks 
 
Country Code 
Saudi Arabia 
1. Al Rajhi Bank 
2. Alinma Bank 
3. Bank Aljazira 
4. Bank Albilad 
5. National 
Commercial 
Bank 
6. Banque Saudi 
Fransi JSC 
7. Saudi British 
Bank 
8. Arab National 
Bank 
SA 
Kuwait 
9. Kuwait Finance 
House 
10. Warba Bank  
11. Kuwait 
International 
Bank 
12. Boubyan Bank 
13. Ahli United 
bank (Islamic 
since 2010) 
14. National Bank of 
Kuwait SAK 
15. Burgan Bank 
16. Gulf Bank SAK 
17. Commercial 
Bank of Kuwait 
SAK 
18. Al Ahli Bank of 
Kuwait 
KW 
Bahrain 
19. Al Salam Bank 
Bahrain 
20. Bahrain Islamic 
Bank 
21. Al Baraka 
Islamic Bank 
22. Khaleeji 
Commercial 
Bank 
23. Kuwait Finance 
House Bahrain 
24. Ithmaar bank 
25. Ahli United Bank 
26. Arab Banking 
Corporation 
27. Gulf International 
Bank 
28. BBK BSC 
29. Awal Bank 
30. National Bank of 
Bahrain 
 
BH 
Qatar 
31. Qatar Islamic 
Bank 
32. Qatar 
International 
Islamic Bank 
33. Masraf Al Rayan 
34. Barwa Bank 
35. Qatar National 
Bank 
36. Commercial 
Bank of Qatar 
37. Doha Bank 
38. Al Khalij 
Commercial 
Bank 
QA 
UAE 
39. Dubai Islamic 
Bank 
40. Abu Dhabi 
Islamic Bank 
41. Emirates Islamic 
Bank 
42. Sharjah Islamic 
Bank 
43. Noor Islamic 
Bank 
46. National Bank of 
Abu Dhabi 
47. Emirates NBD 
PJSC 
48. First Gulf bank 
49. Abu Dhabi 
Commercial 
Bank 
50. MashreqbankPSC 
AE 
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44. Al Hilal Bank 
45. Ajman Bank  
 
51. Union National 
Bank 
52. Commercial 
Bank of Dubai 
53. National Bank of 
Ras Al-Khaimah 
 
TOTAL 26 IB 27 CB  
 
Table A4.1: Two-sample t-test with equal variance of CAR between periods pre- and 
post-GFC 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Before GFC 64 19.483 0.921 7.373 17.641   21.325 
After GFC 232 21.516 1.183 18.029 19.184  23.849 
combined 296 21.077 0.949 16.335 19.208  22.945 
t-statistic -0.881     
Pr(|T| > |t|) 0.378     
 
Table A4.2: Two-sample t-test with equal variance CAR between Conventional & 
Islamic Banks 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interv] 
Conv Banks 178 18.0173 0.3285854 4.383877 17.36885 18.66575 
Islamic Banks 118 25.69322 2.26992 24.65765 21.19776 30.18868 
combined 296 21.0773 0.9494707 16.33531 19.2087 22.94589 
t-statistic -4.06      
Pr(|T| > |t|) 0.000      
 
Table A4.3: Two-sample t-test with equal variance of LLR_GL between Islamic and 
Conventional Banks 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interv.] 
Conv Banks 185 3.616 0.194 2.644 3.232 3.999 
Islamic Banks 125 3.330 0.226 2.534 2.881 3.778 
combined 310 3.500 0.147 2.600 3.210 3.791 
t-statistic  0.949      
Pr(|T| > |t|) 0.343      
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